- ISTC- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies -National Research Council
via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185 - Roma ITALY - +39 06 44595- 259 /200
- Theoretical Psychology, Actor-Network-Theory, Social Norms, Social Theory, Theory (Sociology), Social Capitital And Adaptation, and 33 moreInstitutions (Political Science), Social Capital, Deservingness, Psychology of Hope, Metacognition, Emotion, Cognitive Science, Psychology, Consciousness, Social emotions, Motivation (Psychology), Intrapersonal Communications, Altruism, Functionalism, Knowledge Management, Organizational Theory, Institutional Theory, Trust, Power (social), Theory of Mind, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Social Science, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Agency, Social Ontology, Cooperation, Intentionality, Social and Political Philosophy, Trust Management, Moral Psychology, Beliefs, Social Simulation, and Social Cognitionedit
- http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FncBQzIAAAAJ
http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/indices/a-tree/c/Castelfranchi:Cristiano.htmledit
The purpose of the book is to propose and exploit an analytical, critical, well defined theory of a very crucial human social relation that I call "Tutelarity/ Tutelage". This will thus explain how/why such relation is so relevant at any... more
The purpose of the book is to propose and exploit an analytical, critical, well defined theory of a very crucial human social relation that I call "Tutelarity/ Tutelage". This will thus explain how/why such relation is so relevant at any layer of sociality: from affective relationships, to social cooperation and interactions, to politics and democracy. The approach is theoretical and strongly grounded on cognitive science and the models of human mind: beliefs, desires, expectations, emotions, etc. Written in an accessible way, it will be of interest for a large audience, specifically to researchers and scientists interested in cognitive science and the dynamics of social relationships alike.
The Abstracts of 8 Chapters
The Abstracts of 8 Chapters
... more
Research Interests:
The mind is an anticipatory device. Its main purpose is to ‘produce future’, telling us not only how the world might or will be, but also how it should be, or better how we would like it to be. Expectancies shape our lives: they impact on... more
The mind is an anticipatory device. Its main purpose is to ‘produce future’, telling us not only how the world might or will be, but also how it should be, or better how we would like it to be. Expectancies shape our lives: they impact on our actual outcomes, often acting as self-fulfilling prophecies. They also constitute a reference point for establishing whether an outcome is a loss or a gain; that is, we evaluate our own outcomes not in absolute terms, but against our expectancies. And we feel ill-treated and betrayed when our expectancies are disappointed.
This book addresses anticipation-based emotions, that is, the emotions associated with the dialectical interaction between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not (yet)’, be it a mere wished-for possibility or an expectation proper. It offers an anatomy of both the emotions implying anticipations of future events – such as fear, anxiety, hope, and trust – and those elicited by the disconfirmation of a previous anticipation – surprise, disappointment, discouragement, sense of injustice, regret, and relief – in terms of their belief and goal components. It also addresses anticipated emotions, that is, emotions we foresee we might experience in future circumstances, and explores how they influence our decisions.
The reader will be taken on a journey of exploration and discovery into the multifarious facets and implications of an important family of emotions, aimed at understanding what they have in common, as well as the distinguishing features of each distinct emotion, and predicting their motivational and behavioral consequences.
This book addresses anticipation-based emotions, that is, the emotions associated with the dialectical interaction between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not (yet)’, be it a mere wished-for possibility or an expectation proper. It offers an anatomy of both the emotions implying anticipations of future events – such as fear, anxiety, hope, and trust – and those elicited by the disconfirmation of a previous anticipation – surprise, disappointment, discouragement, sense of injustice, regret, and relief – in terms of their belief and goal components. It also addresses anticipated emotions, that is, emotions we foresee we might experience in future circumstances, and explores how they influence our decisions.
The reader will be taken on a journey of exploration and discovery into the multifarious facets and implications of an important family of emotions, aimed at understanding what they have in common, as well as the distinguishing features of each distinct emotion, and predicting their motivational and behavioral consequences.
Research Interests:
We present the index of the book & the draft of one crucial Chapter of the book in its non final and correct version For the correct and complete version see our book "Trust Theory. A socio-cognitive and computational model"... more
We present the index of the book
& the draft of one crucial Chapter of the book in its non final and correct version
For the correct and complete version see our book
"Trust Theory. A socio-cognitive and computational model"
Wiley, 2010
& the draft of one crucial Chapter of the book in its non final and correct version
For the correct and complete version see our book
"Trust Theory. A socio-cognitive and computational model"
Wiley, 2010
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
We explain the Dual nature of Goal Value (rational & affective) and the problem of how our mind combines these two dimensions in one hybrid value. We criticize "Dual Processing" theories, and we stress the importance of meta-strategies... more
We explain the Dual nature of Goal Value (rational & affective) and the problem of how our mind combines these two dimensions in one hybrid value. We criticize "Dual Processing" theories, and we stress the importance of meta-strategies for managing such duality, and the need for a precise cognitive architecture of goal-processing and affect impact.
Research Interests:
In Human Robot cooperation scenarios, building a robot that can be defined a good collaborator, means endowing it with the capability to evaluate not only the physical environment, but especially the mental states and the features of its... more
In Human Robot cooperation scenarios, building a robot that can be defined a good collaborator, means endowing it with the capability to evaluate not only the physical environment, but especially the mental states and the features of its human interlocutor, in order to adapt its behavior every time she/he requires the robot’s help. The quality of this kind of evaluation, underlies the robot’s capability to operate a meta-evaluation of its own predictive skills to build a model of the interlocutor and of her/his goals. The robot’s capability to self-trust his skills to interpret the interlocutor and the context, is a fundamental requirement for producing smart and effective decisions towards humans. In this work we propose a simulated experiment, designed with the goal to test a cognitive architecture for trustworthy human robot collaboration. The experiment has been designed in order to demonstrate how the robot’s capability to learn its own level of self-trust on its predictive abi...
Research Interests:
Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems (COIN 2011) ... M. Birna van Riemsdijk, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands Javier Vazquez Salceda, Technical University of Catalonia, Spain ... Huib Aldewereld, Utrecht University, The... more
Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems (COIN 2011) ... M. Birna van Riemsdijk, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands Javier Vazquez Salceda, Technical University of Catalonia, Spain ... Huib Aldewereld, Utrecht University, The Netherlands Sergio Alvarez-Napagao, Technical University of Catalonia, Spain Alexander Artikis, National Centre for Scientific Research “Demokritos,” Greece Guido Boella, University of Torino, Italy Cristiano Castelfranchi, ISTC/CNR, Italy Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa, UCPEL, Brazil Stephen Cranefield, ...
Research Interests:
More and more often, Human Robot Interaction(HRI) applications require the design of robotics systems whose decision process implies the capability to evaluate not only the physical environment, but especially the mental states and the... more
More and more often, Human Robot Interaction(HRI) applications require the design of robotics systems whose decision process implies the capability to evaluate not only the physical environment, but especially the mental states and the features of its human interlocutor, in order to adapt their social autonomy every time humans require the robot’s help. Robots will be really cooperative and effective when they will expose the capability to consider not only the goals or interests explicitly required by humans, but also those one that are not declared and to provide help that go beyond the literal task execution. In order to improve the quality of this kind of smart help, a robot has to operate a meta-evaluation of its own predictive skills to build a model of the interlocutor and of her/his goals. The robot’s capability to self-trust its skills to interpret the interlocutor and the context, is a fundamental requirement for producing smart and effective decisions towards humans. In t...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In this article we consider the special abilities needed by agents for assessing trust based on inference and reasoning. We analyze the case in which it is possible to infer trust towards unknown counterparts by reasoning on abstract... more
In this article we consider the special abilities needed by agents for assessing trust based on inference and reasoning. We analyze the case in which it is possible to infer trust towards unknown counterparts by reasoning on abstract classes or categories of agents shaped in a concrete application domain. We present a scenario of interacting agents providing a computational model implementing different strategies to assess trust. Assuming a medical domain, categories, including both competencies and dispositions of possible trustees, are exploited to infer trust towards possibly unknown counterparts. The proposed approach for the cognitive assessment of trust relies on agents' abilities to analyze heterogeneous information sources along different dimensions. Trust is inferred based on specific observable properties (manifesta), namely explicitly readable signals indicating internal features (krypta) regulating agents' behavior and effectiveness on specific tasks. Simulative ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Before elaborating on our topic we wish to define our sense of the word “shame” as opposed to “embarrassment”. A common element in shame and embarrassment is that they are unpleasant social emotions. They may be called social in that they... more
Before elaborating on our topic we wish to define our sense of the word “shame” as opposed to “embarrassment”. A common element in shame and embarrassment is that they are unpleasant social emotions. They may be called social in that they have the function of cognitive mediators of the individual's social behaviour (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, & Poggi, 1989): Through the unpleasant feelings they inflict they lead one to avoid or remediate possible misfunctioning in one's relationships with other people.
Research Interests:
In this paper we will examine two main aspects of trust dynamics: a) How direct experiences involving trust, with their successes or failures, influence the future trust of an agent about similar facts. We challenge the trivial idea that... more
In this paper we will examine two main aspects of trust dynamics: a) How direct experiences involving trust, with their successes or failures, influence the future trust of an agent about similar facts. We challenge the trivial idea that always success increases trust while failure decreases it. Of course, this primitive view cannot be avoided till Trust is modeled just
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Mechanical Engineering, Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Modeling, Autonomous Cognitive Agents, and 13 moreAutonomous Agentes, Multiagent Systems, Adoption, Conflict Resolution, Distributed System, Delegation, Cooperation, Multi Agent System, Problem Solving, Multi Agent Systems, Agent BAsed System, Point of View, and Electrical And Electronic Engineering
Research Interests:
Abstract. This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to change his own mind,... more
Abstract. This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies employed to change the mind of other agents. Belief change and argumentation are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic coin. Argumentation theories are therefore incomplete, if they cannot be grounded in belief ...
Research Interests:
This paper discusses a taxonomy of uses of argument that is based on the arguer's goals on the audience's mind. Our claim in a nutshell is that what we argue for greatly influences how we decide to argue in order to get there.... more
This paper discusses a taxonomy of uses of argument that is based on the arguer's goals on the audience's mind. Our claim in a nutshell is that what we argue for greatly influences how we decide to argue in order to get there. We start emphasizing an ambiguity in current models of argument, concerning the difference between arguing for proper belief and arguing for mere acceptance. Then we import into argumentation theories a technical distinction between belief and acceptance originally introduced in epistemology and ...
This paper provides a game-theoretical description of social and motivational influence over belief dynamics of two arguing agents that hold contrasting views. The formal analysis shows how social influence depends on both (1) the... more
This paper provides a game-theoretical description of social and motivational influence over belief dynamics of two arguing agents that hold contrasting views. The formal analysis shows how social influence depends on both (1) the agent's own motives and (2) her beliefs ...
A series of studies on the systematic connections between argomentative practices and cognitive processes is presented here, reporting on work done over the last two years. At first we focus on the interactions between belief dynamics and... more
A series of studies on the systematic connections between argomentative practices and cognitive processes is presented here, reporting on work done over the last two years. At first we focus on the interactions between belief dynamics and argumentation, and on the consequences that such interactions should have (but so far failed to have) on the formalization of these phenomena. Then we discuss the distinction between belief and pragmatic acceptance, and the possibility of differentiating between” persuading 'and” ...
The relationship between trust and control is quite relevant both for the very notion of trust and for modelling and implementing trust-eontrol relations witlt autonomous systems. We claim that control is antagonistic of the strict form... more
The relationship between trust and control is quite relevant both for the very notion of trust and for modelling and implementing trust-eontrol relations witlt autonomous systems. We claim that control is antagonistic of the strict form of trust:" trust in y": but also that it completes and eomplements i for arriving to a global trust. In other words, putting control and guaranties is trust-building: it produces a sufficient trust, when trust in y's autonomous willingness and competence would not be enough. We also argue that control requires ...
Research Interests:
Abstract. To establish coordination at a cognitive level, we need to come through to some of the strict assumptions of the traditional deliberative agents. We also need to cope with some of the real world boundaries, where, for instance,... more
Abstract. To establish coordination at a cognitive level, we need to come through to some of the strict assumptions of the traditional deliberative agents. We also need to cope with some of the real world boundaries, where, for instance, knowledge and perception are affected by uncertainty and message exchange as most direct form of subjective coordination may not be reliable everywhere. Intentional, subjective aspects of coordination may concern prediction mechanisms (ie future state representations, mind reading), but also true ...
Research Interests:
This paper addresses the way in which trust can be considered as relational capital for agents that are trusted in a social network. The study is an elaboration of a previous work where the issue was presented. The basic idea is that... more
This paper addresses the way in which trust can be considered as relational capital for agents that are trusted in a social network. The study is an elaboration of a previous work where the issue was presented. The basic idea is that trust can be viewed ...
To enhance effectiveness in real world applications, autonomous agents have to develop cognitive competencies and anticipatory capabilities. Here we point out their strong liaison with the functional roles of affective mental states as... more
To enhance effectiveness in real world applications, autonomous agents have to develop cognitive competencies and anticipatory capabilities. Here we point out their strong liaison with the functional roles of affective mental states as those of humanlike metaphor: not only the root elements for both surprise and anticipation are expectations, but also part of the effects of the former elicit efforts on the latter. By analyzing different kinds of expectations, we provide a general architecture enhancing practical reasoning with mental states, ...
Research Interests:
Intelligent agents are one of the most important developments in computer science of the past decade. Agents are of interest in many important application areas, ranging from human-computer interaction to industrial process control. The... more
Intelligent agents are one of the most important developments in computer science of the past decade. Agents are of interest in many important application areas, ranging from human-computer interaction to industrial process control. The ATAL workshop series aims to bring together researchers interested in the core/micro aspects of agent technology. Specifically, ATAL addresses issues such as theories of agency, software architectures for intelligent agents, methodologies and programming languages for realizing agents, and ...
Abstract. What does it mean for a system to be goal oriented? In this paper we investigate how goals are represented and how goals activate actions. We review the main philosophical and psychological assumptions about the ideomotor... more
Abstract. What does it mean for a system to be goal oriented? In this paper we investigate how goals are represented and how goals activate actions. We review the main philosophical and psychological assumptions about the ideomotor principle and we compare it with the TOTE model in cybernetics. We also present three computational architectures which implement in different way goal orientedness, discussing their main peculiarities and limitations. Keywords: idemotor, TOTE, goal, representation, anticipation
Research Interests:
Ce travail d��crit les notions fondamentales d'un m��canisme de raisonnement social, con��u de fa��ona ��tre int��gr�� dans un modele interne d'agent, dans un contexte multi-agents. Ce m��canisme permet qu'un agent puisse... more
Ce travail d��crit les notions fondamentales d'un m��canisme de raisonnement social, con��u de fa��ona ��tre int��gr�� dans un modele interne d'agent, dans un contexte multi-agents. Ce m��canisme permet qu'un agent puisse raisonner sur les autres en utilisant des informations telles que leurs buts, plans, actions et ressources. Chaque agent garde ces informations dans une structure de donn��es appel��e description externe. Nous avons formellement defini les notions de description externe, relation de d��pendance, et r��seau ...
