Java: Insecure Loading of Class in Android App without Package Signature Checking #14752
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owen-mc
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Minor correction. I referred #5435 to when I meant to refer to #4947, in CWE-094, which also identified vulnerability in https://github.com/oversecured/ovaa. |
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This blog https://blog.oversecured.com/Android-arbitrary-code-execution-via-third-party-package-contexts/ gives an overview for the type of vulnerability this PR meant to identify. |
masterofnow
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If a vulnerable loads classes or code of any app based solely on the package name of the app without first checking the package signature of the app, this could malicious app with the same package name to be loaded through "package namespace squatting".
If the victim user install such malicious app in the same device as the vulnerable app, the vulnerable app would load
classes or code from the malicious app, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
Although both uses OVAA as a target application, this QL is different from the one in #5435 that created UnsafeReflection.ql as they target different category of vulnerability.