Zhukov concentrated his forces in the bridgeheads established around Kustrin - opposite the Seelow Heights. His plan of attack was essentially conventional for Soviet operations of this period, though somewhat grander in scale. The battle was set to start on April 16th, before dawn; the unique difficulties of nighttime operations were to be overcome by the use of searchlights. An earth shattering artillery barrage would signal the beginning and rifle divisions would move forward in its wake to develop a breakthrough for the tank armies to exploit. Searchlights were to provide artificial light for the units advancing in the dark while blinding any defenders left alive. These troops were not expected to encounter any significant resistance as the preceding artillery bombardment was believed to be sufficient to eliminate any German forces that might offer a defense. The goal for the first day of operations was to capture the Seelow Heights and open the road to Berlin.

Heinrici reinforced the focal point of Zhukov's advance with every unit he could muster. Facing Zhukov on the primary route to Berlin were three defensive belts, stretching to a total depth of about forty kilometers. The Oder River's flood plain along the Seelow Heights, already soaked from the spring runoff, was turned into a swamp by releasing the waters of an artificial lake upstream. This made the terrain unsuitable for the employment of tanks -- blunting the effect of the massive Soviet advantage in armor. Anti-tank ditches, AA guns and generous quantities of Panzerfaust reinforced the troops in the extensive network of trenches. Heinrici used everything available for this final battle on the Eastern Front.

When the attack broke in the pre-dawn hours of April 16th, Heinrici was prepared. Zhukov's rifle armies failed to capture the Heights on schedule. Instead of marching over dead Germans, Soviet troops encountered stiff resistance to their advance -- thanks to Heinrici's tactical withdrawal shortly before the Soviet artillery obliterated his first line of trenches. The massive artillery barrage had fallen on empty earthworks and, to make matters worse for the Soviet soldiers, the searchlights, intended to create artificial daylight, produced blindness and confusion in the ranks, while creating useful silhouettes for the German defenders. Soviet casualties were enormous.

Frustrated by the slow pace of the advance, Zhukov committed his armor to the breakthrough battle (1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies). It was a serious tactical error. These units had been held in reserve to exploit the anticipated breakthrough so they had not been allotted space in the front line; no coordination between the rifle armies and the tank armies now entering the battle area had been prepared. The swampy terrain forced the armor to use the overburdened roads that the rifle divisions were already using. A giant traffic jam ensued.

An advance of almost six kilometers had been achieved in some areas but the German lines remained intact. Zhukov reported his failure to breech the German lines to Stalin around 1500hrs. It was an unpleasant conversation. Stalin informed Zhukov that Konev's forces, unlike his own, were advancing rapidly and asked him to report back in the evening. That second call was even less reassuring. Stalin correctly accused Zhukov of bad judgement in employing his tank armies so early in the battle. Worse still, Stalin told Zhukov that Konev would be given permission to wheel his tank armies towards Berlin from the south. The battle of the Seelow Heights was proving to be a serious blow to Zhukov's prestige.

On the second day, further advances into the German defensive positions were achieved -- at a heavy cost in casualties. Soviet rear area services were now being combed out to find the replacements needed at the front and doubts about the viability of traditional Soviet tactics of massed attack were quietly expressed by some of the Soviet commanders engaged in the battle. The German front before Zhukov remained unbroken at the end of the day. Heinrici's forces were holding on, but only just.

To the south of Army Group Vistula, the battles were not going nearly as well. 4th Panzer Army, the left flank army of Schorner's Army Group Center, was being battered westward by the forces of Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front. A gap had already opened by April 17th. Busse's 9th Army, the right flank army of Heinrici's Army Group Vistula, was faced with having to fall back in order to avoid an envelopment from the south. In effect, Konev's successful attacks on Schorner's poor defenses, to the south of the battle of the Seelow Heights, was unhinging Heinrici's brilliant defense.

By the end of the third day, the German defense was beginning to falter. The few remaining Army Group reserves arrived too late to occupy prepared positions, which fell into Soviet hands. The time and resources necessary to establish a new defensive line did not exist. On this day Soviet losses were again substantial but they managed to reach the third German defensive line. There was little available to stop their further progress towards Berlin.

On the fourth day, the Soviets finally effected a breakthrough against the 9th Army. The epic battle of the Seelow Heights was over. After three days of fierce resistance there were no German forces left to offer a defense and the road to Berlin was open to Zhukov. Heinrici's method assured that everything available to stop a Soviet thrust had been used. Nothing but depleted remnants of once powerful German armies stood in Zhukov's way. It would not be a German version of Stalingrad.

German defeat in this final battle of the Eastern Front seemed to have been a forgone conclusion. Yet, Heinrici managed to do what no-one else could have done under the circumstances. He delayed Zhukov by three days, embarrassing the best commander in the Soviet army in the final days of the war. It turned what was to be Zhukov's triumphant march to Berlin into a race against Konev, who had faced a far lesser opponent.