This work is intended to constrain the "cooperativistic" view typical of most Multi-Agent approaches. A more restricted notion of cooperation is proposed, which would free various forms of social... more
This work is intended to constrain the "cooperativistic" view typical of most Multi-Agent approaches. A more restricted notion of cooperation is proposed, which would free various forms of social interaction from a cooperativistic mark. Cooperation is here put in relation with, but kept distinct from, the broader phenomenon of goal-adoption. Various kinds and levels of cooperation are presented: accidental, unilaterally intended, and mutual cooperation. A formal notion of common goal, crucial in cooperation, is proposed. Both the distinction between goal adoption and cooperation, and the role attributed to the agents' dependence on each other, are the relevant aspects of the present approach.
Research Interests:
Abstract. This paper describes the fundamental concepts of a social reasoning mechanism, designed to be part of an agent's internal model, in a multi-agent systems (MAS) context. It enables an agent to reason about the others using... more
Abstract. This paper describes the fundamental concepts of a social reasoning mechanism, designed to be part of an agent's internal model, in a multi-agent systems (MAS) context. It enables an agent to reason about the others using information about their goals, actions, resources and plans. Every agent stores this information in a data structure called external description. We have formally defined and implemented the concepts of external description, dependence relation, and dependence network. One of the main contributions of this work ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Abstract. In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed... more
Abstract. In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed by the agents in a dynamic environment, that can help or worse their activity. The agent rely upon different strategies in order to choose whom to delegate. We implemented three classes of trustiers: a random trustier (who randomly chooses the trustee whom delegate the task to); a statistical trustier (who builds ...
The aim of this paper is to show that conventions are sources of tacit agreements. Such agreements are tacit in the sense that they are implicated by what the agents do (or forbear to do) though without that any communication between them... more
The aim of this paper is to show that conventions are sources of tacit agreements. Such agreements are tacit in the sense that they are implicated by what the agents do (or forbear to do) though without that any communication between them be necessary. Conventions are sources of tacit agreements under two substantial assumptions: (1) that there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of every-one's silence as confirmatory of the others' expectations, and (2) that the agents share a value of not hostility. To characterize the normativity of agreements the Principle of Reliability is introduced.
Research Interests:
The goal of this paper is to show the normative component of a convention adopted by a population of cognitive agents. To address this aim we will defend two distinct thesis. The former is that even simple predictions developed to... more
The goal of this paper is to show the normative component of a convention adopted by a population of cognitive agents. To address this aim we will defend two distinct thesis. The former is that even simple predictions developed to anticipate future state of affairs have an intrinsic tendency to evolve in full expectations and then in prescriptions. We consider this as a multilevel phenomenon occurring either at the individual psychological level or at the interpersonal one or, finally, at the collective macro social level. The latter thesis is that we consider this tendency as one of the possible paths of the spontaneous emergence of agents' commitments, of conventions and likely of real social norms: the tacit emergence of a prescriptive character and, then, of obligations and duties. We will examine the constitutive elements-both cognitive and relational-of this process of spontaneous transition from the predictive attitudes to the prescriptive ones and, on this basis, to real...
In this chapter we introduce a vision of agent-oriented AmI systems that is extended to integrate ideas inspired by Mirror Worlds as introduced by Gelernter at the beginning of the 80ies. In this view, AmI systems are actually a digital... more
In this chapter we introduce a vision of agent-oriented AmI systems that is extended to integrate ideas inspired by Mirror Worlds as introduced by Gelernter at the beginning of the 80ies. In this view, AmI systems are actually a digital world mirroring but also augmenting the physical world with capabilities, services and functionalities. We then discuss the value of stigmergy as background reference conceptual framework to define and understand interactions occurring between the physical environments and its digital agent-based extension. The digital world augments the physical world so that traces left by humans acting in the physical world are represented in the digital one in order to be perceived by software agents living there and, viceversa, actions taken by software agents in the mirror can have an effect on the connected physical counterpart.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Trust can be viewed as an instrument both for an agent selecting the right partners in order to achieve its own goals (the point of view of the trustier), and for an agent of being selected from other potential partners (the point of view... more
Trust can be viewed as an instrument both for an agent selecting the right partners in order to achieve its own goals (the point of view of the trustier), and for an agent of being selected from other potential partners (the point of view of the trustee) in order to establish with them a cooperation/collaboration and to take advantage from the accumulated trust. In our previous works we focused our main attention on the first point of view. In this paper we will analyze trust as the agents' relational capital. Starting from the classical dependence network (in ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Engineering, Personality, Agents, Speech acts, Cooperation, and 5 moreDeception, Help, Lie, Cognitive Agents, and Agent platform
Research Interests:
In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed by the... more
In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed by the agents in a dynamic environment, that can help or worse their activity. The agent rely upon different strategies in order to choose whom to delegate. We implemented three classes of trustiers: a random trustier (who randomly chooses the trustee whom delegate the task to); a statistical trustier (who builds the trustworthiness of other agents only on the basis of their previous performances); a cognitive trustier (who builds a sophisticated and cognitively motivated trust model of the trustee, taking into account its specific features, its ability and motivational disposition, and the impact of the environment on its performance). Our experiments show the advantage of using cognitive representations.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Direct interaction and explicit communication are not always the best approaches for achieving coherent systemic behaviour in the context of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). This is evident when taking into account recent approaches dealing... more
Direct interaction and explicit communication are not always the best approaches for achieving coherent systemic behaviour in the context of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). This is evident when taking into account recent approaches dealing with environment-based coordination such as stigmergy and, more generally, mediated interaction. In this paper we propose a conceptual, formal and engineering framework based on the notion of
Research Interests:
In this paper, a model of norms as cognitive objects is applied to establish connections between social conventions and prescriptions. Relevant literature on this issue, especially found in AI and the social sciences, will be shown to... more
In this paper, a model of norms as cognitive objects is applied to establish connections between social conventions and prescriptions. Relevant literature on this issue, especially found in AI and the social sciences, will be shown to suffer from a dychotomic view: a conventionalistic view proposed by rationality and AI scientists; and a prescriptive view proposed by some philosophers of law (Kelsen 1934/1979, Hart 1961, Ross, 1958).
Research Interests:
Computer (Agents)-based simulation is for the social sciences a ‘Trojan horse’: they believe to just have a nice platform for running their previous ideas, for having some experimental confirmation and additional data. They do not realize... more
Computer (Agents)-based simulation is for the social sciences a ‘Trojan horse’: they believe to just have a nice platform for running their previous ideas, for having some experimental confirmation and additional data. They do not realize what they will get: new conceptual tools! especially for modeling the micro and macro processes; new models and theories; new hidden phenomena discovered.
Five issues:
The Simulation revolution & the wrong SocialSciences - SocialSimulation interaction
Why “simulation”: a new scientific method
Kinds & Layers of “Sociality”
Cognitive “mediators”- (“stupid” Agents??)
The “invisible hand” and “alienation”
Five issues:
The Simulation revolution & the wrong SocialSciences - SocialSimulation interaction
Why “simulation”: a new scientific method
Kinds & Layers of “Sociality”
Cognitive “mediators”- (“stupid” Agents??)
The “invisible hand” and “alienation”
Research Interests:
The main aim of this contribution is an important theoretical clarification: - when robot’s behavior and our behavior will be a “message” not just a “cue”, a “sign”. Since this form of COMMUNICATION will be crucial for an efficient... more
The main aim of this contribution is an important theoretical clarification:
- when robot’s behavior and our behavior will be a “message” not just a “cue”, a “sign”.
Since this form of COMMUNICATION will be crucial for an efficient H-R social interaction.
Another crucial distinction is between
- deceiving by LYING vs
- deceiving by PRETENDING, SIMULATING
‘BEHAVIORAL COMUNICATION’ will be used in HRI also for deceiving by pretending
- when robot’s behavior and our behavior will be a “message” not just a “cue”, a “sign”.
Since this form of COMMUNICATION will be crucial for an efficient H-R social interaction.
Another crucial distinction is between
- deceiving by LYING vs
- deceiving by PRETENDING, SIMULATING
‘BEHAVIORAL COMUNICATION’ will be used in HRI also for deceiving by pretending
Research Interests:
A Goal which is not a Goal A Belief which is not a Belief An Intention which is not an Intention A Decision which is not a Decision A Conflict which is not a Conflict A Conditioning which is not a Conditioning……. Defense of a... more
A Goal which is not a Goal
A Belief which is not a Belief
An Intention which is not an Intention
A Decision which is not a Decision
A Conflict which is not a Conflict
A Conditioning which is not a Conditioning…….
Defense of a ‘goal-oriented’,
teleonomic view of neurotic behavior,
but
Attack to its supposed ‘intentional’ nature
Mechanisms for vicious circles
but
via ‘Cognitive Conditioning’
A Belief which is not a Belief
An Intention which is not an Intention
A Decision which is not a Decision
A Conflict which is not a Conflict
A Conditioning which is not a Conditioning…….
Defense of a ‘goal-oriented’,
teleonomic view of neurotic behavior,
but
Attack to its supposed ‘intentional’ nature
Mechanisms for vicious circles
but
via ‘Cognitive Conditioning’
Research Interests:
Vi sono due origini e basi diverse del valore degli scopi (VS)
VS ha una natura duplice e anche ibrida:
VS Ragionato & VS Sentito ed Evocato
e la loro COMBINAZIONE
VS ha una natura duplice e anche ibrida:
VS Ragionato & VS Sentito ed Evocato
e la loro COMBINAZIONE
Research Interests:
In Cogn Psich we know everything about ‘knowledge’: its acquisition, elaboration, use,.. Step by step! We know nothing about the vicissitudes of goals in our mental activity: Goal-processing step by step and its relation with... more
In Cogn Psich we know everything about ‘knowledge’: its acquisition, elaboration, use,.. Step by step!
We know nothing about the vicissitudes of goals in our mental activity:
Goal-processing step by step and its relation with knowledge processing.
But…. Mind is based on 2 kinds of representational functions! And their relations.
What is ‘knowledge’ for??
We know nothing about the vicissitudes of goals in our mental activity:
Goal-processing step by step and its relation with knowledge processing.
But…. Mind is based on 2 kinds of representational functions! And their relations.
What is ‘knowledge’ for??
Research Interests:
CRITICA del CONCETTO MEDICO di “MALATTIA” (in
campo comportamentale)
- Il PROCESSO di AMMALAMENTO come PROCESSO
di PERDITA di POTERI
E la “GUARIGIONE” (RECOVERY) come
PROCESSO di RIACQUISIZIONE di POTERI
campo comportamentale)
- Il PROCESSO di AMMALAMENTO come PROCESSO
di PERDITA di POTERI
E la “GUARIGIONE” (RECOVERY) come
PROCESSO di RIACQUISIZIONE di POTERI
Research Interests:
The thesis of this position paper is that the use of expressions like "What Do You Mean With .......?" is actually quite rare, and that in general we do not explicitly negotiate about the meaning of our words or about the linguistic rules... more
The thesis of this position paper is that the use of expressions like "What Do You Mean With .......?" is actually quite rare, and that in general we do not explicitly negotiate about the meaning of our words or about the linguistic rules we follow and, about the shared meaning of objects, events, and acts. Nevertheless, a real negotiation occurs and new conventions and rules are created, established, and preserved thanks to such a negotiation. This negotiation is implicit and based on what is common called "tacit agreement or consent". This form of negotiation presupposes and exploits a special form of communication which is rather atypical since it is not based on sending-receiving specialized "messages". This is "behavioural implicit communication". Behavioural implicit communication (BIC) is not "non verbal" or "body" communication although it is not verbal and is based on actions. In this paper we present the general theory (definition and preliminary formalization) of BIC, in relation with the semiotic notion of "signification" and in opposition to Bateson and Watzlawich claim that any behaviour is communication. We clarify when and why some behaviour becomes "communication" without specializing in message as happens in non-verbal communication or in other forms of communication such as the linguistic one. All these kinds of communications are based on conventional, specialized acts/messages. We explain how this happens according to Bateson's meta-communication and Gricean view of linguistic communication i.e. the intention to communicate is explicitly shared. BIC theory entails a sophisticated theory of intentions, and a "theory of mind" of the partner. On the basis of this theory we examine how tacit agreements are possible, and how they work. We also claim that all spontaneous social conventions form and establish themselves thanks to BIC communication and tacit negotiation. We will produce a sketch of this process. Eventually we will apply this view to the emerging of linguistic conventions as tacit and partially unconscious (functional not intentional) social constructs.
Research Interests:
Challenges and Problems of Social AI
For a Science-oriented AI & not servant of the business
‘PRESENCES’ in our MIXED REALITY and SOCIETY
MIXED REALITY, MIXED BODY & MIND
DISAGREEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
For a Science-oriented AI & not servant of the business
‘PRESENCES’ in our MIXED REALITY and SOCIETY
MIXED REALITY, MIXED BODY & MIND
DISAGREEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
Research Interests:
Big Data will transform large part of behavioral sciences, but.. not so revolutionary as for “Science”; A great impact on capturing the dynamics of complex phenomena and for policy making, but.. not so autonomous from AI, Agents,... more
Big Data will transform large part of behavioral sciences, but.. not so revolutionary as for “Science”;
A great impact on capturing the dynamics of complex phenomena and for policy making, but.. not so autonomous from AI, Agents, Modeling, Social Simulation, ..
A great impact on capturing the dynamics of complex phenomena and for policy making, but.. not so autonomous from AI, Agents, Modeling, Social Simulation, ..
Research Interests:
For a Systematic Theory of Expectations
Research Interests:
Cognitive Anatomy of Shame and Guilt Differences, Functions, Defensive Moves. People's appraisal of the meaning of a state of affairs for their well-being is assumed to be a condition for their experiencing an emotion. each emotion... more
Cognitive Anatomy of Shame and Guilt Differences, Functions, Defensive Moves.
People's appraisal of the meaning of a state of affairs for their well-being is assumed to be a condition for their experiencing an emotion.
each emotion involves a particular kind of appraisal, as well as a specific set of action tendencies and physiological changes.
Cognitive models of emotion should then try to identify the specific cognitive processes implied by different emotions, by analyzing the structure of beliefs and goals typical of each of them.
Our analysis addresses such cognitive components both directly and, so to say, indirectly, through the cognitive devices or strategies people can employ to elicit or to cope with that feeling.
People's appraisal of the meaning of a state of affairs for their well-being is assumed to be a condition for their experiencing an emotion.
each emotion involves a particular kind of appraisal, as well as a specific set of action tendencies and physiological changes.
Cognitive models of emotion should then try to identify the specific cognitive processes implied by different emotions, by analyzing the structure of beliefs and goals typical of each of them.
Our analysis addresses such cognitive components both directly and, so to say, indirectly, through the cognitive devices or strategies people can employ to elicit or to cope with that feeling.
Research Interests:
We are not just building a new technology but a new Socio-Cognitive-Technical System, a new form of society, an anthropological revolution. We are social engineers. Are we aware of? I will focus on some problems and dangers of the... more
We are not just building a new technology but a new Socio-Cognitive-Technical System, a new form of society, an anthropological revolution. We are social engineers. Are we aware of? I will focus on some problems and dangers of the Digital and WEB Revolution and of the “mixed” (virtual and physical) reality and “hybrid” society (natural and artificial intelligences) we will live in. Like: Is our Intelligent Technology research ONLY BUSINESS ORIENTED just because it needs money??? Or: ‘PRESENCES’ in our MIXED REALITY and SOCIETY. Or: The need for DIS-AGREEMENT TECHNOLOGIES.
> Invited talk at WI'17 and MATES conferences;
> Preliminary version: talk at MATES'16
> Invited talk at WI'17 and MATES conferences;
> Preliminary version: talk at MATES'16
Research Interests:
CLAIMS Reacting to stimuli, perceiving our bodily reaction to events, feeling something, is not enough for human complex affects. Especially complex human emotions are based on specific mental states: typical configurations of beliefs,... more
CLAIMS
Reacting to stimuli, perceiving our bodily reaction to events, feeling something, is not enough for human complex affects.
