Peer Disagreement

How should your opinion change in response to the opinion of an epistemic peer? We show that the pooling rule known as "upco" is the unique answer satisfying some natural desiderata. If your revised opinion will influence your opinions on other matters by Jeffrey conditionalization, then upco is the only standard pooling rule that ensures the order in which peers are consulted makes no difference. Popular proposals like linear pooling, geometric pooling, and harmonic pooling cannot boast the same. In fact, (...) no alternative to upco can if it possesses four minimal properties which these proposals share. (shrink)

Conciliatory views of peer disagreement (aka Conciliationism) have repeatedly been challenged on the grounds that they are epistemically self-undermining. Recently, Dixon (2024) argues that this challenge is worse than previously thought: it is (almost certainly) permanent and this provides strong reason to abandon Conciliationism as (almost certainly) hopeless. In response, Justin (2025, Episteme) argues that the self-undermining challenge and Dixon’s arguments, at best, only apply to the belief-suspension versions of Conciliationism but not to degree-of-belief (aka credal) versions of Conciliationism. Thus, (...) not only can Conciliationists largely avoid the self-undermining challenge but, contra Dixon, this challenge also does not provide adequate reason to abandon Conciliationism as hopeless. This paper argues that not only can the self-undermining challenge be reformulated to apply to credal versions of Conciliationism, this reformulated challenge extends and further supports Dixon’s pessimism: because there (almost certainly) is or will be peer disagreement on any way of responding to this reformulated challenge, any response (almost certainly) be defeated by the very view it is attempting to defend. Thus, credal Conciliationism is also (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining and there is (almost certainly) still no hope for Conciliationism. (shrink)

It is often irrational to believe philosophical claims because they are subject to systematic disagreement, under-determination, and pessimistic induction. Along with some other authors in this volume, I argue that many philosophers should (and do) have a different attitude to their own philosophical commitments. On my account, this attitude is a form of epistemic acceptance called endorsement. However, several objections have been raised to this view and others like it. One worry is that endorsement is spineless: that people who merely (...) endorse their theories fail to have a stable, global commitment to their views. A second worry is that endorsement, and the assertions it licenses, are objectionably insincere. Here, I defend the theory of endorsement from these objections. I suggest that endorsement can be more resilient than belief, while better supporting both intellectual courage and humility. Then, I argue that endorsement can be perfectly sincere, since it is not deceptive. (shrink)

You learn that you disagree about P with someone who—according to your evidence—should be your equal in discerning whether P. Some argue that rationality requires weighing your judgment and your Peer’s judgment equally. I show that this ‘equal weight view’ requires the undefended stipulation that your evidence suggests zero correlation between your success in initially determining whether P and your success in reevaluating P in the face of Peer Disagreement. I describe a Peer Disagreement in which self-trust is rationally mandated, (...) given that this further stipulation fails. Finally, I suggest that default, asymmetric self-trust in the face of Peer Disagreement is justified, given a reasonable expectation of a baseline correlation between success in initial determinations whether P and success in reevaluations of P in the face of Peer Disagreement. (shrink)

The view that epistemic peers should conciliate in cases of disagreement---the Conciliatory View---had been an important view in the early days of the peer disagreement debate. Over the years, however, the view has been the target of severe criticism; an ''obituary'' was already written for the view, and, as a recent proclamation has it, there is ''no hope'' for it. In this paper, I will argue that we should keep the hope alive by defending the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement. (...) The primary strategy of my defense will be to separate the claims made by the view specific to peer disagreement and claims that concern higher-order evidence more generally. This separation allows us to see which problems cannot be addressed in the context of peer disagreement alone. As I will argue, the upshot of making this distinction is that although the jury is still out on whether higher-order evidence should affect our first-order doxastic states, the Conciliatory View likely follows if it does. (shrink)

The topic of disagreement has captured a great deal of attention among epistemologists in recent years. In this paper, I want to raise the issue of disagreement for the epistemic aim of understanding. I will address three main issues. The first concerns the nature of understanding disagreement. What do disagreements in understanding amount to? What kind of disagreement is at play when two agents understand something differently, or have a different understanding of something? The second concerns the norms of rational (...) epistemic behavior in dealing with understanding disagreements. How should an agent react in realizing that another agent understands things differently than she does? The third concerns the value of understanding disagreements. Are understanding disagreements valuable? What is there to gain from understanding disagreements, and what is there to learn from those who understand things differently than we do? My arguments lend support to three main theses. The first is that understanding disagreements are interestingly different from familiar doxastic disagreements. The second is that reasonable understanding disagreements are possible, and hence that we are often entitled to stand our ground in face of an understanding disagreement. The third is that understanding disagreements can have epistemic value, because they can lead to modal insight. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence, given their different background assumptions, on the emergence of polarization in the scientific community. Scientists are represented as Bayesian updaters for whom the diagnosticity of evidence is given by the Bayes factor. Our results suggest that an initial disagreement on the diagnostic value of evidence can, (...) but does not necessarily, lead to polarization, depending on the sample size of the performed studies and the confidence interval within which scientists share their opinions. In particular, the more data scientists share,the more likely it is that the community will end up polarized. (shrink)

