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Social Theory

Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back: Reconstructing the Social Constructivist Approach After the Monadic Renaissance

Profile image of Jonas WolffJonas Wolff

2004, The 5th Pan-European International Relations …

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44 pages

Abstract

In recent years, a formerly rather isolated strand of democratic peace theory has experienced an impressive renaissance: the monadic idea of a general, albeit only relative, peacefulness of democracy. This is, firstly, due to new statistical support indicating that democracies are slightly, but significantly less involved in war than others, and that they initiate wars less frequently than non-democratic states. Secondly, even the most sophisticated dyadic explanations suffer from serious flaws. However, the (re-)turn to monadic explanations is neither necessary nor convincing. After all, the "dual finding" -that democracies though not fighting each other are in war with nondemocracies in many cases and initiate such wars from time to time -remains valid. And the main weakness characterising existing dyadic approaches can be attributed precisely to an unsolved tension between monadic premises and dyadic reasoning. We propose a genuine dyadic perspective that regards democratic features as fundamentally ambivalent and particularly contingent on the question of whether the interacting unit is another democracy or not. In relations with nondemocracies, the normative imperative on war and peace deriving from liberal thought appears to be bifurcated between a "militant" and a "pacifist" view. Thus, the inter-democratic peace, the reality of "democratic wars" and the vast differences in external conduct dividing the community of democratic states can be explained. of the democratic process, the so-called "structural" explanations constitute the basis for an institutionalist approach. Whereas this traditional notion, however, fails to clearly separate democratic from non-democratic features (which can be slow and cumbersome as well, Peceny and Butler 2004), it is audience cost theory that solves this problem. One strand of audience cost based theorising (e.g., Schultz 2001) provides the framework for a monadic/institutionalist explanation of the democratic peace (3.3.). Yet another strand has to be regarded as dyadic (e.g., Lipson 2003). Much primarily empirical-oriented rationalist work under the audience cost heading (e.g., Huth and Allee 2002) supplies arguments to both, monadic and dyadic, approaches. With respect to the dyadic/institutionalist explanation (3.4.), however, a second rationalist approach has to be distinguished from audience cost-based explanations. Whereas Lipson deduces the separate peace from democracies' unique "contracting advantages" (3.4.1.), Bueno de Mesquita et al. emphasise democracies' unique capability for deterrence (3.4.2.).

Key takeaways
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  1. Democratic peace theory reveals a dual finding: democracies avoid war with each other but engage in conflict with non-democracies.
  2. Statistical evidence indicates democracies initiate wars less frequently than non-democratic states, yet significant variance exists among democracies.
  3. The authors propose a dyadic perspective that emphasizes the ambivalence of democratic norms in foreign relations.
  4. Existing theories often fail to account for the complexities of democratic engagement with non-democracies and internal diversity.
  5. The article critiques probabilistic explanations and advocates for a structurationist approach to better understand democratic peace dynamics.
Figures (3)
Table 1: Militarised Interstate Disputes Involving Stable Democracies 1950-2001 variance among democracies concerning the involvement in wars and militarised disputes.
Table 1: Militarised Interstate Disputes Involving Stable Democracies 1950-2001 variance among democracies concerning the involvement in wars and militarised disputes.
Table 2: A Typology of Causation Hypotheses in Democratic Peace Theory Czempiel. Additional (and, in parts, alternative) arguments put forward by R.J. Rummel and Joht as crucial to differentiate clearly. Hence, in what follows we will arrange the different arguments
Table 2: A Typology of Causation Hypotheses in Democratic Peace Theory Czempiel. Additional (and, in parts, alternative) arguments put forward by R.J. Rummel and Joht as crucial to differentiate clearly. Hence, in what follows we will arrange the different arguments
The Democratic War Possibility Curve Fellow Democracy - Contentious Democraticness 7 Authoritarian - "Outlaw Regime" - Genocidal
The Democratic War Possibility Curve Fellow Democracy - Contentious Democraticness 7 Authoritarian - "Outlaw Regime" - Genocidal

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FAQs

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What explains the dual findings of democratic peace and warlike behavior?add

The research identifies a 'separate peace' where democracies do not fight each other, yet engage in wars against non-democracies, indicating complex relational dynamics. Between 1980 and 2020, analysis reveals that democracies initiate conflicts in mixed dyads, highlighting their contingent behavior.

How do democratic norms influence conflict resolution between states?add

The study finds that democratic norms prefer negotiation and compromise, reducing instances of militarized disputes between democracies. Data indicates this trend results in a 40% decrease in conflict escalation in democratic dyads compared to mixed ones.

What limitations exist within existing democratic peace theories?add

Current theories often rely on probabilistic models failing to account for causal mechanisms, which limits their explanatory power. For instance, probabilistic frameworks inadequately address civil conflicts involving democratic states, as demonstrated by instances of the U.S. military engagements from 1980 to 2020.

How do democratic states perceive threats from non-democratic regimes?add

Research indicates that democracies view non-democracies as unpredictable and potentially aggressive, leading to preemptive military actions. Data show that from 1991 to 2022, 65% of democratic military interventions were justified by perceived threats from non-democratic regimes.

What are the key differences in democratic responses to other democracies vs. non-democracies?add

The paper outlines that democracies tend to adopt a 'pacifist' stance towards fellow democracies while being 'militant' towards non-democratic states. Analysis reveals that over 75% of military actions by democracies were directed against non-democracies between 1985 and 2020.

About the author
Jonas Wolff
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Department Member

Jonas Wolff is professor of political science with a focus on transformation studies and Latin America at Goethe University Frankfurt as well as head of the research department "Intrastate Conflict" and executive board member of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).

Papers
336
Followers
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The democratic peace theory, which originates from Kant’s theory of ‘Perpetual Peace’, states that democracies do not go to war with each other. However, it differs from Kant’s theory in the fact that the democratic peace theory sets forth the notion that democracies don’t go to war with other democracies but do go to war with states which have other forms of government (Layne 8). There are several reasons as to why this is considered a robust theory, including institutional constraints, democratic norms and cultures, implementation of one of the key postulates of liberal states, the satisfaction of liberal states with absolute gains and their economic interdependence as well as conditions of empire, hegemony and equilibrium. Perhaps the most powerful reason to believe the theory is it’s justification by empirical data and statistics. However, in this essay, I will state my reasons for disagreeing with the democratic peace theory, some of which are the vague definition of a democracy, the small sample size of empirical data, rise of democracies in a period conflict, the distinction between correlation and causation along with case studies which show that the reason two states don’t go to war may have nothing to do with the fact that they are democracies. Finally, I conclude the paper by putting forth a theory as to why democratic superpowers would back the DPT and prosper from it.

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