Especially complex human emotions are based on specific mental states: typical configurations of beliefs, goals, motives, expectations,…
I will analyze the typical mental configurations needed for:
a) rather simple ‘anticipation-based’ emotions (‘hope’, ‘fear’, ‘disappointment’, ‘relief’, ‘exultance’);
b) complex social emotions like ‘shame’, ‘envy’, ‘guilt’, ‘pity’: their ingredients and their coherent structure.
2. Although atomically decomposable those complex mental states have their own unitary nature, their emergent, specific, non-reducible properties and functions.
I will for example analyze the ‘gestalt’ nature of Expectations although atomically decomposed in ‘beliefs’ + ‘goals’
3. Our body does not respond just to ‘external’ stimuli (events) based on some pattern matching; it reacts to our ‘interpretation’ of the stimulus, to the ‘meaning’ of the event; that is to a mental representation.
It also reacts to merely endogenous representations, to mental events (like a counterfactual imagination).
It is always a ‘thought’ which makes us blush.
We feel our bodily response, and we ascribe it to that event or idea; this combination gives an emotional nature to both sides
4. To really model affective architectures we have to model the ‘body’,
that is, its signals about internal states and reactions, and the two way link with cognition:
Interpreting, eliciting and interpreting bodily reactions.
5. That emotional interaction (Ag-Ag; H-Ag; H-robot; etc.) cannot be based only on the recognition of the expressive or physiological signals.
Appropriate emotional interactions are based on the recognition of the mental stuff of the other agent: of her beliefs, suppositions, motives, expectations, …
We react to this, not just to an expressive ‘face’, posture, or intonation.
Reacting to stimuli, perceiving our bodily reaction to events, feeling something, is not enough for human complex affects.
Especially complex human emotions are based on specific mental states: typical configurations of beliefs, goals, motives, expectations,…
I will analyze the typical mental configurations needed for:
a) rather simple ‘anticipation-based’ emotions (‘hope’, ‘fear’, ‘disappointment’, ‘relief’, ‘exultance’);
b) complex social emotions like ‘shame’, ‘envy’, ‘guilt’, ‘pity’: their ingredients and their coherent structure.
2. Although atomically decomposable those complex mental states have their own unitary nature, their emergent, specific, non-reducible properties and functions.
I will for example analyze the ‘gestalt’ nature of Expectations although atomically decomposed in ‘beliefs’ + ‘goals’
3. Our body does not respond just to ‘external’ stimuli (events) based on some pattern matching; it reacts to our ‘interpretation’ of the stimulus, to the ‘meaning’ of the event; that is to a mental representation.
It also reacts to merely endogenous representations, to mental events (like a counterfactual imagination).
It is always a ‘thought’ which makes us blush.
We feel our bodily response, and we ascribe it to that event or idea; this combination gives an emotional nature to both sides
4. To really model affective architectures we have to model the ‘body’,
that is, its signals about internal states and reactions, and the two way link with cognition:
Interpreting, eliciting and interpreting bodily reactions.
5. That emotional interaction (Ag-Ag; H-Ag; H-robot; etc.) cannot be based only on the recognition of the expressive or physiological signals.
Appropriate emotional interactions are based on the recognition of the mental stuff of the other agent: of her beliefs, suppositions, motives, expectations, …
We react to this, not just to an expressive ‘face’, posture, or intonation.
Research Interests:
Per una teoria del sentire e delle valutazioni affettivo-intuitive
Research Interests:
"Mind reading" is for Manipulating and Being Influenced. From Inter-action to Intra-action: Given this ability to “read” the others’ mind (or better to read their behavior in terms of their mind), and to use this representation to induce... more
"Mind reading" is for Manipulating and Being Influenced.
From Inter-action to Intra-action: Given this ability to “read” the others’ mind (or better to read their behavior in terms of their mind), and to use this representation to induce certain behavior (goals, intentions) in the others, it evolves an "exaptation" of this socio-cognitive ability; the ‘introjection’ of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition-and-action on our selves. I assume that there is self-mind-ascription and self-influencing. And even mind "reading" from the observation of my own behavior: self-signaling. How can we succeed in influencing our selves? Will and its "strength".
From Inter-action to Intra-action: Given this ability to “read” the others’ mind (or better to read their behavior in terms of their mind), and to use this representation to induce certain behavior (goals, intentions) in the others, it evolves an "exaptation" of this socio-cognitive ability; the ‘introjection’ of this mechanism, a reflexive application of this form of social cognition-and-action on our selves. I assume that there is self-mind-ascription and self-influencing. And even mind "reading" from the observation of my own behavior: self-signaling. How can we succeed in influencing our selves? Will and its "strength".
Research Interests:
“Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems” What we are unavoidably building with computer networks, AI, and Ag technologies are Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems: Socio-Technical System in fact means that any new technology... more
“Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems”
What we are unavoidably building with computer networks, AI, and Ag technologies are Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems:
Socio-Technical System in fact means that any new technology implies/requires/introduces not only new skills and competences, but
- new expectations, goals, beliefs;
- new "scripts", with their roles, norms;
- new form of interaction and conventions among the social actors.
So we have to specify the "cognitive" and interactive side of the new system.
We are Social Engineers; are we aware of that?
BUT…. more than that:
>> The technology itself is “intelligent” and “interactive” and “proactive”: intelligent tools, intelligent environments;
… not just “tools” but
an HYBRID SOCIETY of physical and virtual, human and artificial social actors,
with their roles, powers, competences, goals.
What we are unavoidably building with computer networks, AI, and Ag technologies are Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems:
Socio-Technical System in fact means that any new technology implies/requires/introduces not only new skills and competences, but
- new expectations, goals, beliefs;
- new "scripts", with their roles, norms;
- new form of interaction and conventions among the social actors.
So we have to specify the "cognitive" and interactive side of the new system.
We are Social Engineers; are we aware of that?
BUT…. more than that:
>> The technology itself is “intelligent” and “interactive” and “proactive”: intelligent tools, intelligent environments;
… not just “tools” but
an HYBRID SOCIETY of physical and virtual, human and artificial social actors,
with their roles, powers, competences, goals.
Research Interests:
Slides Istanbul talk ESSEM
Research Interests:
What is a “conflict”? What's the relationship between the actors' mental representations (beliefs, goals, ..) and the conflicts between them? Which is the relation between "contradictions" and "conflicts", and the need for mental... more
What is a “conflict”? What's the relationship between the actors' mental representations (beliefs, goals, ..) and the conflicts between them? Which is the relation between "contradictions" and "conflicts", and the need for mental "coherence"?
How to build a systematic ontology of conflicts taking into account the Objective and the Subjective ones, the Internal or Individuals and the External or Social? Are there objective conflicts the agents are not aware of? How do they work?
And which is the relation (if any) between individual/subjective conflicts (among my goals) and social conflicts? Do External Conflicts require Internalized/Mentalized Conflicts?
How do solve personal or social conflicts?
A) Grounding the Theory and Ontology of Conflict in Cognition.
Good notions and foundation.
B) Conflict and cooperation, the two intertwining faces of sociality :
also for changing the others, not just for adjusting my behavior or exploiting or blocking the other’s behavior :
For mind manipulation, influencing
MindReading is for Coop or for Conflict BOTH;
Language/conversation is for Coop or for Conflict BOTH;
Argumentation is Conflict or Coop? BOTH
C) The ideologies of Conflict:
Conflict (interpersonal, personal, social, ...) as a bad thing and situation!
- The usefulness of Conflicts!
For example, competition the best mechanism for resources allocation following Hayek, liberalism: no reasoning and planning
How to build a systematic ontology of conflicts taking into account the Objective and the Subjective ones, the Internal or Individuals and the External or Social? Are there objective conflicts the agents are not aware of? How do they work?
And which is the relation (if any) between individual/subjective conflicts (among my goals) and social conflicts? Do External Conflicts require Internalized/Mentalized Conflicts?
How do solve personal or social conflicts?
A) Grounding the Theory and Ontology of Conflict in Cognition.
Good notions and foundation.
B) Conflict and cooperation, the two intertwining faces of sociality :
also for changing the others, not just for adjusting my behavior or exploiting or blocking the other’s behavior :
For mind manipulation, influencing
MindReading is for Coop or for Conflict BOTH;
Language/conversation is for Coop or for Conflict BOTH;
Argumentation is Conflict or Coop? BOTH
C) The ideologies of Conflict:
Conflict (interpersonal, personal, social, ...) as a bad thing and situation!
- The usefulness of Conflicts!
For example, competition the best mechanism for resources allocation following Hayek, liberalism: no reasoning and planning
Research Interests:
Since the usual dominant note is about the power of collective intelligence; how to build or let emerge a collective mind and action; how it is based on shared and mutual mental states (belief, goals, commitments, intention, ..) and on... more
Since the usual dominant note is about the power of collective intelligence; how to build or let emerge a collective mind and action; how it is based on shared and mutual mental states (belief, goals, commitments, intention, ..) and on awareness, and cooperation, ...
I will try to give a look to a different perspective, to say something a bit discordant.
In fact both history, political experience, social psychology show that the real problem is stupidity and in particular collectively enhanced stupidity.
But stupidity (“irrationality” and blindness) is not only there; as a matter of fact. In my claim it is a necessity, the presupposition not only for human happiness or hope, but for certain layers of societal/collective life and objects.
We are rather stupid (especially collectively)
“No one understands the human heart at all, .. who does not
understand how vast is its capacity for illusions, even when these
are contrary to its interests, or how often it loves the very thing that
obviously harmful to it.”
Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone, 1817/32
Why “we” need to be stupid.
there are several structural and functional reasons at the collective level why “we” have to be (individually and collectively) blind.
I will give a few but very crucial examples of that, providing the analysis of the mental counterpart of those socio-political objects.
I will try to give a look to a different perspective, to say something a bit discordant.
In fact both history, political experience, social psychology show that the real problem is stupidity and in particular collectively enhanced stupidity.
But stupidity (“irrationality” and blindness) is not only there; as a matter of fact. In my claim it is a necessity, the presupposition not only for human happiness or hope, but for certain layers of societal/collective life and objects.
We are rather stupid (especially collectively)
“No one understands the human heart at all, .. who does not
understand how vast is its capacity for illusions, even when these
are contrary to its interests, or how often it loves the very thing that
obviously harmful to it.”
Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone, 1817/32
Why “we” need to be stupid.
there are several structural and functional reasons at the collective level why “we” have to be (individually and collectively) blind.
I will give a few but very crucial examples of that, providing the analysis of the mental counterpart of those socio-political objects.
Premessa: perchè l’ “orgoglio” ? > Lo “stigma”, la svalutazione, l’emarginarsi, non sono solo fatto “esterno”, pressione sociale; sono valori e sentire interiorizzati non a livello della “ragione” solo, ma a livello emotivo. > La... more
Premessa: perchè l’ “orgoglio” ?
> Lo “stigma”, la svalutazione, l’emarginarsi, non sono solo fatto “esterno”, pressione sociale; sono valori e sentire interiorizzati non a livello della “ragione” solo, ma a livello emotivo.
> La lotta non solo “politica” e culturale allo “stigma”, alla negatività, alla paura, alla segregazione/emarginazione, ma la lotta interiore, psicologica, comportamentale e di vita. Il cambiamento dei vissuti e delle condotte.
> Spiegare come la affermazione gruppale della propria differenza ed identità, la sua accettazione con emergenza di aspetti buoni, positivi; la formulazione e manifestazione di un orgoglio (che chiameremo “identitario”) sia una operazione molto importante, se non indispensabile sulla via della Recovery, e più in generale di tutti i percorsi emancipatori di gruppi sociali oggetto di valutazioni negative, inferiorità, esclusione, discriminazione sociale.
> Ma come sia centrale anche un altro tipo di orgoglio: “Ce la faccio!”.
> Lo “stigma”, la svalutazione, l’emarginarsi, non sono solo fatto “esterno”, pressione sociale; sono valori e sentire interiorizzati non a livello della “ragione” solo, ma a livello emotivo.
> La lotta non solo “politica” e culturale allo “stigma”, alla negatività, alla paura, alla segregazione/emarginazione, ma la lotta interiore, psicologica, comportamentale e di vita. Il cambiamento dei vissuti e delle condotte.
> Spiegare come la affermazione gruppale della propria differenza ed identità, la sua accettazione con emergenza di aspetti buoni, positivi; la formulazione e manifestazione di un orgoglio (che chiameremo “identitario”) sia una operazione molto importante, se non indispensabile sulla via della Recovery, e più in generale di tutti i percorsi emancipatori di gruppi sociali oggetto di valutazioni negative, inferiorità, esclusione, discriminazione sociale.
> Ma come sia centrale anche un altro tipo di orgoglio: “Ce la faccio!”.
Research Interests:
Socio-Technical (and mental) System cannot be just planned and designed. It is dynamically emerging and self-organizing: it is a spontaneous Social Order (von Hayek); a dynamic equilibrium not necessarily "good" for the goals of the... more
Socio-Technical (and mental) System cannot be just planned and designed.
It is dynamically emerging and self-organizing: it is a spontaneous Social Order (von Hayek); a dynamic equilibrium not necessarily "good" for the goals of the actors.
What we need is not just a top-down organization and control.
in order
to support and mediate human interaction and organization and
to emulate them in efficient open MAS systems,
we have to (partially) "understand" and to reproduce features of human social mind (like commitments, norms, mind reading, power, trust, "institutional" effects, ...) and of social macro-phenomena.
In particular we have to model "immergence" and "cognitive emergence"; the mental "mediators" of societal phenomena and the partial understanding and awareness in the actors.
Can we engineering and manage our society (in part) preserving
self-organization and
individuality and (semi-)autonomy of people?
Are we aware that we are in fact building, engineering a new SOCIETY?
A society where we shape H-H, C-C (Ag-Ag), H-C & C-H interactions and organizations,
with their mental and behavioral counterparts.
It is dynamically emerging and self-organizing: it is a spontaneous Social Order (von Hayek); a dynamic equilibrium not necessarily "good" for the goals of the actors.
What we need is not just a top-down organization and control.
in order
to support and mediate human interaction and organization and
to emulate them in efficient open MAS systems,
we have to (partially) "understand" and to reproduce features of human social mind (like commitments, norms, mind reading, power, trust, "institutional" effects, ...) and of social macro-phenomena.
In particular we have to model "immergence" and "cognitive emergence"; the mental "mediators" of societal phenomena and the partial understanding and awareness in the actors.
Can we engineering and manage our society (in part) preserving
self-organization and
individuality and (semi-)autonomy of people?
Are we aware that we are in fact building, engineering a new SOCIETY?
A society where we shape H-H, C-C (Ag-Ag), H-C & C-H interactions and organizations,
with their mental and behavioral counterparts.
We discuss the cognitive and pragmatic foundations of powers; the different (internal and external) kinds of power. We analyze how the power of an agent creates social "power over" the other agents and the power of influencing and... more
We discuss the cognitive and pragmatic foundations of powers; the different (internal and external) kinds of power. We analyze how the power of an agent creates social "power over" the other agents and the power of influencing and controlling them; how an agent acquires new powers, and a given power becomes a different power; how a power is transferred from one agent to another one and accumulated; how co-powers require coordination and a social power feedbacks on the personal one. Different form of power of influencing, like spontaneous subjection and leadership based on 'values'. How power is no longer a 'means' and becomes a motive and end. What is power ‘alienation’ and a power 'capital', and why the spontaneous emergent trend necessarily is towards inequality. We also stress the relationships between knowledge and communication and personal social power.