Conciliationism holds that it is rational to modify one's beliefs in the face of disagreement. But extant conciliatory norms yield incorrect results in cases involving excessive confidence--cases in which one's interlocutors are sure, or almost sure, that their opinions are correct. After explaining the problem of excessive confidence, I show that a Bayesian approach to Conciliationism handles the problem elegantly and effectively. Further, it has desirable--indeed essential--features, including the ability to (i) contend with multiple interlocutors, (ii) deal with gradations in (...) competence, (iii) incorporate ubiquitous interdependence, and (iv) account for critical contextual features of cases of disagreement. (shrink)

If you encounter a disagreement, what makes you think you are the right party? You may think you know better. What if your opponent is someone you considered epistemically equal to yourself? Someone who is your peer. Peer disagreement, as a relatively recent topic in epistemology, has attracted increasing attention. Thus, there are some gaps in the field. In this research, I aim to address one aspect of it, which is the individuality of epistemic responsibility. In the first part, key (...) concepts of the discussion and various attitudes derived from the systematization of these concepts, such as peerness standards, rationality, permissiveness, uniqueness thesis, and principle of independence will be examined and then the new position will be introduced. A number of positions have been developed through different systematizations of these concepts. In the second part of the article, those different approaches; steadfast view, conciliatory view, justificationist view, equal weight view and total evidence view of peer disagreement with pros and cons in solution and explanatory power will be explained. After setting the tone of the discussion, the justification of why personal responsibility matters and what is special to it will be discussed. Briefly, the responsibility view provides a steadfast position while not rejecting the principle of independence and uniqueness thesis and, by not breaking the ideal peer disagreement. Finally, the application of this position will be demonstrated on religious and non-religious beliefs, and it will be shown that even in an ideal peer disagreement on religious beliefs, individuals can keep their position. (shrink)

Many accounts of political liberalism contend that reasonable citizens ought to refrain from invoking their disputed comprehensive beliefs in public deliberation about constitutional essentials. Critics maintain that this ‘refraining condition’ puts pressure on citizens to entertain skepticism about their own basic beliefs, and that accounts of political liberalism committed to it are resultantly committed to a position – skepticism about conceptions of the good – that is itself subject to reasonable disagreement. Discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have tended to (...) reinforce this critique, which has come to be known as political liberalism’s skeptical problem. This paper responds to the skeptical problem by providing a novel rationale for the refraining condition, which I call the burden of total experience. Such a burden emphasizes that full communication on the basis of individual belief is not always possible, even between epistemic peers. Accepting the burden of total experience allows individuals to recognize the reasonableness of the refraining condition in a way that stops the slide to skepticism, all while avoiding, or so I argue, relying on a problematically controversial explainer for disagreement. (shrink)

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal (...) evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed. (shrink)

In response to the self-undermining problem for modest accounts of rational belief, some have proposed that an agent may rationally lose confidence in the truth of these accounts, while continuing to believe as the accounts prescribe. Such agents believe akratically. Many reject the possibility of rational akrasia. Others have defended it—at least in cases where an agent rationally sees her own beliefs as more accurate than rational alternatives would be. This paper argues that akrasia can be rational, but that defending (...) rational akrasia based on an agent’s views about accuracy cannot succeed. Fortunately, however, the defense is not necessary. (shrink)

Moral disagreement is often invoked to support skeptical conclusions about moral judgment, typically by modeling it on the epistemology of peer disagreement. On the dominant picture, disagreement with a peer supplies higher-order evidence of error and thereby rationally requires suspension of judgment or a substantial reduction in confidence. We argue that this evidential picture is problematic, especially in the moral domain. First, the conditions for epistemic peerhood are difficult to specify and apply without arbitrariness, and this undermines the assumption that (...) disagreement is a uniform sign of error. Second, even where peerhood conditions are plausible, moral disagreement need not play the specific evidential role presupposed by the skeptical argument. Drawing on resources from social epistemology, we develop an alternative framework on which persistent moral disagreement can function as a structured form of collective inquiry, regulated by argumentative practices and epistemic institutions. On this view, steadfastness is not automatically a sign of epistemic arrogance; under appropriate conditions, it is compatible with epistemic humility, and it can contribute to both epistemic and moral improvement. (shrink)

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal (...) evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed. (shrink)

Philosophical experts persistently disagree on the answers to major questions; this serves as a key motivation for pessimism about progress in philosophy. We do not seem to advance on philosophical topics when there is little to no expert consensus on them. Beebee (2018) disagrees. According to her account Equilibrism, progress in philosophy is made by identifying equilibria that can withstand examination. Knowing or agreeing on which of them is the best is not required. Beebee claims that disagreements are no threat (...) to progress in her Equilibrist sense. In this paper, I scrutinize this claim. I first argue, in Beebee’s support, that Equilibrist progress is not affected by four different arguments from disagreement discussed in the literature. But I then show that persistent expert disagreements do nevertheless affect Equilibrism and threaten even Equilibrist progress. One issue concerns the fact that how to define an equilibrium of theoretical views is subject to controversy. The other issue concerns the fact that polarization and the epistemic uncertainty resulting from expert disagreements can hinder or stall progress. The upshot of my paper is thus that progress in the Equilibrist sense is still impacted by expert disagreements. (shrink)

