This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.

Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry, (...) with the result that even beliefs based on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of justified/rational belief and of the epistemology of cognitive penetration. (shrink)

This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses seven kinds of situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise; dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them; and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmist’s replies to them.

Daniel Greco (forthcoming) argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas. I argue that he is wrong. I then look in detail at a would-be epistemic dilemma and argue that no non-dilemmic approach to it can be made to work. Along the way, there is discussion of octopuses, lobsters, and other ‘inscrutable cognizers’; the relationship between evaluative and prescriptive norms; a failed attempt to steal a Brueghel; epistemic and moral blame and residue; an unbearable guy who thinks he’s God’s gift to (...) women; excuses; stupid games involving hats; radical permissivism; how I’ll never be able to afford to buy a house in Hampstead; and many other exciting topics. (shrink)

I argue that evidentialism should be rejected because it cannot be reconciled with empirical work on bias in cognitive and social psychology.

This chapter discusses an apparent dilemma between epistemic norms and Harmanian clutter avoidance norms, which forbid “cluttering” the mind with useless or trivial beliefs. Clutter avoidance norms capture the idea that limitations on our cognitive resources—attention, memory, processing power, and time—put normative pressure on us to use those resources wisely. The chapter argues that clutter avoidance norms that prohibit having or forming beliefs, like Jane Friedman’s prominent “junk beliefs” interpretation of Harman’s principle, fail to capture our intuitions about which beliefs (...) are worthwhile and are unmoored from the empirical evidence about how belief formation taxes our cognitive resources. Instead, she argues, a clutter avoidance norm should govern the real source of cognitive clutter: mental activities like explicit reasoning, considering one’s evidence, pondering, and so on, whether or not they lead to belief. If this is right, then there is no clutter avoidance dilemma at the level of belief. The chapter considers the possibility that the clutter avoidance dilemma re-arises at the level of action, but ultimately rejects the idea on the grounds that none of the principles that motivate a requirement to act on the basis of epistemic norms is plausible. (shrink)

This volume of essays is about the possibility, nature, and scope of epistemic dilemmas—situations where every available option is epistemically unacceptable or unjustifiable from a rational perspective. Recently, epistemologists have become increasingly interested in whether there can be epistemic dilemmas, and, if there can, where and how they arise. The 17 essays in the volume push the discussion forward. They shed new light on many topics in epistemology, including the fundamental norms of belief, higher-order evidence, epistemic akrasia, moral encroachment, the (...) relationship between the epistemic and the practical, paradoxes of self-reference, inquiry, and science communication, amongst others. (shrink)

Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can φ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject’s belief that p. One can φ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge (...) is not best conceived as an ability of this kind. (shrink)

Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially similar arguments against knowledge norms, knowledge normers preferred strategy of appealing to the distinction between permissibility and excusability cannot help them to rebut this argument.

I consider a number of reasons one might think we should only accept epistemic dilemmas in our normative epistemology as a last resort and argue that none of them is compelling.

I argue that there is a surprising asymmetry in the way that the demands of epistemic normativity are constrained by one’s abilities: positive requirements to believe things obey an ought-implies-can principle, but negative requirements to not believe things do not.

I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.

It is widely thought that moral obligations are necessarily guidance giving. This supposed fact has been put to service in defence of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle according to which one cannot be morally obligated to do the impossible, since impossible-to-satisfy obligations would not give guidance. It is argued here that the supposed fact is no such thing; moral obligations are not necessarily guiding giving, and so the ‘guidance argument’ for ought-implies-can fails. This is the result of no non-trivial condition being ‘luminous’.

It is often argued that the requirement that moral obligations be ‘action guiding’ motivates the claim that one can be obligated to ϕ only if one can ϕ. I argue that even on its most plausible interpretation, this argument fails, since the reasoning behind it leads to the absurd conclusion that one is permitted to ϕ if one cannot ϕ.