Research Interests:
THe "internalization" of Norms; related emotions (Guilt, blame, shame, ..); altruistic social control for social order
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
What “Autonomy” Is Dependence & Power relations Autonomy and Agent’s (Cognitive) Architecture ________________ The basic social moves: Reliance/Goal-Delegation Goal-Adoption (Help) Levels of... more
What “Autonomy” Is
Dependence & Power relations
Autonomy and Agent’s (Cognitive) Architecture
________________
The basic social moves:
Reliance/Goal-Delegation
Goal-Adoption (Help)
Levels of cooperation
Norms Adoption and cooperative Violations
________________
Trust
A Cognitive Approach
Why probability is not enough
Theory of Mind
________________
Affective Interaction beyond face recognition
Mind Reading
Appropriate interaction
________________
Behavioral Communication and Social Control
Dependence & Power relations
Autonomy and Agent’s (Cognitive) Architecture
________________
The basic social moves:
Reliance/Goal-Delegation
Goal-Adoption (Help)
Levels of cooperation
Norms Adoption and cooperative Violations
________________
Trust
A Cognitive Approach
Why probability is not enough
Theory of Mind
________________
Affective Interaction beyond face recognition
Mind Reading
Appropriate interaction
________________
Behavioral Communication and Social Control
Both ‘EMPOWERMENT’ and ‘RECOVERY’ lack a ‘THEORY’, and a real ‘MODEL’ of the process. A theory means not only the identification of the main relevant conditions and factors, but: the identification of different well defined ‘concepts’;... more
Both ‘EMPOWERMENT’ and ‘RECOVERY’ lack a ‘THEORY’, and a real ‘MODEL’ of the process.
A theory means not only the identification of the main relevant conditions and factors, but:
the identification of different well defined ‘concepts’;
the identification of different ‘mechanisms’ (relational psychological, political, ...);
modeling how they works;
modeling how they interact with each other for producing the desirable or undesirable outcomes.
A theory means not only the identification of the main relevant conditions and factors, but:
the identification of different well defined ‘concepts’;
the identification of different ‘mechanisms’ (relational psychological, political, ...);
modeling how they works;
modeling how they interact with each other for producing the desirable or undesirable outcomes.
What Goal-Adoption Is its oddity its definition Why it is central in human “cooperation” Different kinds Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental Spontaneous vs. On demand Normative Adoption Cognitive Prerequisites for... more
What Goal-Adoption Is
its oddity
its definition
Why it is central in human “cooperation”
Different kinds
Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental
Spontaneous vs. On demand
Normative Adoption
Cognitive Prerequisites for Goal-Adoption
Mind Reading
Goal-generation
The value of the others, etc.
============================
The Issue
Goal-Adoption is how an autonomous agent is not an isle but becomes social, or better pro-social; that its (s)he does something for the others;
puts her/his autonomous goal-pursuing (intentional action), her/his cognitive machinery for that, and her/his powers and resources, into the service of the others and of their interests.
How is this possible?
Not only economically or evolutionary, but cognitively, that is from the point of view of the working of an autonomous, self-regulated, goal-driven system.
What kind of mental representations and operations are needed?
How is it possible that the goal (need, desire, objective, request, order, ....) of another entity succeeds in regulating my own autonomous behavior?
How such a goal is ‘imported’ in my regulatory, purposive system?
its oddity
its definition
Why it is central in human “cooperation”
Different kinds
Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental
Spontaneous vs. On demand
Normative Adoption
Cognitive Prerequisites for Goal-Adoption
Mind Reading
Goal-generation
The value of the others, etc.
============================
The Issue
Goal-Adoption is how an autonomous agent is not an isle but becomes social, or better pro-social; that its (s)he does something for the others;
puts her/his autonomous goal-pursuing (intentional action), her/his cognitive machinery for that, and her/his powers and resources, into the service of the others and of their interests.
How is this possible?
Not only economically or evolutionary, but cognitively, that is from the point of view of the working of an autonomous, self-regulated, goal-driven system.
What kind of mental representations and operations are needed?
How is it possible that the goal (need, desire, objective, request, order, ....) of another entity succeeds in regulating my own autonomous behavior?
How such a goal is ‘imported’ in my regulatory, purposive system?
Research Interests:
How the norm should work through the minds of the agents? How is it “represented”? Which are the proximate mechanisms underlying the normative behavior? What does it mean to “conform” to a norm from a mental - not just a... more
How the norm should work through the minds of the agents? How is it “represented”?
Which are the proximate mechanisms underlying the normative behavior?
What does it mean to “conform” to a norm from a mental - not just a behavioral - point of view? What does it mean to “obey”?
What kind of mental attitude the Norm “prescribes” to, builds into, the agents?
_____________
Several COMPLEMENTARY Normative Minds and Attitudes
The appropriate mind of X; the ‘subject’/addressee of the N;
The Mind of the issuer of the Norm (“Y wants/expects that X (not) does a give action for normative reasons”);
The mind of the ‘controller’, monitoring the application;
The mind of the ‘judge’, valuating and sanctioning;
The mind of the bystander,..
A NETWORK of Minds and complementary attitudes
_____________
The very strange claims of the Norm on our mind:
1. ADOPTING for specific reasons; relying on specific higher motives.
The real difference between an ‘order’, a ‘favor’, a ‘prayer’, ….
The nature of psychological and interpersonal ‘rights’: their ‘claim’ and their ‘recognition’
2. ADOPTING without sharing the ‘instrumental’ nature of the N, and understanding /adopting its ‘function’ or end.
My ‘plan’ different from the authority’s ‘plan’
____________________
First, they count on Goal-Adhesion: that is, on the recognition by the addressee of the will of the issuer, and on an adoption due also to this: I adopt your goal also because I know that you want so.
“Obedience” in general is a sub-kind of “Adhesion”, and norm obedience is a kind of obedience.
Second, it is a non “personal”, individual request, but it is a generalized request, and should be understood as such and used as such.
Third, it should ideally be motivated by the sense and respect of the authority and values; not by external rewards.
Which are the proximate mechanisms underlying the normative behavior?
What does it mean to “conform” to a norm from a mental - not just a behavioral - point of view? What does it mean to “obey”?
What kind of mental attitude the Norm “prescribes” to, builds into, the agents?
_____________
Several COMPLEMENTARY Normative Minds and Attitudes
The appropriate mind of X; the ‘subject’/addressee of the N;
The Mind of the issuer of the Norm (“Y wants/expects that X (not) does a give action for normative reasons”);
The mind of the ‘controller’, monitoring the application;
The mind of the ‘judge’, valuating and sanctioning;
The mind of the bystander,..
A NETWORK of Minds and complementary attitudes
_____________
The very strange claims of the Norm on our mind:
1. ADOPTING for specific reasons; relying on specific higher motives.
The real difference between an ‘order’, a ‘favor’, a ‘prayer’, ….
The nature of psychological and interpersonal ‘rights’: their ‘claim’ and their ‘recognition’
2. ADOPTING without sharing the ‘instrumental’ nature of the N, and understanding /adopting its ‘function’ or end.
My ‘plan’ different from the authority’s ‘plan’
____________________
First, they count on Goal-Adhesion: that is, on the recognition by the addressee of the will of the issuer, and on an adoption due also to this: I adopt your goal also because I know that you want so.
“Obedience” in general is a sub-kind of “Adhesion”, and norm obedience is a kind of obedience.
Second, it is a non “personal”, individual request, but it is a generalized request, and should be understood as such and used as such.
Third, it should ideally be motivated by the sense and respect of the authority and values; not by external rewards.
‘Normative’ Agents??? In which sense? How? Why? For doing what? ________________ Human centered systems and how to support the user: - Machine should understand & incorporate human interaction including deontic and institutional... more
‘Normative’ Agents???
In which sense?
How?
Why? For doing what?
________________
Human centered systems and how to support the user:
- Machine should understand & incorporate
human interaction
including deontic and institutional aspects
_______________
Norms are for Autonomy:
Autonomy requires Norms;
Norms presuppose and require Autonomy
How to deal with Norms in Computer supported and mediated social interaction and organization? Some issues
How to deal with Norms in Artificial Social Intelligence
Towards Normative (Norm-Autonomous) Agents
Towards Normative-Agents mediated Human
Coordination,Organization, Institutions
___________
AGAINST REDUCTION OF NORMS TO
SANCTION/INCENTIVES AND UTILITY
AGAINST A COMPUTER SUPPORTED AND AGENT
MEDIATED SURVEILLANCE and ENFORCEMENT
Normative Agents as
Supporting Functional Flexibility (including Functional violation) and
Mediating Norms and Commitments Interpretation, (Ri)Negotiation, Evolution, Adaptation
In which sense?
How?
Why? For doing what?
________________
Human centered systems and how to support the user:
- Machine should understand & incorporate
human interaction
including deontic and institutional aspects
_______________
Norms are for Autonomy:
Autonomy requires Norms;
Norms presuppose and require Autonomy
How to deal with Norms in Computer supported and mediated social interaction and organization? Some issues
How to deal with Norms in Artificial Social Intelligence
Towards Normative (Norm-Autonomous) Agents
Towards Normative-Agents mediated Human
Coordination,Organization, Institutions
___________
AGAINST REDUCTION OF NORMS TO
SANCTION/INCENTIVES AND UTILITY
AGAINST A COMPUTER SUPPORTED AND AGENT
MEDIATED SURVEILLANCE and ENFORCEMENT
Normative Agents as
Supporting Functional Flexibility (including Functional violation) and
Mediating Norms and Commitments Interpretation, (Ri)Negotiation, Evolution, Adaptation
"How do we communicate just by our practical behavior, without specialized gestures?
Why this form of communication is so basic and fundamental for social interaction and conventions?"
Why this form of communication is so basic and fundamental for social interaction and conventions?"
Beyond the Ptolemaic view of Cognition “Autonomy” and Goals The “Agent” perspective Goal Ontology Goal Dynamics Goal Value Knowledge & Goals: the “Value” of Knowledge Knowledge & Goals: belief-based Goal processing Sociality... more
Beyond the Ptolemaic view of Cognition
“Autonomy” and Goals
The “Agent” perspective
Goal Ontology
Goal Dynamics
Goal Value
Knowledge & Goals: the “Value” of Knowledge
Knowledge & Goals: belief-based Goal processing
Sociality & Goals: Adoption, Delegation, Influence
Sociality & Goals: Social Links & Networks
“Autonomy” and Goals
The “Agent” perspective
Goal Ontology
Goal Dynamics
Goal Value
Knowledge & Goals: the “Value” of Knowledge
Knowledge & Goals: belief-based Goal processing
Sociality & Goals: Adoption, Delegation, Influence
Sociality & Goals: Social Links & Networks
Why Trust is needed and is not reducible to "security" and "perceived security" > In case, what matters is more the “perceived” Security, which requires its own policies and design; > It is not just (mainly) a matter of Security, but... more
Why Trust is needed and is not reducible to "security" and "perceived security"
> In case, what matters is more the “perceived” Security, which requires its own policies and design;
> It is not just (mainly) a matter of Security, but of “competence”, skills, quality, …, and of accessibility, dependability, positive attitude, cooperativity, …
___________
Another limit is the attemp to invest very much on "control".
Control can have serious problem for an effective collaboration, for establishing good relations, etc. It can collapse trust.
Introducing a new Technology is always the creation of a Socio-Technical System:
What matters is to understand the cognitive, motivational, and social consequences of that Tech
To design, promote the new needed “modalities” of the activity mediated by that tool, the needed “interaction design”, the accessibility, ....
The new kind of “organization” and relations among people or with the artificial system imposed or allowed by that technology
__________
Trust is a very dialectic and dynamic phenomenon, and it should acquire the same level of quality with technology.
There are 3 different (but not independent) perspectives on that:
(i) A trustworthy technology deserving and eliciting trust disposition,
which is not at all just a matter of “security”, like engineers currently believes: dependability, emotion, …..
(ii) A technology (ex. Agents) able to build “social” trust relationships with the user; confidence, social bonds, empathy, …..
(iii) A technology really able to support social trust relations in communities, social networks, …. and to create new trust dimensions among humans (institutions, …).
> In case, what matters is more the “perceived” Security, which requires its own policies and design;
> It is not just (mainly) a matter of Security, but of “competence”, skills, quality, …, and of accessibility, dependability, positive attitude, cooperativity, …
___________
Another limit is the attemp to invest very much on "control".
Control can have serious problem for an effective collaboration, for establishing good relations, etc. It can collapse trust.
Introducing a new Technology is always the creation of a Socio-Technical System:
What matters is to understand the cognitive, motivational, and social consequences of that Tech
To design, promote the new needed “modalities” of the activity mediated by that tool, the needed “interaction design”, the accessibility, ....
The new kind of “organization” and relations among people or with the artificial system imposed or allowed by that technology
__________
Trust is a very dialectic and dynamic phenomenon, and it should acquire the same level of quality with technology.
There are 3 different (but not independent) perspectives on that:
(i) A trustworthy technology deserving and eliciting trust disposition,
which is not at all just a matter of “security”, like engineers currently believes: dependability, emotion, …..
(ii) A technology (ex. Agents) able to build “social” trust relationships with the user; confidence, social bonds, empathy, …..
(iii) A technology really able to support social trust relations in communities, social networks, …. and to create new trust dimensions among humans (institutions, …).
I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize into artifacts and tools; how these tools are not only for “coordination” but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective... more
I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize into artifacts and tools; how these tools are not only for “coordination” but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective activity and objective. In particular I will suggest that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. In contrast with prevailing behavioristic views of scripts and roles, I will argue that when we play a role we wear a “mind”. Wearing such a public mind turns out to be necessary for collective action and for an important form of automatic “mind reading” (mind ascription).
Second, I will try to argue that what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed mind, not the real, private one. We have to “play” (like in symbolic play) as if we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes social interaction possible, and allows “the game we’re playing” (Garfinkel). Moreover such ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit in the sense of “inactive” (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as “potential”. The coordination and social action works thanks to these “as if” (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are social institutions.
Second, I will try to argue that what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed mind, not the real, private one. We have to “play” (like in symbolic play) as if we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes social interaction possible, and allows “the game we’re playing” (Garfinkel). Moreover such ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit in the sense of “inactive” (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as “potential”. The coordination and social action works thanks to these “as if” (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are social institutions.
Research Interests:
I present an analitical theory of the necessary "cognitive mediators" of social phenomena; the "mental representations" (specific beliefs, goals, ....) underlying Social ‘Values’, Norms, Trust, Rights, Order, Power, ... and social... more
I present an analitical theory of the necessary "cognitive mediators" of social phenomena; the "mental representations" (specific beliefs, goals, ....) underlying Social ‘Values’, Norms, Trust, Rights, Order, Power, ... and social emotions like shame.
Research Interests: Shame Theory, Trust Theory (Evolution of cooperation), Social Norms, Social Values, and Research interests include ethics & governance; financial communication; social and environmental accountin;.company perceptions, corporate image and identity and their underlying origins; and a variety of areas in finance
THE INVISIBLE (LEFT) HAND: For a (Pessimistic) Theory of Spontaneous Social Order A critical discussion to F. von Hayek's theory of "spontaneous social order" and Adam Smith' "invisible end" as providential. I present the theory of... more
THE INVISIBLE (LEFT) HAND:
For a (Pessimistic) Theory of
Spontaneous Social Order
A critical discussion to F. von Hayek's theory of "spontaneous social order" and Adam Smith' "invisible end" as providential. I present the theory of "bad-functions" of our behavior and of self-organizing orders very bad for their participants.
