Utility

This is a series of lectures on formal decision theory held at the University of Bayreuth during the summer terms 2008 and 2009. It largely follows the book from Michael D. Resnik: Choices. An Introduction to Decision Theory, 5th ed. Minneapolis London 2000 and covers the topics: Decisions under ignorance and risk Probability calculus (Kolmogoroff Axioms, Bayes' Theorem) Philosophical interpretations of probability (R. v. Mises, Ramsey-De Finetti) Neuman-Morgenstern Utility Theory Introductory Game Theory Social Choice Theory (Sen's Paradox of Liberalism, Arrow's (...) Theorem). (shrink)

There's an important connection between preferences, i.e. facts of the form: *making A true is better for me than making B true*, and counterfactual facts. Facts about: *how good things would be for me if A had been true* and *how good things would have been had B been true*. However, it's commonly assumed that the direction of analysis and explanation goes from the latter sorts of facts to the former --- the value facts are defined and explained in terms (...) of the counterfactual facts. In this paper I will prove that counterfactuals are implicitly defined by their role in thought by way of their connection with rational preference and value, and explore some applications of this fact to problems in conditional logic, counterfactual contextualism, and the vexed issue of reductive analysis in the philosophy of conditionals. (shrink)

The richer you are, the less equally rich or richer people. The richest is only one (=unique). Maximization of richness or leisure (=classic utility), maximizes the uniqueness (=improbability) that can be maximized also by: extreme sport, suicide, tattoo, count of views... The richest seem unique as the poorest, but the rich can easily become poor, while the poor can hardly get rich. So the aim of maximization reflects IQ and options. Few options increase irrationality, regardless of IQ. I also present (...) the law of values' equality, Utility of Suicide, motivation to support the better, and overview the economics as such. Presented as PhD thesis at CERGE-EI, 2000, exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, 2013, presented at conferences in Santorini 2016, Daejon 2016, Adelaide 2016. (shrink)

Nozick's experience machine thought experiment involves a machine that will provide you with pleasurable experiences for the rest of your life. But Nozick thinks it is rational not to enter the machine. This experiment needs some clarification. What is Nozick's target? Is it the following choice rule (as I said in my paper earlier today on skepticism and Nozick's experience machine)? if you are faced with a choice of A and B, and A will provide you with more pleasure, then (...) choose A - rationality requires this. Or is it... you can work out alternatives by yourself? I want to focus on exactly how the machine beats not entering it for pleasure. Here are two clarifications. (Total pleasure) The total pleasure for the rest of your life is higher than if you enter the machine. ( Average pleasure) Take the amount of pleasure at each moment and the average is higher than if you enter the machine. I am worried about total pleasure: it does not tell you anything about the distribution of pleasure over moments of your life. It's horrible in the machine except for an enormously fun one week at the beginning? (Saddam Hussein on Americans and peasant marriage!) Average pleasure: what if your life is shortened significantly after entering the machine, but each moment is enormous fun? I wonder: is there a clarification of what the machine does which is sufficiently reassuring to a normal subject, the common man as they used to say? (shrink)

Traditional moral frameworks conflate subjective justification with objective impact, allowing harmful effects to be “washed away” by good intentions or beneficial outcomes. This paper introduces Dual-Ledger Transactionalism (DLT), a diagnostic framework that maintains separate ledgers for objective effects (beneficial/harmful impacts on all parties) and subjective verdicts (moral justifications). Drawing on concepts from W.D. Ross’s prima facie duties and Bernard Williams’s moral remainders, DLT advances a novel principle: harmful effects persist as negative residuals that generate reciprocal effects (structural blowback), regardless of (...) moral justification. Critically, DLT also recognizes that beneficial effects persist as enduring structural facts alongside negative residuals, creating permanent structural changes to reality. Unlike utilitarianism, which permits net calculations to erase negatives, DLT conserves both beneficial and harmful effects on separate ledgers, explaining persistent guilt after “necessary evils” while also acknowledging lasting positive impact. Through analysis of cases like Ursula K. Le Guin’s Omelas and the “Nazi at the door” dilemma, this paper demonstrates how DLT resolves explanatory gaps in existing moral theory while offering practical guidance: minimize negative residuals and their reciprocal effects within one’s epistemic horizon. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews the arguments supporting rational genuine satisficing. The deconstructive effort unearths inherent problems with the position in both static and dynamic contexts. Many of these arguments build on Herbert Simon’s canonical arguments surrounding incommensurability and demandingness problems. Optimizing is re-constructed using the principles of instrumental satisficing to answer these charges. The resulting conception is both obviously undemanding and a recognizable response to focused decision making.