The discussion of epistemic dilemmas has proceeded largely independently of the much more extensive literature on moral dilemmas. The aim of this chapter is to extract some lessons from debates about moral dilemmas and apply them to questions about epistemic dilemmas. It argues that making sense of epistemic dilemmas is harder than epistemologists have hitherto appreciated. In the moral domain, it is common to identify moral dilemmas with unavoidable moral residue. But, Greco argues, this way of thinking carries over only (...) awkwardly to the epistemic domain, as there are principled reasons why there cannot be unavoidable epistemic residue. The chapter concludes that, as a result, we don’t yet have a good idea of what it would be for a case to present an epistemic dilemma. (shrink)

This chapter discuss conflicts between general evidentialism and enkrasia. One possible response to such conflicts is to reject enkrasia. The chapter explores two ways of defending it. First, it argues that evidentialists about epistemic justification are committed to holding that an ex post (i.e., doxastically) justified belief, as part and parcel of being ex post justified, is accompanied by a corresponding higher-order belief that the first-order belief is supported by the evidence. In conflict cases, this higher-order belief, they argue, comes (...) into direct rational conflict with the subject’s other higher-order beliefs that her evidence does not support the belief—so, the subject has contradictory beliefs. In this way the claim that being akratic is not per se irrational is called into question. The second argument for enkrasia presupposes normativism about belief and appeals to the conditions of having epistemically permissible beliefs. The chapter sketches an argument starting from an influential view about the normativity of belief: that irrational beliefs are impermissible beliefs. From this claim, together with some widely held assumptions about the notion of rationality, it argues that agents who have akratic combinations of attitudes hold impermissible beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on dilemmas arising from conflicts between epistemic rationality and practical rationality, where practical rationality requires you to believe that p but epistemic rationality prohibits you from believing that p. It articulates what the author takes to be the clearest form of the dilemma and critically assesses existing attempts to resolve it by denying one or another of the constraints that generate it. It argues that, contrary to the presuppositions of the current literature, the constraints are not inconsistent, (...) and so we need not deny any of them in order to avoid dilemmas. The key, the chapter argues, is recognizing that “belief” picks out a wide variety of distinct doxastic attitudes rather than a single monolithic state. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the conflict between general evidentialism and enkrasia doesn’t give rise to dilemmas because enkrasia isn’t a genuine norm of belief. According to ‘Incoherentism’, rationality doesn’t require coherence, and so doesn’t require enkratic beliefs. On this view, it can be fine to be epistemically akratic. It is argued that Incoherentism is preferable to Dilemmism for two reasons. First, unlike Dilemmism, Incoherentism allows us to deliberate about what we ought to believe using ordinary epistemology. Second, it does a (...) better job than Dilemmism at accommodating the positive features of incoherence. These considerations show that we need not be Dilemmists. (shrink)

This chapter looks at epistemic-moral dilemmas. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that, in some circumstances, prejudicial beliefs are both morally wrong and rationally required. In order to avoid this conflict, some have argued that belief is morally encroached upon—that is, the standards of epistemic rationality can shift in light of moral considerations. In assessing the moral encroachment thesis, Ross distinguishes between ‘definitive prejudice’ and ‘probabilistic prejudice’. He argues that if the ordinary norms of epistemic rationality that apply to (...) morally neutral beliefs also applied to prejudicial beliefs, then while definitive prejudice would never be rationally required, probabilistic prejudice would be. Hence, he argues, if we are to maintain that probabilistic prejudice is never rationally required, we must accept the moral encroachment thesis. In fact, we must accept a radical version of the thesis affecting the most fundamental rational norms. (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 4, October 2019, Page 591-596.

This chapter provides a general account of dilemmas, including practical dilemmas as well as epistemic dilemmas. According to the account, a dilemma is a case where every available response is in some way worse than some available alternative response. It is argued that this implies a plurality of conflicting values, which disagree about how to rank these responses in relation to one another. The chapter argues that this account is preferable to the rival view that dilemmas are cases involving conflicting (...) ‘oughts’. It then proposes an account of how different values differ from each other. Finally, on the basis of this account, the chapter develops a taxonomy of dilemmas, which includes a distinction between ‘unreal’ dilemmas and ‘real’ dilemmas’, and a distinction between ‘resoluble’ real dilemmas and ‘irresoluble’ real dilemmas. It argues that unreal dilemmas and real-but-resoluble dilemmas are, in a way, untroubling, but that there’s no denying the troubling character of real irresoluble dilemmas. (shrink)

This chapter argues that dilemmas arising from higher-order conflicts and conflicts between substantive and structural norms can be avoided if we pay careful attention to the nature and variety of suspensive attitudes. Suspensive attitudes can come in stronger and weaker forms. On a strong form, you suspend when you’re in a state of mind that disposes you to treat your evidence for p as insufficient to justify belief or disbelief in p, and at the same disposes you not to evaluate (...) the relevance of new information as to whether p. On a much weaker form, you suspend when you are in an inquisitive state of mind vis-à-vis p which merely disposes you to wonder whether p, where that involves adopting a disposition to be responsive to the reasons that bear on the question of whether p. We argue that this weaker form of suspension is always epistemically permissible, even in higher-order conflicts and conflicts between substantive and structural norms. As a result, we argue, there is no dilemma in these cases. (shrink)