For a (Pessimistic) Theory of
Spontaneous Social Order
A critical discussion to F. von Hayek's theory of "spontaneous social order" and Adam Smith' "invisible end" as providential. I present the theory of "bad-functions" of our behavior and of self-organizing orders very bad for their participants.
Research Interests:
The main FUNCTIONS of MIND-READING capacity in humans, and probably the major evolutionary pressures are not only imitation, behavior explanation, ‘understanding’, - a better prediction and thus coordination very relevant... more
The main FUNCTIONS of MIND-READING capacity in humans,
and probably the major evolutionary pressures
are not only
imitation,
behavior explanation, ‘understanding’,
- a better prediction and thus coordination
very relevant are:
1.1 - ‘goal-adoption’ and ‘sharing’; the crucial mental operation for true cooperation, collaboration, ...
1.2 - beliefs adoption and sharing; the crucial operation for collective action, conventions, institutions, ...
1.3 - getting ‘power over’ the other; the crucial resource for exchange, social hierarchy, etc.
1.4 - influencing &manipulating: changing Y’s mind (beliefs, goals, intentions, preferences,..) in order to change Y’s behavior; not necessarily by using language!
1.5 - behavioral communication (signaling about mental states); exploiting behavior-reading in mind terms for communicating about intentions, beliefs, etc.
and probably the major evolutionary pressures
are not only
imitation,
behavior explanation, ‘understanding’,
- a better prediction and thus coordination
very relevant are:
1.1 - ‘goal-adoption’ and ‘sharing’; the crucial mental operation for true cooperation, collaboration, ...
1.2 - beliefs adoption and sharing; the crucial operation for collective action, conventions, institutions, ...
1.3 - getting ‘power over’ the other; the crucial resource for exchange, social hierarchy, etc.
1.4 - influencing &manipulating: changing Y’s mind (beliefs, goals, intentions, preferences,..) in order to change Y’s behavior; not necessarily by using language!
1.5 - behavioral communication (signaling about mental states); exploiting behavior-reading in mind terms for communicating about intentions, beliefs, etc.
Research Interests:
co-author Luca Tummolini __________________ Our claims (some of them quite obvious) are: We have to model a three parties relationship: the bystander, the guilty guy or violator, the possible victim. >> to take into account the... more
co-author Luca Tummolini
__________________
Our claims (some of them quite obvious) are:
We have to model a three parties relationship: the bystander, the guilty guy or violator, the possible victim.
>> to take into account the relevant attitudes, behaviors, and feelings from those three perspectives. Actually they co-operate for social order, normative control, afford their costs.
Strong reciprocity is not only based on “sanctions” and punishments; it works thanks to:
exposition/observation and surveillance;
social approval; pity, help, aid for victims;
c) internalization and self-blame (approval), self-punishment, etc.
It is fundamental to study the specific ‘ideas’ underlying a given moral emotion: subject’s beliefs and goals (Cognitive Anatomy); for example, for really understanding guilt feeling or indignation, and what really activates or blocks it. (Emotions cannot be justaposed to “cognition”)
It is fundamental an explicit theory of ‘motivations’ in moral behavior; both in respecting and in violating.
The ‘violation’ the group worries about is the true violation, the ‘mental’ one. What matters for the moral judgment is a ‘processo alle intenzioni’: what did you have in mind.
Are you an ‘alien’ non recognizing our norms? Or a troublemaker rejecting them? Or did you violate on purpose, being aware of the norm as a norm?
This is why for example is so important for the group an expressed shame or guilt feeling, a repentance: the values are sincerely shared; there are good future directed intentions.
Moral emotions strongly affect our social ‘capital’, and moral disposition/evaluation towards us are constitutive of it.
It is crucial do not mix-up goals in psychological sense (internal representations guiding and evaluating our behavior) and in biological or sociological sense (‘functions’ impinging on our behaviors and emotions).
__________________
Our claims (some of them quite obvious) are:
We have to model a three parties relationship: the bystander, the guilty guy or violator, the possible victim.
>> to take into account the relevant attitudes, behaviors, and feelings from those three perspectives. Actually they co-operate for social order, normative control, afford their costs.
Strong reciprocity is not only based on “sanctions” and punishments; it works thanks to:
exposition/observation and surveillance;
social approval; pity, help, aid for victims;
c) internalization and self-blame (approval), self-punishment, etc.
It is fundamental to study the specific ‘ideas’ underlying a given moral emotion: subject’s beliefs and goals (Cognitive Anatomy); for example, for really understanding guilt feeling or indignation, and what really activates or blocks it. (Emotions cannot be justaposed to “cognition”)
It is fundamental an explicit theory of ‘motivations’ in moral behavior; both in respecting and in violating.
The ‘violation’ the group worries about is the true violation, the ‘mental’ one. What matters for the moral judgment is a ‘processo alle intenzioni’: what did you have in mind.
Are you an ‘alien’ non recognizing our norms? Or a troublemaker rejecting them? Or did you violate on purpose, being aware of the norm as a norm?
This is why for example is so important for the group an expressed shame or guilt feeling, a repentance: the values are sincerely shared; there are good future directed intentions.
Moral emotions strongly affect our social ‘capital’, and moral disposition/evaluation towards us are constitutive of it.
It is crucial do not mix-up goals in psychological sense (internal representations guiding and evaluating our behavior) and in biological or sociological sense (‘functions’ impinging on our behaviors and emotions).
Research Interests:
The real reason of the need for "secrets" in democracy
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Journal of Science Communication
https://jcom.sissa.it/sites/default/files/documents/Jcom0604%282007%29C03.pdf
https://jcom.sissa.it/sites/default/files/documents/Jcom0604%282007%29C03.pdf
Research Interests:
(i) Goals compete and have to prevail against competitors because of the need for coherence of mind and behavior (some sort of meta-goal; a function of mental processing); (ii) Goals not only selfishly compete but they cooperate and... more
(i) Goals compete and have to prevail against competitors because of the need for coherence of mind and behavior (some sort of meta-goal; a function of mental processing);
(ii) Goals not only selfishly compete but they cooperate and build groups and alliances in order to prevail. Like humans.
(ii) Goals not only selfishly compete but they cooperate and build groups and alliances in order to prevail. Like humans.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Invited talk at
WEBINTELLIGENCE2017 & MATES1’
August 23 - 26, 2017
Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
WEBINTELLIGENCE2017 & MATES1’
August 23 - 26, 2017
Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
Research Interests:
Agent organizations are an emergent area of multiagent systems (MAS) that relies on the notion of openness and heterogeneity of MAS and poses new demands on traditional MAS models. These demands include the integration of organizational... more
Agent organizations are an emergent area of multiagent systems (MAS) that relies on the notion of openness and heterogeneity of MAS and poses new demands on traditional MAS models. These demands include the integration of organizational and individual perspectives and the dynamic adaptation of models to organizational and environmental changes [6]. Organizational self-design will play a critical role in the development of larger and more complex MAS.
Recently several review articles on cognitive architectures (CAs) have been published by Hui-Qing, Tan, and Ng (2007); Langley, Laird, and Rogers (2008); Duch, Oentaryo, and Pasquier (2008); Taatgen and Anderson (2009), and de Garis et... more
Recently several review articles on cognitive architectures (CAs) have been published by Hui-Qing, Tan, and Ng (2007); Langley, Laird, and Rogers (2008); Duch, Oentaryo, and Pasquier (2008); Taatgen and Anderson (2009), and de Garis et al.(2010). All these articles, as well as the current target article, ignore some important issues related to creativity, imagination, intuition and insight. The target article is focused on relations between cognitive architectures and autonomy, stressing four main aspects: real-time system operation, ...
In this paper, I explain how we just "ascribe"... more
In this paper, I explain how we just "ascribe" "attribute" to social actors--in a fast and automatic way and without complex reasoning--mental representations on the basis of "scripts," "roles," role-signs, tool use and functions, categories and prejudices, and several heuristics; or by default. How scripts and roles must be filled in with the actors' mental attitudes. How social interaction systematically requires assumptions about the other's mind. How sometimes in the subject those mental attitudes are not only unconscious but actually implicit; just potential or tacit (non-activated), or just the non-intended or non-understood function of his behavior/role. However, what really matters is that we assume that those beliefs and goals are there, and we act "as if" it were so. I finally claim that this mechanism of mind ascription while reading the behavior or the signs of the roles and scripts is the basis of a fundamental form of communication: Behavioral Implicit Communication.
Research Interests:
The relationship between trust and control is quite relevant both for the very notion of trust and for modelling and implementing trust-control relations with autonomous systems. We claim that control is antagonistic of the strict form of... more
The relationship between trust and control is quite relevant both for the very notion of trust and for modelling and implementing trust-control relations with autonomous systems. We claim that control is antagonistic of the strict form of trust:'trust in y'; but also that it completes and complements it for arriving to a global trust. In other words, putting control and guaranties is trust-building; it produces a sufficient trust, when trust in y's autonomous willingness and competence would not be enough. We also argue that control requires ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
After discussing a possible contradiction in Sloman's very challenging intervention, I stress the need for not identifying" consciousness" with phenomenal consciousness and with the"... more
After discussing a possible contradiction in Sloman's very challenging intervention, I stress the need for not identifying" consciousness" with phenomenal consciousness and with the" qualia" problem. I claim that it is necessary to distinguish different forms and functions of" consciousness" and to explicitly model them, also by exploiting the specific advantage of AI: to make experiments impossible in nature, by separating what cannot be separated in human behavior/mind. As for phenomenal consciousness, one should first be able to ...
Research Interests:
This paper provides an analysis of the defense strategy known as projection in terms of the cognitive processes it implies. Our attempt to translate the mechanisms typical of psychoanalysis into cognitive mechanisms and processes has... more
This paper provides an analysis of the defense strategy known as projection in terms of the cognitive processes it implies. Our attempt to translate the mechanisms typical of psychoanalysis into cognitive mechanisms and processes has several purposes. First, it is a means for better understanding the relations between projection as a defense strategy and projection as a more general and basic cognitive process. In fact, in our view general projection does not necessarily originate from defensive needs. Rather, it satisfies the ...
Research Interests: Sociology and Psychology
Abstract Formalisms based on a propositional representation demonstrate a high representational competence because of their flexibility, properties, and their great expression power, even if they often fail to represent the meaning of the... more
Abstract Formalisms based on a propositional representation demonstrate a high representational competence because of their flexibility, properties, and their great expression power, even if they often fail to represent the meaning of the nodes that make up the propositional networks. The presence of a network of definitions would make the representation richer, and would augment the expressiveness and the inferential capabilities of the whole system: the twofold architecture of the hybrid systems seems to ...
Research Interests:
In this paper we will briefly present the adjustment of autonomy as the problem of adjusting the level and the kind of delegation. The cncept of autonomy here considered is about a delegated task (or role). It is argued that by a careful... more
In this paper we will briefly present the adjustment of autonomy as the problem of adjusting the level and the kind of delegation. The cncept of autonomy here considered is about a delegated task (or role). It is argued that by a careful analysis of the various aspects of delegation (openness, strength, etc.) it is possible to represent and model many dimensions of autonomy and consequently both the reasons and the ways to introduce a dynamic level of control.
Research Interests:
Crying can occur in a great variety of contexts, including fulfilment and happiness as well as failure, loss, and sadness or other negative feelings, such as anger and guilt. Despite such differences, we have tried to identify a unitary... more
Crying can occur in a great variety of contexts, including fulfilment and happiness as well as failure, loss, and sadness or other negative feelings, such as anger and guilt. Despite such differences, we have tried to identify a unitary underlying psychological cause for crying: perceived helplessness. We explore the different crying situations, describing the basic cognitive ingredients and critical steps in the process leading to crying. We start from those situations which directly imply personal frustration and suffering, then we consider ...
Research Interests:
Abstract We argue in favor of the adaptive value of acceptance and that it deserves a definite status within the 'positive paradigm'. Acceptance currently suffers from ambiguous... more
Abstract We argue in favor of the adaptive value of acceptance and that it deserves a definite status within the 'positive paradigm'. Acceptance currently suffers from ambiguous connotations because of its lack of optimistic biases and its similarity to resignation. We endeavor to show that acceptance and resignation are distinct attitudes by exploring their relationships with various phenomena–frustration, disappointment, expectation, positive thinking, replanning, and accuracy. The resulting distinguishing features of acceptance– ...
Research Interests:
Humans and other animals are able to guide their actions toward the realization of their own goals, both proximal and distal. Recently, cognitive neuroscientists, biologists and psychologists have begun unraveling, from different but... more
Humans and other animals are able to guide their actions toward the realization of their own goals, both proximal and distal. Recently, cognitive neuroscientists, biologists and psychologists have begun unraveling, from different but converging perspectives, the organization of goaldirected, intentional action in terms of (brain, computational) structures and mechanisms. Converging evidence indicates that several cognitive capabilities across the individual and social domains, including action planning and execution, ...
Research Interests:
AI adoption of the game-theoretic paradigm although motivated and productive, suffers from basic limits for modelling autonomous agents and MA systems. First, we briefly restate game-theory's role for DAI and MAS: the... more
AI adoption of the game-theoretic paradigm although motivated and productive, suffers from basic limits for modelling autonomous agents and MA systems. First, we briefly restate game-theory's role for DAI and MAS: the introduction of formal prototypical social situations (���games���); the use of formal and sound notions, a self-interested view of autonomous agents, etc. Then, a number of criticisms, that have an impact on modelling intelligent social/individual action, are examined: the economicist interpretation of rationality; its ...
Research Interests:
Abstract We try to identify the configurations of beliefs and goals typical of the various kinds of representation of the future: forecasts, hopes and fears, and a particular kind of anticipatory representations that we... more
Abstract We try to identify the configurations of beliefs and goals typical of the various kinds of representation of the future: forecasts, hopes and fears, and a particular kind of anticipatory representations that we callhope-casts' andfear-casts', which are supposed to imply not only forecasts and either hopes or fears, but also a normative component according to which the expected eventought'to happen. We address the psychological consequences of hope-casts, either before or after the expected event comes true or false, ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Abstract. In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed... more
Abstract. In this paper we use a contract net protocol in order to compare various delegation strategies. We have implemented some different agents, having a set of tasks to delegate (or to perform by themselves); the tasks are performed by the agents in a dynamic environment, that can help or worse their activity. The agent rely upon different strategies in order to choose whom to delegate. We implemented three classes of trustiers: a random trustier (who randomly chooses the trustee whom delegate the task to); a statistical trustier (who builds ...
Research Interests:
The problem of the interaction among intelligent and autonomous agents is in search of a theoretical foundation. In this paper we claim that this foundation of distributed activity, and in particular the treatment of some basic aspects of... more
The problem of the interaction among intelligent and autonomous agents is in search of a theoretical foundation. In this paper we claim that this foundation of distributed activity, and in particular the treatment of some basic aspects of a model of sociality (the notion of common world, the reasons for having and pursuing social goals, and the functions of social behavior) presupposes and requires a theory of interdependence among the interacting systems.