Is the Kantian basis of valuing in humanity sufficient or sound enough to account for all valuing? At least two other such bases have been proposed across the ages, that of the sentiments and the valuing of life itself. This article focuses on the Kantian view, the first of these three possible bases of valuing. The concern is: by which criteria can we assess whether a given theory of or approach to basing a value is in fact usable and optimal, (...) that is can in fact explain why a value can be assuredly based on a theory of value. That is, can a possible theory of value indeed explain all other values? That is, it seems a “meta” analysis of the situation is due. The article looks to five perspectives on the Kantian concept of humanity to determine if that humanity, as a theory of all valuing’s bases, is at least supportable / sustainable, if not yet sufficiently fleshed out. The article concludes that these five perspective may each and severally leave some cogent doubt of humanity as the basis of all other value, while leaving unsettled the possibility the perspective is flawed or is not thorough enough for due criticism of humanity as basis. (shrink)

"Resolution of Jerusalem’s status arguably remains controversial because of the divergent analytical lenses through which the conflict’s parties, and others, view its intertwined legal, territorial, historical and religious issues. Thus, Jerusalem persists as an intricate and intractable cornerstone of the Israel-Palestine conflict." Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Resource Centre.

This paper aims to address the question of how one ought to choose when one is uncertain about what outcomes will result from one’s choices, but when one can nevertheless assign probabilities to the different possible outcomes. These choices are commonly referred to as choices under risk. In this paper, I develop and motivate a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. Roughly, for any agent, S, faced with any choice under risk, ECU (...) theory says that S ought to measure and rank her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their ECU and S ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several options are tied). The ECU of an option is a probability‐weighted sum of each of its possible comparative utilities. For any option, a, and for any possible state of the world, G, the comparative utility of a in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative(s) to a carry the greatest utility in G. In this paper, I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory gives different recommendations from those of expected utility theory—the standard normative theory of rational choice under risk. (shrink)

In "Pascal's Mugging" (Bostrom 2009), Pascal gives away his wallet for an extremely tiny chance of an extremely large reward. In this continuation of Bostrom's story, Pascal's friend counsels him to take into account the possibility of making mistakes about his true expected utilities, and they consider to what extent this will help Pascal make plans to avoid future muggings.

The author of a text originally produced as a literary work has the comprehensive authority, upon its being situated in certain context of evaluation or interpretation or deployment to declare one's text as philosophical. There would have to be extraordinary or even absurd contexts of evaluation in which one's originally-intended philosophical text is so situated for one to declare it as literary.

Some hold that expected utility is too restrictive in the way it handles risk. Risk‐weighted expected utility is an alternative that allows decision‐makers to have a range of attitudes toward probabilistic risk. It holds that any attitude within this range is instrumentally rational, since these attitudes represent different, equally good, strategies for taking the means to one's ends. A different challenge to expected utility is that it is too restrictive in the way it handles ambiguity—it requires decision‐makers to have sharp (...) probabilities—and risk‐weighted expected utility shares this restrictive feature. This paper presents a generalization of risk‐weighted expected utility which allows for ambiguity. It defends this theory as a theory of instrumental rationality, and argues that attitudes toward risk and attitudes toward ambiguity each represent different but important features of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

Economists routinely measure individual welfare by (von-Neumann-Morgenstern) utility, for instance when analysing welfare intensity, social welfare, or welfare inequality. Is this welfare measure justified? Natural working hypotheses turn out to imply a different measure. It overcomes familiar problems of utility, by faithfully capturing non-ordinal welfare features, such as welfare intensity -- despite still resting on purely ordinal evidence, such as revealed preferences or self-reported welfare comparisons. Social welfare analysis changes when based on this new individual welfare measure rather than utility. (...) For instance, Harsanyi's `utilitarian theorem' now supports prioritarianism. We compare the standard utility-based versions of utilitarianism and prioritarianism with new versions based on our welfare measure. We show that utility is a hybrid object, determined by two rival influences: welfare, and the attitude to intrinsic risk, i.e., to risk in welfare. A new version of Harsanyi's theorem shows that Harsanyi implicitly makes the questionable assumption that society is neutral to intrinsic risk, even when all individuals are averse to intrinsic risk. (shrink)