This chapter articulates some epistemological and ethical dilemmas in science communication. The first dilemma is faced by science reporters such as journalists. It arises from a tension between two objectives: reporting the most reliable information while at the same time giving a balanced presentation of different perspectives. The second dilemma is faced by scientific expert testifiers, and arises when they engage in scientific expert trespassing testimony. Trespassing testimony—testifying outside of one’s domain of expertise—is usually epistemically problematic. However, it can also (...) be epistemically good. As a result, scientists may face a dilemma as to whether and how to testify. The chapter provides partial resolution strategies for both kinds of dilemma, but suggests that even so residual hard dilemmas will persist. Consequently, it articulates a general unifying solution-strategy, which consists of a general norm of public scientific testimony. (shrink)

This chapter discusses conflicts between structural and substantive norms of epistemic rationality. A distinction is drawn between monists, who maintain that one set of norms can be eliminated, or reduced to, or be shown to be identical to, the other, and dualists, who argue that they pick out two distinct, sui generis, and possibly conflicting, kinds of rationality. In previous work, Worsnip has argued for a form of dualism by showing how the two sets of norms can come into conflict (...) in some cases. In this chapter he does two things. First, he argues that the most promising ways of resisting his diagnosis of the cases as conflicts still end up undermining monism in different ways. Second, supposing that the cases should be understood as conflicts, he addresses the question of what we should do when such conflicts arise. He argues that, at least in a prominent kind of conflict case, the structural requirements take precedence over the substantive requirements. (shrink)

This chapter looks at ongoing debate that invokes conflicts between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. According to the ‘strict evidentialist’, the only reasons for belief are evidential. According to the ‘pragmatist’, there are also practical reasons for belief. The chapter looks at what the authors take to be the best argument against strict evidentialism: the argument that it should be rejected because it leads to epistemic-practical dilemmas. In response, the authors concede that strict evidentialism is committed to such dilemmas, but (...) maintain that this isn’t a reason to reject the view because, they argue, pragmatists are committed to them too. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Greco’s argument against the possibility of unavoidable epistemic residue goes wrong in three ways: it mistakenly assumes that it is irrational to pre-emptively epistemically ‘blame’ people for what they believe; it overgenerates, leading inexorably to the conclusion that there are no epistemic norms whatsoever; and it cannot account for the fact that epistemic norms apply to non-human animals. The chapter concludes that we shouldn’t identify epistemic dilemmas with unavoidable epistemic residue. It then argues that even if (...) we did, there could still be epistemic dilemmas. The last part of the chapter compares dilemmism with some dilemmish theories and argues that dilemmism is preferable to them. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on reflexive dilemmas. Sometimes, one’s beliefs impact the way the world is, and sometimes this can lead to a situation where whatever one believes, the world will make one’s belief false. Such situations appear to lead to epistemic dilemmas. The chapter provides a formal framework for analysing these cases by providing a connection with languages with self-referential predicates, as have been studied in philosophical logic. Such self-referential languages lead to similar paradoxes—most prominently the liar paradox. The chapter (...) shows how solutions that have been proposed to the liar paradox can be applied to these dilemmas, with different solutions advising different responses to the dilemmas. It focuses on a specific solution to the liar paradox—the ‘supervaluationist-based version of Kripke’s theory of truth’ and its application to such dilemmas. Applying the solution to belief tells us, it argues, that our representations of agent’s beliefs were too restrictive and that we should instead adopt an ‘imprecise probabilities’ model of belief, where we represent an agent’s beliefs with a set of probability functions. The author suggests that this is close to saying that in the dilemmas one should always suspend judgement. The chapter finishes by briefly outlining some alternative responses to the dilemmas that would result from applying some alternative theories of truth to the case of belief and compares them to the proposal on the table. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on conflicts between factive epistemic norms and non-factive norms. It argues that, while there is in some sense a genuine conflict between them, dilemmism isn’t the best theory of that conflict. Rather, we should adopt the dilemmish, dividers view. It argues that dividerism has some important explanatory virtues that the dilemmic view lacks—most notably, that the deontic logic proposed by dividerism validates plausible inferences that dilemmism must reject as invalid—while at the same time accounting for the intuitions (...) that seem to support the dilemmic view. (shrink)