Research Interests:
The aim of this paper is to show how relevant is a trust model based on beliefs and their credibility.The approaches to the study of trust are various and very different from each of other. In our view, just a socio-cognitive approach to... more
The aim of this paper is to show how relevant is a trust model based on beliefs and their credibility.The approaches to the study of trust are various and very different from each of other. In our view, just a socio-cognitive approach to trust would be able to analyse the sub-components on which the final decision to trust or not
Research Interests:
Ambiguity, defined as the existence of potential alternative choices at particular points in the processing of a sentence, is perhaps the most serious problem in constructing a sentence understanding system. A sentence understanding... more
Ambiguity, defined as the existence of potential alternative choices at particular points in the processing of a sentence, is perhaps the most serious problem in constructing a sentence understanding system. A sentence understanding system is inevitably a very complex system, made up of a large number of complexly interacting components, and ambiguity choice points can show up in the functioning of each of these components. In the present paper we will examine the problem of ambiguity and disambiguation from the point of view ...
Trust is a complex notion -- with various components and dimensions-, and a multi-role relation: Trust (x y t G c); x trusts y as for action/task t useful for goal G, in context c. It is an attitude, a disposition towards another agent... more
Trust is a complex notion -- with various components and dimensions-, and a multi-role relation: Trust (x y t G c); x trusts y as for action/task t useful for goal G, in context c. It is an attitude, a disposition towards another agent (natural, technical, or social) on which our "welfare", that is, the realization of some goal of
Research Interests:
When the micro-units of emerging dynamic processes are cognitive agents, a very important and unique phenomenon arises, called Cognitive Emergence (CE). We argue that: CE characterises the theory of Sociological dynamics with respect to... more
When the micro-units of emerging dynamic processes are cognitive agents, a very important and unique phenomenon arises, called Cognitive Emergence (CE). We argue that: CE characterises the theory of Sociological dynamics with respect to other forms of emergence at different level of organisation (ex. physics, biology, etc.); CE has a very strong influence on the process of emergence, changing it, and should be taken into account in simulating and modelling social phenomena; certain important emerging social phenomena, like ...
We develop in this chapter a conceptual and logical model of social trust. We first present a modal logic of mental attitudes and action in which the concepts of plausible belief, certain belief, and a possibility order over formulas can... more
We develop in this chapter a conceptual and logical model of social trust. We first present a modal logic of mental attitudes and action in which the concepts of plausible belief, certain belief, and a possibility order over formulas can be characterized. Then, we apply the logic to the formalization of the truster's expectation about some fundamental properties of the trustee (trustee's opportunity to accomplish a given task, his skills, abilities, and willingness to perform a given action for the accomplishment of the task). A, part of this chapter is ...
Research Interests:
This paper illustrates the Goal Dynamics theory, a proposal for dealing with some crucial aspects of goal revision, bas belief revision, one of the most fundamental aspects in a cognitive agent architecture. The theory concerns the... more
This paper illustrates the Goal Dynamics theory, a proposal for dealing with some crucial aspects of goal revision, bas belief revision, one of the most fundamental aspects in a cognitive agent architecture. The theory concerns the relationships between beliefs, goals and intention; moreover it shows the different forms that goals and intentions can assume according to the status of their supporting beliefs. Since beliefs support goals and intentions in the various phases of their processing, it is possible demonstrate how the acquisition or ...
The anticipatory approach that we propose consists in understanding and conceptualizing anticipation and anticipatory behavior in natural cognition and implementing them in artificial systems. We propose that anticipatory systems have... more
The anticipatory approach that we propose consists in understanding and conceptualizing anticipation and anticipatory behavior in natural cognition and implementing them in artificial systems. We propose that anticipatory systems have capabilities that go far beyond those of purely reactive ones and that anticipation is a prerequisite for several cognitive functions, and in general for goal-oriented behavior. Consequently, in this chapter we first provide definitions for anticipation and anticipatory behavior (Section 2.1). We then classify and ...
Research Interests:
This volume contains thoroughly refereed versions of the best papers presented at the 4th European Workshop on Modelling Automomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, held July 29-31, 1992 in S. Martino al Cimino, Italy. The book opens with... more
This volume contains thoroughly refereed versions of the best papers presented at the 4th European Workshop on Modelling Automomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, held July 29-31, 1992 in S. Martino al Cimino, Italy. The book opens with an introductory survey by the volume editors not only on the collection of papers but also on the history and present situation of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) and its interdisciplinary relations to social sciences, artificial life, and economics. The 19 technical papers are organized into ...
The possibility of Cooperation is still a matter of debate in the field of GT. Generally speaking, the emergence of cooperation is seen in the prospect of re-encounter as a forward-looking, calculated, and self-interested decision to... more
The possibility of Cooperation is still a matter of debate in the field of GT. Generally speaking, the emergence of cooperation is seen in the prospect of re-encounter as a forward-looking, calculated, and self-interested decision to cooperate. In this paper, it is argued that neither one-shot nor repeated versions of PD-game can account for a theory of cooperation as distinct from other forms of social action, and particularly bargaining it. It is also argued that in order to provide a theory of cooperation it is necessary to ground social ...
Research Interests:
Abstract This chapter reviews research on computational models of surprise. Part 1 begins with a description of the phenomenon of surprise in humans, reviews research on human surprise, and describes a psychological model of surprise... more
Abstract This chapter reviews research on computational models of surprise. Part 1 begins with a description of the phenomenon of surprise in humans, reviews research on human surprise, and describes a psychological model of surprise (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997). Part 2 is devoted to computational models of surprise, giving special prominence to the models proposed by Macedo and Cardoso (eg, Macedo & Cardoso, 2001b) and by Lorini and Castelfranchi (eg, Lorini & Castelfranchi, 2007). Part 3 ...
Abstract. Multi-agent systems (MAS) should not be conceived as only cooperative. As open systems situations of concurrence, competition and conflict often arise. Starting from this perspective it is relevant not only pro-social... more
Abstract. Multi-agent systems (MAS) should not be conceived as only cooperative. As open systems situations of concurrence, competition and conflict often arise. Starting from this perspective it is relevant not only pro-social interaction modeling, but also a theory of trust and monitoring, giving special relevance to issues of security and defense: how can an agent prevent that dangerous actions of other agents and dangerous events will frustrate his goals? In this paper some relevant concepts for a general model of defense in intentional ...
Research Interests:
In this chapter we address possible conflicts arising between an agent (the “client”) delegating some tasks to some other agent, and this agent (the “contractor”) adopting and/or satisfying those tasks; conflicts which are either due to... more
In this chapter we address possible conflicts arising between an agent (the “client”) delegating some tasks to some other agent, and this agent (the “contractor”) adopting and/or satisfying those tasks; conflicts which are either due to the intelligence and the initiative of the delegated agent or to an inappropriate delegation by the client. We present a plan-based definition of delegation, adoption and task, and a theory of different kinds and levels of delegation and adoption. We examine several kinds of conflict due to different ...
Roles may be analyzed in many ways:“abstract agents”; as power positions; as sets of obligations; etc. For sure one of the main facets of roles is their Delegation-Adoption nature. This is exactly the perspective we assume here: it is a... more
Roles may be analyzed in many ways:“abstract agents”; as power positions; as sets of obligations; etc. For sure one of the main facets of roles is their Delegation-Adoption nature. This is exactly the perspective we assume here: it is a partial view of roles, but a fundamental one.
“Adjustable autonomy means dynamically adjusting the level of autonomy of an agent depending on the situation”[1]. Our claim is that in studying how to adjust the level of autonomy and how to arrive to a dynamic level of control, it could... more
“Adjustable autonomy means dynamically adjusting the level of autonomy of an agent depending on the situation”[1]. Our claim is that in studying how to adjust the level of autonomy and how to arrive to a dynamic level of control, it could be useful an explicit theory of delegation able to specify different kinds and levels of autonomy. In this paper, we present our model of delegation and help. On such a basis, it is possible to analyze the adjustable autonomy of an agent both by considering the level of delegation allowed to the contractor ...
Research Interests:
Vi sono due origini e basi diverse del valore degli scopi (VS)
VS ha una natura duplice e anche ibrida:
VS Ragionato & VS Sentito ed Evocato
e la loro COMBINAZIONE
VS ha una natura duplice e anche ibrida:
VS Ragionato & VS Sentito ed Evocato
e la loro COMBINAZIONE
Research Interests:
Presento delle brevi tesi e riflessioni su alcune perversioni e stravolgimenti in atto nello sviluppo della conoscenza e nella rappresentazione della scienza. Gli stravolgimenti della scienza e della conoscenza, divenute la risorsa... more
Presento delle brevi tesi e riflessioni su alcune perversioni e stravolgimenti in atto nello sviluppo della conoscenza e nella rappresentazione della scienza. Gli stravolgimenti della scienza e della conoscenza, divenute la risorsa fondamentale dello sviluppo, in primo luogo quello economico. La conoscenza come capitale.
Research Interests:
_____________________________________________________________ BOZZA __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 0. Premessa La tesi centrale di questo... more
_____________________________________________________________ BOZZA __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 0. Premessa La tesi centrale di questo intervento e' che nelle scienze cognitive e del comportamento esiste una vistosa lacuna teorica fonte di continue ambiguita', contraddizioni, impossibilita' di relare i fenomeni a livello cognitivo alto (basati su rappresentazioni esplicite) con i loro precursori a livelli evolutivi precedenti, ecc. Ad esempio questa lacuna impedisce di avere una teoria unitaria dell'inganno (a livello non-intenzionale animale ed a livello umano) come impedisce una nozione generale di comunicazione, di cooperazione, di competizione, ecc. Essa e' anche una delle basi della difficolta' della teoria dell'autoinganno e della impossibilita' (paradossi) di applicare la normale nozione di inganno sociale-intenzionale in modo riflessivo. Ma l'ostacolo creato da questa lacuna teorica-per quanto concerne la teoria dell'autoinganno-e' ancora piu' vistoso: infatti, finche' non colmiamo questa lacuna disporremo di una magra alternativa nei nostri modelli teorici: una alternativa tra atti goal-governed, intenzionali, e puri meccanismi causali. Questa alternativa e' insufficiente per modellare la mente ed il comportamento. ______________________________________________________________ Castelfranchi Workshop Autoinganno-Roma 12 dic 98
Research Interests:
A guardare i fortissimi sviluppi scientifici in atto, cosa "tira", dove si orienta l'interesse degli studiosi, gli articoli con il maggiore "impatto", cosa fa notizia su riviste piu' o meno divulgative e giornali; ma soprattutto... more
A guardare i fortissimi sviluppi scientifici in atto, cosa "tira", dove si orienta l'interesse degli studiosi, gli articoli con il maggiore "impatto", cosa fa notizia su riviste piu' o meno divulgative e giornali; ma soprattutto guardando agli investimenti in corso ed in fortissima progressione, c'e' da fare una previsione fin troppo facile (gia' in parte in atto). La previsione 'oggettiva' e' quella di un impressionante, non comparabile sviluppo delle ricerche sul substrato (in vari sensi) biologico delle condotte. E' in atto, ma e' destinato a crescere esponenzialmente in tempi rapidi, un enorme sviluppo: (i) della genetica, in particolare sul genoma umano, che ha ed avra' sempre maggiori riferimenti non solo a malattie ma ad aspetti comportamentali (e psicologici) ed in particolare a capacita' e condotte fuori della norma, in qualche senso devianti (specie socialmente); (ii) delle neuroscienze ed in particolare della mappatura cerebrale delle funzioni cognitivo-affettivo-comportamentali; i diversi tipi e tecnologie di "brain imaging" e affini, in prepotente sviluppo e sotto l'eccitato interesse di tutti (dai media agli studiosi); (iii) della psicobiologia e biochimica cerebrale e neuropsicofarmacologia. E' facilmente prevedibile un enorme aumento di fondi, laboratori, progetti, ricerche e studiosi in ciascuno di questi tre domini.
Research Interests:
Semantica generativa; semantica procedurale; significato e immagini; analisi componenziale; struttura concettuale
Research Interests:
La rivoluzione basagliana - che poi si è trasformata nella 180 e soprattutto nelle reali creazioni: le nuove pratiche, i servizi, le norme e le regole innovative - è stata una rivoluzione in primis politica. Però si tratta una rivoluzione... more
La rivoluzione basagliana - che poi si è trasformata nella 180 e soprattutto nelle reali creazioni: le nuove pratiche, i servizi, le norme e le regole innovative - è stata una rivoluzione in primis politica. Però si tratta una rivoluzione incompiuta! Rivoluzione incompiuta non solo perché di fatto è una rivoluzione senza fine, è permanente, è un problema continuamente da affrontare con tematiche nuove e anche con aspetti sociali nuovi. È incompiuta come rivoluzione politica, sociale, culturale, ideale ma anche scientifica (la ricerca scientifica è una conseguenza e premessa fondamentale per la rivoluzione pratica e questo è stato il modesto tentativo del ruolo del PMM nel tentare di dare una base di documentazione e di ricerca). Ma anche la ricerca scientifica è stata una rivoluzione incompiuta, ..anche per responsabilità nostra.
Research Interests:
Una delle caratteristiche più eclatanti della cognizione sociale umana è la nostra capacità di interpretare il comportamento dei nostri simili (ma anche di creature e sistemi piuttosto diversi da noi) in quanto determi-nato da stati... more
Una delle caratteristiche più eclatanti della cognizione sociale umana è la nostra capacità di interpretare il comportamento dei nostri simili (ma anche di creature e sistemi piuttosto diversi da noi) in quanto determi-nato da stati interni non direttamente osservabili – emozioni, sensazioni, credenze, desideri, scopi, intenzioni. Tale capacità viene genericamente indicata col termine mindreading, usando questa etichetta per coprire in realtà un insieme piuttosto disparato di processi cognitivi, nonché per avere un termine neutro da utilizzare nel dibattito in corso su quasi ogni aspetto del fenomeno – la sua natura, il suo sviluppo, le sue funzioni. Il termine mindreading ovviamente non indica facoltà telepatiche, ben-sì la capacità di fare ipotesi sugli stati mentali degli altri a partire dal loro comportamento. Dunque ciò che si legge è il comportamento, non la mente: la mente è piuttosto ciò che si ipotizza essere alla base del comportamento – ma, come per ogni segno, questa è un'interpretazio-ne, un'ipotesi, una scommessa, un'abduzione, non certo una «lettura» in senso stretto. Inoltre la mente non solo si legge dal comportamento, ma si «ascrive» all'altro sulla base anche di proiezione, identificazione, stereotipi, generalizzazioni 1. 1 Come ci ha fatto giustamente osservare Riccardo Manzotti, in questo articolo ci occupiamo della capacità interpretativa degli esseri umani nota come mindreading, lasciando in ombra la vexata quaestio sull'esistenza o meno degli stati mentali che il soggetto attribuisce a se stesso o ad altri. A scanso di equivoci, non abbiamo tuttavia remore a dichiararci dei realisti sugli stati mentali, intesi però come stati funzionali di certe rappresentazioni interne: funzioni specifiche che una data rappresentazione as-solve nel contesto dei processi cognitivi, e che naturalmente presuppongono l'esistenza di tale rappresentazione, quale che sia la sua realizzazione fisica. Per un funzionalista, essere realista sugli stati mentali non implica alcun dualismo: si sta dicendo che gli stati mentali esistono, non che esistono a prescindere dalla loro realizzazione fisica. La nostra ragione per essere realisti sugli stati mentali, che qui enunciamo senza fornire ulteriori giustificazioni, è piuttosto semplice: non crediamo alle coincidenze. E sarebbe necessario postulare una lunga serie di fortunate coincidenze per spiegare il successo della nostra attività di mindreading, se gli stati interni che attribuiamo, agli altri o a noi stessi, fossero inesistenti. Siamo quindi realisti per ragioni di economia concettuale.