This paper considers two competing views of the relationship between preference and desire. On what I call the “preference-first view,” preference is our most basic form of conative attitude, and desire reduces to preference. This view is widely assumed, and essentially treated as orthodoxy, among standard decision theorists, economists, and others. I argue, however, that the preference-first view has things the wrong way around. I first show that the standard motivation offered for this view—motivation underlying foundational work in decision theory (...) and economics—leaves the view with unacceptable psychological implications. I then introduce an alternative view—the “desire-first view”—on which desire is our most basic form of conative attitude, and preference reduces to desire. On the desire-first view I propose, preferences, as comparisons, are best understood as comparisons of the extents to which alternatives are desired. I show that this desire-first view is simple, ecumenical, and explanatorily powerful. (shrink)

Two particularly puzzling phenomena among standard decision theorists and economists are those of intransitive choice and preference reversal. Given certain standard assumptions about human beings and our basic conative attitudes, some take these phenomena to cast doubt on the idea of our having a stable set of basic conative attitudes that (together with our beliefs) determine choices. In this paper, I reject one of these standard assumptions, and show that we can thereby solve these puzzles. Specifically, I reject the widely (...) assumed “preference-first view,” according to which preference is our most basic form of conative attitude relevant to decision making. And, I adopt and defend the alternative “desire-first view,” according to which desire is our most basic form of conative attitude relevant to decision making. I offer a general account of the relationship between desire, preference, context, and choice, on this view, and show that the resulting account can naturally explain the phenomena of intransitive choice and preference reversal. I also show that this view offers a natural analysis of choice more generally, and that it does so without casting doubt on the idea that we have a stable set of basic conative attitudes determining choice. (shrink)

This chapter explores the roles of preference and desire in decision theory. I first outline the foundations of decision theory, and more specifically expected utility theory, as well as the roles of preference and desire in these foundations. I then explore three disagreements over the nature and roles of preference and desire in decision theory. These are disagreements over the metaphysical commitments of decision theorists, the conative structure of our minds, and the traditional understanding of preference in decision theory.

I present a counter-example to Nash's derivation of utility theory in 'The Bargaining Problem'.

I discuss conditions under which maximizing a proxy utility function is harmful and suggest this poses problems for applying decision theory.

Decision theories give guidance about what to do when you face a particular decision. But they also give higher-level advice—depending on how likely you think it is that you’ll face various decision problems, decision theories give advice about the best strategy for picking what to do. For some ways of being uncertain over possible decisions, decision theories that accommodate risk undermine themselves. They simultaneously provide specific advice about what to pick whilst also deeming that very picking strategy to be impermissible. (...) Savage-style expected utility theory does not have this flaw; it always deems its own picking strategies to be the rational ones. Popular decision rules for imprecise probabilities never straightforwardly undermine themselves but they often require adopting strategies that pick in accordance with expected utility theory, thereby coordinating how to pick across different potential decision problems. Some strategies that always pick an option that the decision theory does not reject are deemed impermissible. In particular, randomising amongst non-rejected options is often impermissible. This raises questions about how to use the guidance of an imprecise decision theory when it leaves different options non-rejected. (shrink)

Shadmehr and Ahmed’s book is a welcome extension of optimal foraging theory and neuroeconomics, achieved by integrating both with parameters relating to effort and rate of movement. Their most persuasive and prolific data comes from saccades, where times before and after decision are reasonably determinate. Skeletal movements are less likely to exhibit such tidy temporal organisation.

Are interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded, that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on which correct (...) interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines. (shrink)

Significant renewed interest in Rawls’s original position has emerged. In this article, I argue that the recent original position arguments, despite their increased sophistication regarding decision-theoretic considerations behind the veil of ignorance or attempts to bypass such considerations, still talk past each other. In an important way, the arguments have it backwards. The significance of original position arguments, especially for contemporary pluralistic societies, lies not in defending a unique moral outcome due to the application of formal methods, but rather in (...) justifying the moral assumptions that inform the design of the original position and their best formalization. (shrink)

Pascal’s Wager involves expected utilities. In this chapter, we examine the Wager in light of two main features of expected utility theory: utilities and probabilities. We discuss infinite and finite utilities, and zero, infinitesimal, extremely low, imprecise, and undefined probabilities. These have all come up in recent literature regarding Pascal’s Wager. We consider the problems each creates and suggest prospects for the Wager in light of these problems.

