RFC 8954: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
- M. Sahni, Ed.
This RFC is now obsolete
Abstract
This document specifies the updated format of the Nonce extension in the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) request and response
messages. OCSP is used to check the status of a certificate, and
the Nonce extension is used to cryptographical
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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1. Introduction
This document updates the usage and format of the Nonce extension
in OCSP request and response messages. This extension was
previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960]. [RFC6960]
does not mention any minimum or maximum length of the nonce in the Nonce
extension.
Lacking limits on the length of the nonce in the Nonce extension, OCSP
responders that follow [RFC6960] may be
vulnerable to various attacks, like Denial
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
2. OCSP Extensions
The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in [RFC6960]. [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see [RFC5280]). This document only specifies the new format for the Nonce extension and does not change the specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in [RFC6960].¶
2.1. Nonce Extension
This section replaces the entirety of Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960], which describes the OCSP Nonce extension.¶
The nonce cryptographical
A server MUST reject any OCSP request that has a nonce
in the Nonce extension with a length of either 0 octets or more than 32 octets
with the malformed
The value of the nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographical
3. Security Considerations
The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid. Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that the response is the latest response from the server and not an old copy.¶
3.1. Replay Attack
The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request and respond with an earlier response from the server without the Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields in the OCSP response.¶
3.2. Nonce Collision
If the value of the nonce used by a client in the OCSP request is
predictable, then an attacker may prefetch responses with the
predicted nonce and can replay them, thus defeating the purpose of
using the nonce. Therefore, the value of the Nonce extension in the OCSP
request MUST contain cryptographical
4. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.¶
5. Changes to Appendix B of RFC 6960
This section updates the ASN.1 definitions of the OCSP Nonce extension in Appendices B.1 and B.2 of [RFC6960]. Appendix B.1 defines OCSP using ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax; Appendix B.2 defines OCSP using ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax.¶
5.1. Changes to Appendix B.1 OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
OLD Syntax:¶
The definition of OCSP Nonce extension is not provided in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960] for the ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax.¶
NEW Syntax:¶
6. References
6.1. Normative References
- [RFC2119]
-
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC2119 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc2119 - [RFC5280]
-
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5280 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5280 - [RFC6960]
-
Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC6960 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc6960 - [RFC8174]
-
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC8174 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc8174
6.2. Informative References
- [RFC4086]
-
Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC4086 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc4086 - [RFC4732]
-
Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet Denial
-of , RFC 4732, DOI 10-Service Considerations" .17487 , , <https:///RFC4732 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc4732 - [RFC5019]
-
Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10
.17487 , , <https:///RFC5019 www >..rfc -editor .org /info /rfc5019