Deviant causal chain problems arise in many settings. The most famous instance of the problem is the Gettier problem, but the problem also arises in the philosophy of action and perception. Usually, attempts to tackle these problems try to solve them individually. This paper takes a different approach: I propose a general solution to the problem. I begin by providing a solution to the deviant causal chain problem for skillful performance, and I argue that the solution can be extended to (...) solve the Gettier problem and the deviant causal chain problems for perception and intentional action. As I develop my solution to these problems, I also compare it with other solutions to bring out the advantages of my approach. I then explain why the solution generalizes: my solution provides us with an analysis of disposition manifestation, which is the key to ruling out deviance. I conclude by considering objections and giving my replies. (shrink)

A popular argument for a right to ectogenic abortions appeals to a right to avoid the obligations associated with parenthood. A common objection to this argument questions whether there are any sufficiently great harms associated with parenthood to ground such a right. I propose a novel formulation of this argument that avoids these objections. I then defend it against important objections.

A popular argument for a right to ectogenic abortions appeals to a right to avoid the obligations associated with parenthood. A common objection to this argument questions whether there are any sufficiently great harms associated with parenthood to ground such a right. I propose a novel formulation of this argument that avoids these objections. I then defend it against important objections.

There are reasons for many things. For instance, we can have reasons to watch our favorite movie and believe that it will live up to the hype. These are cases of reasons for beliefs and actions. We can also have reasons for affective attitudes: we can have reasons to be excited the movie is releasing, to fear that our friends won’t like it as much as we do, and to be relieved that they did. Barry Maguire has recently argued against (...) the claim that there are reasons for affective attitudes. If he is right, it would have serious consequences in metaethics. Several projects in metaethics are committed to the existence of reasons for affective attitudes. These views are doomed if Maguire is right. Other projects have run into serious difficulties in trying to account for the existence of reasons for attitudes. Their prospects are seriously improved if Maguire is right. I hope to show we should not accept these consequences: the existence of reasons for attitudes can be defended against Maguire’s attack. (shrink)

The Golden Rule is regularly used in ordinary life, across many different cultures, to acquire new moral knowledge. At the same time, the Golden Rule is widely ignored both in ethics and metaethics because it seems to be an implausible normative theory. Most philosophers who have paid it any attention have thought that, at best, it is an initially tempting thought whose appeal should be explained by the ultimately correct normative theory. My aim in this paper is to attend to (...) an alternative possibility: the Golden Rule teaches us something about metaethics, in the form of moral epistemology, rather than normative ethics. I will argue that sentimentalism, the view that the emotions are an essential source of moral knowledge, provides a compelling explanation of the usefulness of the Golden Rule. Before giving the sentimentalist explanation, I explain why proposed alternative sources of moral knowledge provide less compelling explanations of its usefulness. (shrink)

There are many relations that are popularly believed to be factive. Knowing, seeing, reason why, explanation, showing, and proving are a non-exhaustive list of such relations. But, famously, Allan Hazlett provided examples of felicitous sentences that picked out some of these relations and seem to suggest that these relations are non-factive. More recently, Jacob Nebel has challenged the factivity of reason why for similar reasons. And it’s not hard to generate these kinds of cases for factive relations that these authors (...) do not explicitly consider. If they are right, this threatens to undermine significant portions of philosophical theorizing across many different areas of philosophy. My aim in this paper is to provide a unified, factivity-preserving explanation of what makes these apparent factivity violations felicitous, an explanation that itself presupposes that these relations are factive. My hope is that, in doing so, I will provide philosophers with a general way to resist these kinds of challenges. I begin by arguing that Nebel’s and Hazlett’s cases, along with the cases I present, ought to be seen as different instances of a single problem. I then argue that, despite the existence of these cases, we still have compelling reason to think these relations are factive. I then present my explanation of the apparent violations and reply to important objections to the account. (shrink)

A popular view is that you deserve credit for a successful performance only if you were aware in some way of what you were doing. It has been argued that some such cognitive condition on creditworthy performance must be true because it is the only way to ensure that one’s success is not an accident. In this paper, I argue against cognitive conditions on creditworthy performance: cognitive conditions are false because there are agents who deserve credit for their successful performances (...) even though they had no idea what they were doing. After presenting my argument and defending it against possible replies, I explore broader implications of the falsity of cognitive conditions in the philosophy of action and of moral worth. I then close by presenting an alternative account of creditworthy performance that explains why success can be non-accidental even if one was not aware of what they were doing. (shrink)

The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.