There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories (...) of interpersonal aggregation besides utilitarianism, and by many decision theories besides expected value theory. Considering the range of consistent responses, we find all of them to be quite radical. (shrink)

Utilitarianism is often contrasted with egalitarianism, and sometimes rejected for its alleged neglect of egalitarian concerns. Utilitarians, it appears, do not care who gets what or how we relate to one another, so long as overall well-being is maximized. Egalitarians, on the other hand, prefer social arrangements in which the degree to which some have more than others, or that some are placed above others, is less. I argue, however, that utilitarianism should be considered an egalitarian theory. Real-world egalitarian movements (...) aim to reduce inequalities in wealth and hierarchical social relations. Utilitarianism, I argue, shares these aims, and does so in similar way to contemporary egalitarian theories. If I am right, utilitarianism should not be rejected for failing to be egalitarian, but engaged with as an egalitarian theory—and utilitarians should take egalitarian concerns seriously. (shrink)

The desirable gambles framework provides a foundational approach to imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility assumptions. This paper introduces function-coherent gambles, a generalization that accommodates non-linear utility while preserving essential rationality properties. We establish core axioms for function-coherence and prove a representation theorem that characterizes acceptable gambles through continuous linear functionals. The framework is then applied to analyze various forms of discounting in intertemporal choice, including hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, scale-dependent, and state-dependent discounting. We demonstrate how these alternatives to (...) constant-rate exponential discounting can be integrated within the function-coherent framework. This unified treatment provides theoretical foundations for modeling sophisticated patterns of time preference within the desirability paradigm, bridging a gap between normative theory and observed behavior in intertemporal decision-making under genuine uncertainty. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

An Introduction to Utilitarianism: From Theory to Practice is a state-of-the-art text, simultaneously accessible to introductory students and informative for more advanced readers. Two key features set it apart. First, its comprehensive coverage of the arguments for and against utilitarianism is unparalleled. Second, it takes seriously the practical implications of utilitarianism for how we should live, with a particular emphasis on utilitarianism's impartial beneficence and its focus on effectiveness. Guided by the conviction that practical ethics is more about how best (...) to use our limited time and resources than which victims to hit with trolleys in thought experiments, its practical upshots should prove amenable to utilitarians and non-utilitarians alike. (shrink)

This paper explores the consequences of applying two natural ideas from epistemology to decision theory: (1) that knowledge should guide our actions, and (2) that we know a lot of non-trivial things. In particular, we explore the consequences of these ideas as they are applied to standard decision theoretic puzzles such as the St. Petersburg Paradox. In doing so, we develop a “knowledge-first” decision theory and we will see how it can help us avoid fanaticism with regard to the St. (...) Petersburg puzzle and related puzzles. The result will be a decision theory that gives a novel, but well-motivated, reason for discounting small probabilities when making decisions. We examine the merits and demerits of such a decision theory. (shrink)

This paper develops and explores a new framework for theorizing about the measurement and aggregation of well-being. It is a qualitative variation on the framework of social welfare functionals developed by Amartya Sen. In Sen’s framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned to each profile of real-valued utility functions. In the qualitative framework developed here, numerical utilities are replaced by the properties they are supposed to represent. This makes it possible to characterize the measurability and interpersonal comparability of (...) well-being directly, without the use of invariance conditions, and to distinguish between real changes in well-being and merely representational changes in the unit of measurement. The qualitative framework is shown to have important implications for a range of issues in axiology and social choice theory, including the characterization of welfarism, axiomatic derivations of utilitarianism, the meaningfulness of prioritarianism, the informational requirements of variable-population ethics, the impossibility theorems of Arrow and others, and the metaphysics of value. (shrink)