Research Interests:
Dal punto di vista, che potrebbe sembrare " ristretto " , di chi fa ricerca e teorie della mente, vorrei tentare di individuare il problema che secondo me, tra altri vari problemi, è importante quando parliamo di pratiche nel mondo... more
Dal punto di vista, che potrebbe sembrare " ristretto " , di chi fa ricerca e teorie della mente, vorrei tentare di individuare il problema che secondo me, tra altri vari problemi, è importante quando parliamo di pratiche nel mondo dell'handicap, di interventi sulla riabilitazione e sulla malattia mentale. Perché queste attività non funzionano come potrebbero funzionare o non funzionano come vorremmo che funzionassero? Uno dei punti di difficoltà per cui queste attività vivono fasi di crisi è la mancanza di un intervento integrato tra le varie sedi, le diverse figure professionali, le differenti iniziative; la mancanza di progetti che siano realmente tali, di un'integrazione dei vari punti di vista e delle varie metodologie. E una delle cause che sta a monte di ciò è facile da individuare: è il fatto che prima di tutto non si costruisce un sapere condiviso e un linguaggio comune e in secondo luogo i saperi rimangono non solo separati, ma purtroppo disconosciuti e gerarchizzati. Questi sono ostacoli precisi alla possibilità di costruire un progetto e un intervento efficaci. Chi fa ricerca non può non capire l'importanza dello studio interdisciplinare: l'Università è nata come universitas studiorum, cioè non un singolo studio (come era, per esempio, quello di Padova di legge o quello di Salerno di medicina), ma l'università delle discipline, l'università degli studi, cioè in sostanza l'idea che le scienze sono multiple e molteplici e ci sono molti saperi scientifici di pari dignità e di eguale importanza nell'efficacia d'intervento sulla società e sulla natura. Di questo dobbiamo prendere coscienza perché quando noi neghiamo conoscenza, quando neghiamo competenza a una parte delle figure che operano nel campo della malattia mentale, non solo noi neghiamo la loro professionalità e creiamo seri problemi di interazione e di lavoro di gruppo e di sviluppo e di crisi e di burnout , ma noi andiamo a sottrarci strumenti di comprensione e di intervento fondamentali. Non è possibile infatti che chi più è vicino al problema, che chi più conosce il caso della persona non abbia poi spazio di parola, sia estromesso dal progetto di riabilitazione e non vi possa portare il suo contributo. Che cosa accade, allora? Mi trovo a essere un operatore che lavora «in prima linea» e non solo non decido, ma neanche posso suggerire. Le informazioni, gli eventi importanti, i risultati di azioni quotidiane e quanto può nascere in termini di comprensione e di suggerimento da tutto ciò non viene usato, non viene messo a frutto perché non viene «cifrato» nei linguaggi delle nostre discipline ufficiali: e questo è un danno che si paga. Dobbiamo accettare l'idea che ci sono diverse scienze dell'uomo, diversi saperi scientifici e professionali e che questi saperi discendono da professioni differenti. Ci sono scienze dietro al sapere degli educatori, così come ci sono scienze dietro al sapere degli assistenti sociali e alle spalle di tutte quelle figure professionali il cui solo limite è talvolta quello di non essere in grado di esprimere tali saperi e di non rappresentare in forma teorica necessaria e ufficiale ciò che capiscono, ciò che sanno, ciò che fanno. Ma non è un problema loro, è un problema dell'operatività generale. Vorrei esprimere – proprio nel momento in cui sottolineo questa difficoltà e questa critica – l'immensa stima che ho per i medici e per gli psichiatri che lavorano sulla malattia mentale nelle comunità alloggio o nei gruppi appartamento; una stima dovuta proprio al fatto che le gerarchie dei poteri, delle categorie, dei saperi sociali consentirebbero loro altre strade che non cimentarsi in una frontiera del servizio sociale così ardua. Vuol dire che hanno capito qual è la reale natura della malattia mentale e che hanno il coraggio di andare alle radici del problema. Ma, non neghiamolo, un passo ulteriore è necessario. Se da un lato gli altri saperi e gli altri operatori devono essere capaci di esprimersi a un livello adeguato di conoscenza, di documentare il sapere che costruiscono e non ridurlo a mere pratiche; dall'altro, gli operatori che provengono da saperi forti devono avere il coraggio di capire che in quelle altre professioni c'è un sapere, che si può
Research Interests:
An abstract notion of goal in terms of “regulatory state”, however necessary for a general theory of motivated behavior, is still insufficient. Actually, a complex family of regulatory states exist, such as desires, needs, and intentions.... more
An abstract notion of goal in terms of “regulatory state”, however necessary for a general
theory of motivated behavior, is still insufficient. Actually, a complex family of
regulatory states exist, such as desires, needs, and intentions. The general notion of goal
is to be subdivided into different kinds of “goal” endowed with special properties to
account for their different kinds of influence on people’s beliefs, behavior, and emotional
reactions. Our work aims to take some steps in this direction by providing the basic
ingredients which characterize intentions, desires, and needs. Special attention is paid to
needs, their distinguishing properties, the reasons for their driving force, the important
difference between “having a need” and “feeling a need” for something, and the crucial
3
role played by the body and by self-perception in “felt” needs. Actually, in our view the
analysis of “felt” needs points to the necessity for cognitive science to foster the
integration between cognitive ingredients – such as beliefs, goals, and expectations – and
the “feeling” typical of subjective experience, which implies a relation with the body and
its perceptions.
Key words: goal, desire, need, intention, behavior
theory of motivated behavior, is still insufficient. Actually, a complex family of
regulatory states exist, such as desires, needs, and intentions. The general notion of goal
is to be subdivided into different kinds of “goal” endowed with special properties to
account for their different kinds of influence on people’s beliefs, behavior, and emotional
reactions. Our work aims to take some steps in this direction by providing the basic
ingredients which characterize intentions, desires, and needs. Special attention is paid to
needs, their distinguishing properties, the reasons for their driving force, the important
difference between “having a need” and “feeling a need” for something, and the crucial
3
role played by the body and by self-perception in “felt” needs. Actually, in our view the
analysis of “felt” needs points to the necessity for cognitive science to foster the
integration between cognitive ingredients – such as beliefs, goals, and expectations – and
the “feeling” typical of subjective experience, which implies a relation with the body and
its perceptions.
Key words: goal, desire, need, intention, behavior
Research Interests:
Decomporremo qui le ‘aspettative’ nei loro costituenti elementari fondamentali, per dar conto di somiglianze e differenze con oggetti o stati mentali affini, e per basare su cio’ previsioni circa loro effetti e proprieta’ (es. il dar... more
Decomporremo qui le ‘aspettative’ nei loro costituenti elementari fondamentali, per dar conto di somiglianze e differenze con oggetti o stati mentali affini, e per basare su cio’ previsioni circa loro effetti e proprieta’ (es. il dar luogo a delusioni o sollievi o intenzioni). Sosterremo poi che questa decomposizione non implica negare il carattere unitario di questo stato mentale, caratterizzato da nuove emergenti proprieta’ ed effetti, non propri dei suoi costituenti.
Research Interests:
Centralità delle strutture di APPARTENENZA (categorie vs. gruppo); conflitti di appartenenza. Cosa ereditiamo dalle nostre appartenenze (valore, obblighi, ecc.). Identità come “teoria” su di sé; base di spiegazione e previsione. Cosa... more
Centralità delle strutture di APPARTENENZA (categorie vs. gruppo); conflitti di appartenenza. Cosa ereditiamo dalle nostre appartenenze (valore, obblighi, ecc.).
Identità come “teoria” su di sé; base di spiegazione e previsione. Cosa entra nella Biografia. Aspetto ‘narrativo’: racconto di sé, e ‘mito’. Aspettative, rinunce e progetti come parti dell’Identità. Centralità della Valutazione.
Identità come “teoria” su di sé; base di spiegazione e previsione. Cosa entra nella Biografia. Aspetto ‘narrativo’: racconto di sé, e ‘mito’. Aspettative, rinunce e progetti come parti dell’Identità. Centralità della Valutazione.
Research Interests:
L’interrogativo centrale di questo lavoro e’ il seguente: E’ possibile prendere atto e dar conto teoricamente del carattere finalistico, funzionale, teleonomico della “mano invisibile”, senza tuttavia adottare una visione teleologica e... more
L’interrogativo centrale di questo lavoro e’ il seguente:
E’ possibile prendere atto e dar conto teoricamente del carattere finalistico, funzionale, teleonomico della “mano invisibile”, senza tuttavia adottare una visione teleologica e provvidenziale della societa’ o della storia?
Io sosterro’ che questo e’ possibile (e persino necessario, se si vuole avere una adeguata teoria scientifica delle istituzioni spontanee e delle funzioni sociali), ma che i massimi teorici della mano invisibile (dai filosofi scozzesi a von Hayek) non sono stati in grado di dipanare teleonomia e teleologia: essi ci forniscono una visione ottimistica e persino provvidenziale della mano invisibile come problem solver e dell’ordine spontaneo come bene pubblico. Ne’ essi sono in grado di separare il finalismo spontaneo, auto-organizzantesi dalle finalita’ soggettive.
Non e’ importante capire se cio’ sia dovuto a motivi ideologici o (un ‘o’ non esclusivo) ad un armamentario teorico (storicamente) limitato, in particolare per quanto attiene alla teoria della mente, della conoscenza, dell’intenzione e dell’azione.
Smith -a mio avviso- cade chiaramente nella fallacia finalistica, ed anche Hayek con il suo concetto molto problematico di ‘ordine sociale’ (vedi le sezioni 3 e 4).
Prima di discutere di questi limiti, tuttavia, risottolineero’ la grandezza di questa intuizione della mano invisibile, e l’ assoluta crucialita’ di questa teoria per le scienze sociali.
Per quanto attiene al finalismo, sosterro’ che finalismo soggettivo e finalismo senza soggetto sono due distinte nozioni che possono e devono essere dipanate l’una dall’altra e fondate in modo autonomo, e che sono entrambe scientificamente praticabili.
Originariamente ogni nozione teleologica era inserita in una visione finalistica della natura, dell’uomo o della storia. Non vi era una possibile distinzione tra quella che Mayr (xx) ha proposto di chiamare ‘teleonomia’ proprio perche’ riteneva non scollabile il finalismo dalla nozione di teleologia (vedi anche Hayek7). E questa fu la ragione principale per espungere per molto tempo le ‘cause finali’ dalla scienza. Le nozioni teleonomiche scientifiche moderne, forniteci da un lato dalla cibernetica dall’altro dalla biologia evoluzionistica, non portano invece con se’ alcuna visione ottimistica, o valutativa, o provvidenziale.
Tuttavia una spiacevole conseguenza di questa distinzione e fondazione autonoma e’ appunto il fatto che fenomeni teleonomici auto-referenziali (come l’ordine spontaneo, le funzioni sociali, le convenzioni, ecc.) non sono garantiti per essere funzionali ai bisogni umani, per essere buoni per i fini soggettivi umani.
E’ possibile prendere atto e dar conto teoricamente del carattere finalistico, funzionale, teleonomico della “mano invisibile”, senza tuttavia adottare una visione teleologica e provvidenziale della societa’ o della storia?
Io sosterro’ che questo e’ possibile (e persino necessario, se si vuole avere una adeguata teoria scientifica delle istituzioni spontanee e delle funzioni sociali), ma che i massimi teorici della mano invisibile (dai filosofi scozzesi a von Hayek) non sono stati in grado di dipanare teleonomia e teleologia: essi ci forniscono una visione ottimistica e persino provvidenziale della mano invisibile come problem solver e dell’ordine spontaneo come bene pubblico. Ne’ essi sono in grado di separare il finalismo spontaneo, auto-organizzantesi dalle finalita’ soggettive.
Non e’ importante capire se cio’ sia dovuto a motivi ideologici o (un ‘o’ non esclusivo) ad un armamentario teorico (storicamente) limitato, in particolare per quanto attiene alla teoria della mente, della conoscenza, dell’intenzione e dell’azione.
Smith -a mio avviso- cade chiaramente nella fallacia finalistica, ed anche Hayek con il suo concetto molto problematico di ‘ordine sociale’ (vedi le sezioni 3 e 4).
Prima di discutere di questi limiti, tuttavia, risottolineero’ la grandezza di questa intuizione della mano invisibile, e l’ assoluta crucialita’ di questa teoria per le scienze sociali.
Per quanto attiene al finalismo, sosterro’ che finalismo soggettivo e finalismo senza soggetto sono due distinte nozioni che possono e devono essere dipanate l’una dall’altra e fondate in modo autonomo, e che sono entrambe scientificamente praticabili.
Originariamente ogni nozione teleologica era inserita in una visione finalistica della natura, dell’uomo o della storia. Non vi era una possibile distinzione tra quella che Mayr (xx) ha proposto di chiamare ‘teleonomia’ proprio perche’ riteneva non scollabile il finalismo dalla nozione di teleologia (vedi anche Hayek7). E questa fu la ragione principale per espungere per molto tempo le ‘cause finali’ dalla scienza. Le nozioni teleonomiche scientifiche moderne, forniteci da un lato dalla cibernetica dall’altro dalla biologia evoluzionistica, non portano invece con se’ alcuna visione ottimistica, o valutativa, o provvidenziale.
Tuttavia una spiacevole conseguenza di questa distinzione e fondazione autonoma e’ appunto il fatto che fenomeni teleonomici auto-referenziali (come l’ordine spontaneo, le funzioni sociali, le convenzioni, ecc.) non sono garantiti per essere funzionali ai bisogni umani, per essere buoni per i fini soggettivi umani.
Research Interests:
La struttura del discorso come gerarchia di scopi e sovrascopi delle frasi, basata sulla visione delle frasi come atti non semplicemente intenzionali ma finalistici
Research Interests:
Se la democrazia è tutela formale del gioco delle parti, i soggetti di questo gioco sono volontà di parte (rappresentanti di interessi), capaci di negoziare, di elaborare strategie per raggiungere obiettivi di parte. Ciò porta con sé... more
Se la democrazia è tutela formale del gioco delle parti, i soggetti di questo gioco sono volontà di parte (rappresentanti di interessi), capaci di negoziare, di elaborare strategie per raggiungere obiettivi di parte. Ciò porta con sé diverse conseguenze problematiche. Prima di tutto, la cosiddetta «razionalità limitata»: le parti in causa sono definite come attori capaci di riconoscere i propri interessi e di perseguirli, dunque, come attori cognitivi. È evidente allora che esse hanno, come minimo, una razionalità limitata, come i teorici della razionalità umana sostengono. Inoltre:
a) Sul piano strettamente cognitivo, il concetto di interesse non è distinguibile da quello di scopo, di obiettivo ecc. Esso è distinguibile da altre categorie teleologiche nella misura in cui descrive fatti della realtà (vantaggiosi per un individuo o per una categoria di individui), o meglio il rapporto fra questi fatti e gli scopi degli individui, e non fatti della mente (vantaggi ritenuti tali).
b) Un contributo dell'analisi marxiana, oggi sostanzialmente ignorato, era stato quello di fondare una serie di concetti (come quello di classe e di conflitto di classe) su una nozione oggettiva di interesse: nel momento in cui invece la nozione di interesse ridiventa interamente soggettiva (è tale solo ciò che il portatore riconosce come suo interesse), la capacità individuale di riconoscere gli interessi diventa fondamento dell'azione politica e della democrazia.
c) Ma questa capacità individuale è limitata in molti modi.
a) Sul piano strettamente cognitivo, il concetto di interesse non è distinguibile da quello di scopo, di obiettivo ecc. Esso è distinguibile da altre categorie teleologiche nella misura in cui descrive fatti della realtà (vantaggiosi per un individuo o per una categoria di individui), o meglio il rapporto fra questi fatti e gli scopi degli individui, e non fatti della mente (vantaggi ritenuti tali).
b) Un contributo dell'analisi marxiana, oggi sostanzialmente ignorato, era stato quello di fondare una serie di concetti (come quello di classe e di conflitto di classe) su una nozione oggettiva di interesse: nel momento in cui invece la nozione di interesse ridiventa interamente soggettiva (è tale solo ciò che il portatore riconosce come suo interesse), la capacità individuale di riconoscere gli interessi diventa fondamento dell'azione politica e della democrazia.
c) Ma questa capacità individuale è limitata in molti modi.