This chapter discusses dilemmas arising from conflicts between ‘local’ and ‘global’ cognitive norms. Local norms evaluate individual beliefs, whereas global norms evaluate the overall functioning of a belief-formation system. An analogy is drawn with local and global norms for simple communication systems. It is argued that dilemmas can also arise as a result of conflicts between basic norms and derivative norms of evidence that one is complying with the basic norms. It is suggested that if epistemology fails to take the (...) complexity of the normative landscape into account, it is liable to reject norms as inadequate. We must learn to live with epistemological ambivalence. (shrink)

This chapter discusses dilemmas emerging from conflicts between general evidentialism and enkrasia. It is argued that there are structural constraints on the evidentialism support relation, which guarantee that your evidence never supports akratic beliefs. So there is no dilemma after all. Intuitions suggesting otherwise can be explained away by invoking a distinction between ideal and non-ideal requirements of epistemic rationality. It is also argued that dilemmism cannot explain the value of rationality, and argue that the non-dilemmic view is superior to (...) dividerism, indeterminism, and priority views. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the No-Paradise Dilemma. According to the dilemma, one ought and ought not to believe a specific proposition. The dilemma results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals concerning rationality, logic, and self-knowledge, coupled with our evidence about our cognitive failures. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. The chapter opts for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be (...) motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, the chapter argues for the initially implausible claim that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support. (shrink)

This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses a number of different situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise, including: conflicts between first-order epistemic norms and higher-order epistemic norms; conflicts between factive and non-factive epistemic norms; conflicts between substantive and structural norms of epistemic rationality, conflict for non-ideal agents involving stereotyping; situations where one’s evidence appears to rule out suspending judgement at the same time as prohibiting belief and disbelief; situations where one has compelling evidence (...) that one believes that p if and only if not-p; conflicts between epistemic norms and norms of morality and practical rationality. It surveys dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmists’ replies to them. (shrink)

Williamson (2000) appeals to considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that all and only knowledge is evidence. It is argued here that the relevant considerations do not support this claim, and in fact conflict with it.

I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

I describe two ways of thinking about what constitutes a knowledgeable assertion – the ‘orthodox view’ and the ‘isomorphic view’. I argue that we should discard the orthodox view and replace it with the isomorphic view. The latter is more natural and has greater theoretical utility than the former.

Population-level biomedical research offers new opportunities to improve population health, but also raises new challenges to traditional systems of research governance and ethical oversight. Partly in response to these challenges, various models of public involvement in research are being introduced. Yet, the ways in which public involvement should meet governance challenges are not well understood. We conducted a qualitative study with 36 experts and stakeholders using the World Café method to identify key governance challenges and explore how public involvement can (...) meet these challenges. This brief report discusses four cross-cutting themes from the study: the need to move beyond individual consent; issues in benefit and data sharing; the challenge of delineating and understanding publics; and the goal of clarifying justifications for public involvement. The report aims to provide a starting point for making sense of the relationship between public involvement and the governance of population-level biomedical research, showing connections, potential solutions and issues arising at their intersection. We suggest that, in population-level biomedical research, there is a pressing need for a shift away from conventional governance frameworks focused on the individual and towards a focus on collectives, as well as to foreground ethical issues around social justice and develop ways to address cultural diversity, value pluralism and competing stakeholder interests. There are many unresolved questions around how this shift could be realised, but these unresolved questions should form the basis for developing justificatory accounts and frameworks for suitable collective models of public involvement in population-level biomedical research governance. (shrink)

This paper examines an ideology I call techno-colonialism. I argue that techno-colonialism represents an attempt to selectively reproduce settler colonial practices adjusted to twenty-first century realities. This argument has implications for contemporary settler colonialism, the radical right, and climate change politics. In what follows, I discuss the techno-colonial doctrines of Nick Land, Curtis Yarvin, Peter Thiel, and Patri Friedman. These figures articulate a political theory about exploiting new technologies to escape the state and found new societies. To explore techno-colonial (...) ideology, I focus on Seasteading—the practice of creating floating city-states to colonize the ocean––as an attempted realization of techno-colonial ideals. As I claim, techno-colonialism attempts to humanize the politics of settlement. But I argue that techno-colonialism's ambitions fail, and techno-colonialism fails to create a harmless politics of settlement. I conclude that we should be attentive to the relations of political and economic power in which such exit projects are embedded. Moreover, this paper also promotes our understanding of climate change and the radical right's politics. While scholars most naturally associate the radical right with climate change denialism, the techno-colonists illustrate another possibility. They welcome catastrophe, and see rising-sea levels as an opportunity to start society afresh. (shrink)