Welfarism is the view that individual welfare is the only thing that matters. One important contribution of social choice theory has been to provide a precise formulation and axiomatic characterization of welfarism using Amartya Sen's framework of social welfare functionals. This paper is motivated by the observation that the standard formalization of welfarism is too restrictive, since a welfarist social planner need not be committed to maximizing a preference ordering or any other binary relation over alternatives. We therefore provide a (...) characterization of welfarism in a more general choice-functional setting and show that welfarism, so understood, carries no commitment to rationalizability. This characterization is compatible with welfare values having any structure whatsoever. It also sheds light on different formulations of anonymity, revealing only some of these to be fundamental requirements of impartiality. (shrink)

It may soon be possible for neurotechnology to connect two subjects' brains such that they share a single token mental state, such as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. How will our moral frameworks have to adapt to accommodate this prospect? And if this sort of mental-state-sharing might already obtain in some cases, how should this possibility impact our moral thinking? This question turns out to be extremely challenging, because different examples generate different intuitions: If two subjects share very few (...) mental states, then it seems that we should count the value of those states twice, but if they share very many mental states, then it seems that we should count the value of those statesonce. We suggest that these conflicting intuitions can be reconciled if the mental states that matter for welfare have a holistic character, in a way that is independently plausible. We close by drawing tentative conclusions about how we ought to think about the moral significance of shared mental states. (shrink)

Im zweiten Kapitel von Utilitarianism beschreibt Mill seine Konzeption des Utilitarismus. Er beklagt, dass das Wort ‚Utilitarismus‘ zu vielerlei Missverständnissen geführt hat, von denen er einige ausräumen möchte. Das ist ihm schon damals nur zum Teil gelungen. Seit 1861 hat sich dieses Problem für den Utilitarismus in der Tat noch potenziert, da das ihm zugrunde liegende Wort utility (dt. ‚Nutzen‘) durch die Volkswirtschaftslehre eine völlig neue Bedeutung verliehen bekam. Darüber hinaus befürworten viele Volkswirtschaftler auch eine normative Theorie, die sie, da (...) sie sich auf diesen Begriff von Nutzen stützt, konsequenterweise ebenfalls als ‚Utilitarismus‘ bezeichnen. (shrink)

Due to the imperfect ability of individuals to discriminate between sufficiently similar alternatives, individual indifferences may fail to be transitive. I prove two impossibility theorems for social choice under indifference intransitivity, using axioms that are strictly weaker than Strong Pareto and that have been endorsed (sometimes jointly) in prior work on social choice under indifference intransitivity. The key axiom is Consistency, which states that if bundles are held constant for all but one individual, then society’s preferences must align with those (...) of that individual. Theorem 1 combines Consistency with Indifference Agglomeration, which states that society must be indifferent to combined changes in the bundles of two individuals if it is indifferent to the same changes happening to each individual separately. Theorem 2 combines Consistency with Weak Majority Preference, which states that society must prefer whatever the majority prefers if no one has a preference to the contrary. Given that indifference intransitivity is a necessary condition for the just-noticeable difference (JND) approach to interpersonal utility comparisons, a key implication of the theorems is that any attempt to use the JND approach to derive societal preferences must violate at least one of these three axioms. (shrink)

Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows (...) how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability. (shrink)

Decision theory requires agents to assign probabilities to states of the world and utilities to the possible outcomes of different actions. When agents commit to having the probabilities and/or utilities in a decision problem defined by objective features of the world, they may find themselves unable to decide which actions maximize expected utility. Decision theory has long recognized that work-around strategies are available in special cases; this is where dominance reasoning, minimax, and maximin play a role. Here we describe a (...) different work around, wherein a rational decision about one decision problem can be reached by ‘interpolating’ information from another problem that the agent believes has already been rationally solved. (shrink)

An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.

We present experimental evidence that supports the thesis :602–625, 2015, Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2019; Bradley in Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017; Goldschmidt and Nissan-Rozen in Synthese 198:7553–7575, 2021) that people might positively or negatively desire risky prospects conditional on only some of the prospects’ outcomes obtaining. We argue that this evidence has important normative implications for the central debate in normative decision theory between two general approaches on how to rationalize several common (...) patterns of preference, which are ruled out as irrational by orthodox decision theory, namely the re-individuation approach and the non-expected utility approach. (shrink)

Apparently the Western philosophical tradition has (wrongly) preferred speech over writing – so claims Jacques Derrida. In this paper, I consider whether utilitarianism involves such a preference. There are at least two arguments against the claim.