Research Interests:
Ma gli italiani si fidano o non si fidano delle istituzioni? Uffici pubblici, giudici, politici, amministratori, ospedali, e via discorrendo. Ufficialmente e proclamatamente non se ne fidano, ma di fatto se ne fidano e le “usano”; ed anzi... more
Ma gli italiani si fidano o non si fidano delle istituzioni? Uffici pubblici, giudici, politici, amministratori, ospedali, e via discorrendo. Ufficialmente e proclamatamente non se ne fidano, ma di fatto se ne fidano e le “usano”; ed anzi se ne fidano in quanto non se ne fidano, e non se ne fidano in quanto sanno di poterle usare e come, quando, e di chi fidarsi. Danno a se stessi attivamente la prova provata che istituzioni e funzionari sono inaffidabili sulle regole ufficiali ed i diritti ma ben affidabili su interessi privati e favori.
La tesi che si sostiene è che la sfiducia degli italiani nelle istituzioni è molto diffusa e ad arte propagata, e pure fondata, ma è anche davvero di comodo, e per questo molto coltivata e attivamente e praticamente costruita. Dunque, il discredito delle istituzioni (e il loro pessimo funzionamento e corruzione) e la sfiducia negli altri (e le diffuse cattive condotte) sono analizzati come fondamento di pratiche illegali ed immorali che a loro volta fondano materialmente lo sfascio istituzionale e dell’ordine sociale.
Vi è un circolo vizioso sistematico e funzionale (riproduttivo, auto-alimentantesi) tra sfiducia e cattive istituzioni: non solo le seconde fondano la prima ma anche vice versa, in modo diretto e indiretto, in quanto la sfiducia spinge a, fonda e giustifica cattive pratiche che inquinano le istituzioni e la cooperazione sociale. La sfiducia nelle istituzioni non è solo una “profezia auto-avverantesi” ma è funzionale alla sua riproduzione come fondamento del fare i propri comodi (familismo amorale, favoritismi, clientelismi, corruzioni, logge, “conoscenze”).
La tesi che si sostiene è che la sfiducia degli italiani nelle istituzioni è molto diffusa e ad arte propagata, e pure fondata, ma è anche davvero di comodo, e per questo molto coltivata e attivamente e praticamente costruita. Dunque, il discredito delle istituzioni (e il loro pessimo funzionamento e corruzione) e la sfiducia negli altri (e le diffuse cattive condotte) sono analizzati come fondamento di pratiche illegali ed immorali che a loro volta fondano materialmente lo sfascio istituzionale e dell’ordine sociale.
Vi è un circolo vizioso sistematico e funzionale (riproduttivo, auto-alimentantesi) tra sfiducia e cattive istituzioni: non solo le seconde fondano la prima ma anche vice versa, in modo diretto e indiretto, in quanto la sfiducia spinge a, fonda e giustifica cattive pratiche che inquinano le istituzioni e la cooperazione sociale. La sfiducia nelle istituzioni non è solo una “profezia auto-avverantesi” ma è funzionale alla sua riproduzione come fondamento del fare i propri comodi (familismo amorale, favoritismi, clientelismi, corruzioni, logge, “conoscenze”).
Research Interests:
Analisi semantica componenziale delle parole esprimenti relazioni causali (perché, causa, ... verbi causativi); tipi di cause, concause, etc.
Research Interests:
L'analisi dei componenti semantici/concettuali dei concetti fi "funzione" e "funzionamento". In particolare il significato di "rotto" "guasto" ecc.
Research Interests:
The concept of “interest” as relative to the Goals of an Agent and its world conditions and possibilities. Objective and Subjective interests. Common interest; conflicts of interest. Interest as the ground of social collective actors... more
The concept of “interest” as relative to the Goals of an Agent and its world conditions and possibilities. Objective and Subjective interests. Common interest; conflicts of interest. Interest as the ground of social collective actors (like “classes”). Manipulation of subjects about their interests. Marx’s view of classes in term of interests and consciousness.
Research Interests:
What is a "chair"; its conceptual/semantic analysis. The difference between "use", "destination" and "function", crucial for the theory of artifacts and tools.
Research Interests:
The theory of Goals of the behavior. In particular the non mentally represented goals: the functions of our conduct, or of objects, etc.
The relationships between internal motivations and intentions and external functions.
The relationships between internal motivations and intentions and external functions.
Research Interests:
Is our affective capability that makes us "moral"? Are our moral acts necessarily due to some emotion? I deny that. We might have unemotive moral agents; just regulated by internal moral principles and decisions. Conversely, only a... more
Is our affective capability that makes us "moral"? Are our moral acts necessarily due to some emotion? I deny that. We might have unemotive moral agents; just regulated by internal moral principles and decisions. Conversely, only a cognitive agent can be really moral and behave morally. It is the presupposed mind (with its specific motivational and doxastic representations) that makes a given act moral. Emotion can be there and activate or drive our moral conduct, but emotions too are due to cognitive evaluations and critical goals at staking. I present the "cognitive anatomy" necessary for some moral emotion: compassion/ pity; guilt with a victim; guilt for mere norm violation; moral shame. Moreover, moral emotions and conducts are not necessarily prosocial, benevolent, and helpful; based on empathy. Indignation, anger, impulse to punish or insult, desire of vengeance, etc. can be moral. I analyze the necessary cognitive structure for altruism and for hate; recognizing an act as "altruistic" is a "judgment on mere intent". I conclude with some remarks on the specific mental attitude required for a real "obedience" to moral or social norms; and why it is merely ideological and wrong that what is good and moral is in accordance with Nature, and vice-versa.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
0. Questo lavoro ha diversi scopi connessi tra loro. Innanzitut to vogliamo proporre una certa analisi del gerundio italiano, che lo riavvicina alla preposizione con. A questa analisi sono dedi cate le Sezioni 2 e 7. In secondo luogo... more
0. Questo lavoro ha diversi scopi connessi tra loro. Innanzitut to vogliamo proporre una certa analisi del gerundio italiano, che lo riavvicina alla preposizione con. A questa analisi sono dedi cate le Sezioni 2 e 7. In secondo luogo vogliamo analizzare due fenomeni apparentati al gerundio e alla preposizione 00%; e. cioè la preposizione senza e l'uso degli aggettivi in funzione avver-biale (Sezione 3).
Search all the public and authenticated articles in CiteULike. Include unauthenticated results too (may include "spam") Enter a search phrase. You can also specify a CiteULike article id (123456),. a DOI (doi:10.1234/12345678).... more
Search all the public and authenticated articles in CiteULike. Include unauthenticated results too (may include "spam") Enter a search phrase. You can also specify a CiteULike article id (123456),. a DOI (doi:10.1234/12345678). or a PubMed ID (pmid:12345678). Click Help for advanced usage. CiteULike, Group: LABSS, Search, Register, Log in, ...
... Al riguardo si vedano anche gli importanti volumi di ALESSANDRO SARDELLI, Dalla certificazione alla Qualità Totale, Milano, Editrice Bibliografica, 2001, e di GIOVANNI DI DOMENICO, Percorsi della qualità in biblioteca, Manziana,... more
... Al riguardo si vedano anche gli importanti volumi di ALESSANDRO SARDELLI, Dalla certificazione alla Qualità Totale, Milano, Editrice Bibliografica, 2001, e di GIOVANNI DI DOMENICO, Percorsi della qualità in biblioteca, Manziana, Vecchiarelli, 2002. ...
Questo articolo analizza i principali meccanismi cognitivi e metacognitivi che favoriscono la persistenza decisionale della condotta, cioè la capacità di mantenere stabili le proprie scelte nel tempo e tradurle efficacemente in azione.... more
Questo articolo analizza i principali meccanismi cognitivi e metacognitivi che favoriscono la persistenza decisionale della condotta, cioè la capacità di mantenere stabili le proprie scelte nel tempo e tradurle efficacemente in azione. Partendo dagli studi in psicologia ed economia sulla scelta intertemporale e sulle sue anomalie, proporremo sia una critica di tali modelli, sia un'analisi alternativa della persistenza decisionale nei termini della teoria degli scopi. Tale analisi non intende definire un unico modello del ...
Sosterrò che:–lo studio della mente richiede nozioni informazionali e nozioni funzionali;–queste nozioni sono parte integrante del vocabolario delle moderne scienze della natura;–l'unificazione mente-corpo è necessaria e possibile e... more
Sosterrò che:–lo studio della mente richiede nozioni informazionali e nozioni funzionali;–queste nozioni sono parte integrante del vocabolario delle moderne scienze della natura;–l'unificazione mente-corpo è necessaria e possibile e richiede una descrizione dei due su uno stesso piano (ma non un unico piano di descrizione scientifica ed un unico tipo di spiegazione);–è possibile e necessaria una teoria informazionale e funzionale del corpo: es. il «sentire il bisogno di»;–è errato contrapporre la visione computazionale ed ...
Questo articolo commenta le posizioni assunte da Parisi sulla vita artificiale e sulle scienze cognitive presentate sia nel contributo pubblicato in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti», sia in Parisi (2005). Prima di commentare alcune... more
Questo articolo commenta le posizioni assunte da Parisi sulla vita artificiale e sulle scienze cognitive presentate sia nel contributo pubblicato in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti», sia in Parisi (2005). Prima di commentare alcune ambiguità di tali posizioni, e dissentire su alcuni punti, voglio dire che io amo il taglio dei suoi interventi e molti dei temi e tesi che egli ha presentato. Mi piace il tentativo di un'ottica complessiva, storica e prospettica (se non futuribile); il presentare una vision. Troppo spesso la ricerca è chiusa nelle sue strettoie ...
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to mind and behaviour that combines the theoretical frameworks and methodologies of psychology, neuroscience and computer science. Notwithstanding its important achievements, classical... more
Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to mind and behaviour that combines the theoretical frameworks and methodologies of psychology, neuroscience and computer science. Notwithstanding its important achievements, classical cognitive science has neglected, however, the role in cognition of the body, of the physical environment, and, last but not least, of sociality. While contemporary approaches have successfully explored the embodied and situated nature of the human mind, they have unfortunately carried over ...
I argue that the current predominant focus on a sole aspect of consciousness, namely phenomenal experience, is misleading, insofar as it creates a lack of studies of other features of consciousness that are i) equally interesting, ii)... more
I argue that the current predominant focus on a sole aspect of consciousness, namely phenomenal experience, is misleading, insofar as it creates a lack of studies of other features of consciousness that are i) equally interesting, ii) much better defined and understood at the conceptual level, and iii) liable of computational reduction and simulation. With reference to the quest for artificial consciousness, I suggest we should devote greater efforts to implement metacognitive self-awareness in artificial systems, both embodied and ...
Siamo onorati e grati ai commentatori per le stimolanti osservazioni mosse al nostro articolo bersaglio, e ci sembra doveroso ricambiare con una replica articolata e, se possibile, altrettanto costruttiva. Prima di entrare nel dettaglio... more
Siamo onorati e grati ai commentatori per le stimolanti osservazioni mosse al nostro articolo bersaglio, e ci sembra doveroso ricambiare con una replica articolata e, se possibile, altrettanto costruttiva. Prima di entrare nel dettaglio dei vari commenti, è utile riassumere un punto che li accomuna tutti, e che era già accennato nel nostro contributo: la necessità di comprendere la natura multi-fattoriale della scelta intertemporale, che, in quanto fenomeno emergente, dipende da una pluralità di meccanismi interni e di influenze esterne. Da più ...
Turing ad esempio conclude il suo pezzo dicendo:«Ma di certo spero e credo che non si farà alcuno sforzo notevole nella costruzione di macchine con le caratteristiche più distintivamente umane, ma non-intellettuali...; mi sembra che fare... more
Turing ad esempio conclude il suo pezzo dicendo:«Ma di certo spero e credo che non si farà alcuno sforzo notevole nella costruzione di macchine con le caratteristiche più distintivamente umane, ma non-intellettuali...; mi sembra che fare tali tentativi sia del tutto futile...». Questa esclusione non ha riguardato solo il corpo (che peraltro è decisivo anche per il pensiero, dato che il pensiero anche concettuale si radica nell'intelligenza senso-motoria), o le emozioni, ha riguardato proprio quegli aspetti che nella discussione erano ...
The main FUNCTIONS of MIND-READING capacity in humans, and probably the major evolutionary pressures are not only imitation, behavior explanation, ‘understanding’, - a better prediction and thus coordination very relevant... more
The main FUNCTIONS of MIND-READING capacity in humans,
and probably the major evolutionary pressures
are not only
imitation,
behavior explanation, ‘understanding’,
- a better prediction and thus coordination
very relevant are:
1.1 - ‘goal-adoption’ and ‘sharing’; the crucial mental operation for true cooperation, collaboration, ...
1.2 - beliefs adoption and sharing; the crucial operation for collective action, conventions, institutions, ...
1.3 - getting ‘power over’ the other; the crucial resource for exchange, social hierarchy, etc.
1.4 - influencing &manipulating: changing Y’s mind (beliefs, goals, intentions, preferences,..) in order to change Y’s behavior; not necessarily by using language!
1.5 - behavioral communication (signaling about mental states); exploiting behavior-reading in mind terms for communicating about intentions, beliefs, etc.
and probably the major evolutionary pressures
are not only
imitation,
behavior explanation, ‘understanding’,
- a better prediction and thus coordination
very relevant are:
1.1 - ‘goal-adoption’ and ‘sharing’; the crucial mental operation for true cooperation, collaboration, ...
1.2 - beliefs adoption and sharing; the crucial operation for collective action, conventions, institutions, ...
1.3 - getting ‘power over’ the other; the crucial resource for exchange, social hierarchy, etc.
1.4 - influencing &manipulating: changing Y’s mind (beliefs, goals, intentions, preferences,..) in order to change Y’s behavior; not necessarily by using language!
1.5 - behavioral communication (signaling about mental states); exploiting behavior-reading in mind terms for communicating about intentions, beliefs, etc.
Research Interests:
Presentazione del disegno di ricerca e dei principali risultati della valutazione partecipata del Centro Marco Cavallo di Latiano. Questo Centro sperimentali si caratterizza per un uso sistematico della assemblea come metodologia di... more
Presentazione del disegno di ricerca e dei principali risultati della valutazione partecipata del Centro Marco Cavallo di Latiano. Questo Centro sperimentali si caratterizza per un uso sistematico della assemblea come metodologia di lavoro e per una ampia cogestione.