I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. This decision should lead causalists to a better understanding of what it takes for a decision between some collection of options to count as a subdecision of a decision between a larger collection of options. And with (...) this better understanding of subdecisions in hand, causalists will not violate the IIA or the NEE. This decision will also teach causalists that, in sequential decisions, a rational agent may be led to make a series of choices which are causally dominated by some other sequence of choices they could have made instead. I will encourage causalists to recognise this as an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons. (shrink)

A dialogue, in three parts, on utilitarian vulnerability to exploitation.

Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory by being cyclic. Money-pump arguments offer a way to show that such violations are irrational. Suppose that you start with A. Then you should be willing to trade A for C and then C for B. But then, once you have B, you are offered a trade back to A for a small cost. Since you prefer A to B, you (...) pay the small sum to trade from B to A. But now you have been turned into a money pump. You are back to the alternative you started with but with less money. This Element shows how each of the axioms of Expected Utility Theory can be defended by money-pump arguments of this kind. The Element also defends money-pump arguments from the standard objections to this kind of approach. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

After the WHS inscription of the Historic Centre of Macau in 2005, the relationship between citizens of Macau and their heritage is not distanced. Most of these monuments remain functional for religious and social purposes and are actively engaged in public commercial activities such as the annual Macau Light Festival. Several historic houses have been transformed into either a permanent library or a museum where people can experience various events. With such frequent interaction, these monuments are more than just heritage (...) to locals; they are the venues where people’s daily lives are attached. However, this familiarity will cause a paradox in preservation since losing the distance might mean being unable to deliver the message of protection. It would be difficult to find a balance between preservation and reuse of heritage. This paper will use the Historic Centre of Macau as a case study to discuss the types of adaptive reuse in Macau and propose potential risks of these approaches. (shrink)

What is risk? How do we assess risk? What are the ethical implications of risk? The concept of risk is important – sometimes even crucial – for many philosophical domains, from philosophy of science and technology to ethics and sustainability. Philosophy and Science of Risk is a clear, wide-ranging introduction to this urgent and fast-growing subject. It covers the following key topics: -/- • The philosophical and historical background to understanding and interpreting risk -/- • The meaning of risk and (...) how it differs from closely related concepts, such as uncertainty or dangers -/- • The social construction of risk -/- • Risk perception and risk as an object of scientific study -/- • The measurement of risk, its probability and severity -/- • Risk and scientific modeling -/- • Risk, value judgments, and expertise -/- • Risk management, including cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary approach -/- • Risk communication, including deliberative models -/- • Ethics of risk, including duties toward nonhuman animals and future generations -/- • Risk and sustainability -/- • Decision-making under risk -/- Including helpful additional features such as text boxes, chapter summaries, review, and discussion questions, Philosophy and Science of Risk: An Introduction is an ideal textbook for students of the philosophy of risk. It is also suitable for students studying the conceptual questions surrounding risk in related subjects, such as sociology, psychology, economics, politics, geography, sustainability, and environmental studies. (shrink)

This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being. How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interpersonal comparability of well-being is hidden in Harsanyi's premises. Others argue that it is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi's theorem, which is not presupposed by any one (...) of the premises. I argue instead that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-utilitarian conclusion do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key to making sense of this possibility is to treat Harsanyi's weights as dimensional constants rather than dimensionless numbers. (shrink)

Affective forecasting refers to the ability to predict future emotions, a skill that is essential to making decisions on a daily basis. Studies of the concept have determined that individuals are often inaccurate in making such affective forecasts. However, the mechanisms of these errors are not yet clear. In order to better understand why affective forecasting errors occur, this article seeks to trace the theoretical roots of this theory with a focus on its multidisciplinary history. The roots of affective forecasting (...) lie mainly in economics, with early claims positing that utility (i.e. satisfaction) played a role in decision-making. Furthermore, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s descriptions of utilitarianism played a major role in our understanding of whether to define utility as a hedonic quality. The birth of behavioural economics resulted in a paradigm shift, introducing the concept of cognitive biases as influences on the accuracy of predicted utility. Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, the earliest researchers of affective forecasting errors, have proceeded with the concept of the accuracy of predicted affective utility to conduct experiments that seek to determine why our predictions of future affect are inaccurate and how such errors play a role in our decision-making. (shrink)