Los desacuerdos profundos plantean un desafío central para la epistemología del desacuerdo, al involucrar conflictos persistentes y sistemáticos entre pares epistémicos que no pueden resolverse mediante argumentación ni apelando a nueva evidencia. Este trabajo busca explorar algunos aspectos de la estrategia de revisión de bisagras desarrollada en Lema (2023) y compararla con otras respuestas propuestas para afrontar este tipo de desacuerdos. Sostendremos que la revisión debisagras constituye una estrategia racional apta para disolver y superarciertos desacuerdos profundos sin por ello renunciar (...) a las pretensiones teóricas propias de la investigación filosófica y científica. Esta propuesta permite, además, ofrecer un modelo para reconstruir la superación de determinados desacuerdos en la historia de la filosofía y de la ciencia, y contribuye a delinear una concepción dinámica de la racionalidad epistémica. (shrink)

The main purpose of my paper is to work out an experiential notion of religious diversity. This means characterising religious diversity in terms of relational and doxastic features. Such a proposal differs from mainstream approaches to religious beliefs (at least from a philosophical viewpoint) because these handle the epistemic dimension of faith as a purely epistemic matter. On the contrary, my idea consists of highlighting how the epistemic evaluation of opposing religious propositions is the outcome of an interpersonal process of (...) evidence sharing wherein the particularities of the involved individuals matter. In the introductory section, I will define the topic of my paper. In the subsequent one, I will characterise how the mainstream approach to religious diversity and my own contrast. In the third section, I will develop in a few details the main reasons for why the epistemic approach is unsatisfactory. In the fourth one, I will provide a thought experiment for religious diversity, and I will set forth my considerations about what the thought experiment shows, with a focus on issues about the epistemology of religious disagreements. I will conclude my paper with a brief overview of the main consequences of my proposal. (shrink)

This entry provides an opinionated overview of central debates surrounding doxastic disagreement, focusing on doxastic states or attitudes such as beliefs and credences. It differentiates between various types of epistemologically significant disagreement based on the agents involved and the source of the disagreement. It also examines and evaluates current accounts of how peers should (rationally) address disagreement and highlights the fundamental principles that support these accounts.

Scientists often find themselves in disagreement with their peers, yet continue to hold fast to their views. While Conciliationism, a prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement, condemns such steadfastness as epistemically irrational, philosophers of science often defend it as rationally permissible–indeed, even beneficial for scientific progress. This tension gives rise to what we call the puzzle of scientific disagreement.

Permissivism is the claim that more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition can at least sometimes be justified by the same total body of evidence. Impermissivism, the negation of Permissivism, is commonly taken to involve evidentialist assumptions. The only versions of Permissivism consistent with evidentialist assumptions are those which combine coarse-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes with fine-grained accounts of evidential support, as with Blake Roeber’s equipollent cases or vice-versa with fine-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes combined with coarse-grained accounts of (...) evidential support as with Thomas Kelly’s Intuitive Credal Permissivism (ICP). This paper argues that such mismatches in granularity are not justified. I address various motivations for mismatched granularities and show in each case that the argument for the mismatch does not succeed. If these arguments succeed, Permissive views consistent with certain evidentialist assumptions are not tenable. (shrink)

Following Robert Fogelin’s work, philosophers have traditionally analysed deep disagreements in Wittgenstein’s thought through the lens of “On Certainty.” This paper explores another fruitful avenue for understanding Wittgenstein’s views on deep disagreements: this avenue lies in examining the form of disagreement that arises between believers and non-believers, as documented in his “Lectures on Religious Belief”. Drawing on this text and others, I will try to demonstrate how deep disagreement, starting from a situation of incompatibility and mutual non-persuasiveness between the parties, (...) can, through the intermediary stage of mutual partial emotive understanding, lead sometimes to an extreme form of resolution: the conversion of one’s own way of seeing things to that of the other party. This conversion, however, does not rely on an appeal to explanations, reasons, or rationality. Instead, it appeals to the overcoming of a blockage by the will. This concept of a complete reorientation of one’s own perspective is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and may even be considered the ultimate goal of his mature work. (shrink)

So far, the peer disagreement literature has focused on determining the rational response to the discovery that a peer disagrees with you. I think we should also focus on determining the moral response to peer disagreement. I provide two fully distinct arguments for the conclusion that we have moral reason to conciliate with our peer. First, I demonstrate that we have a moral duty, on pain of disrespect, to factor in the higher-order evidence of our peer’s reliability and the fact (...) of peer disagreement. Factoring this in will often result in at least some conciliation. Second, I argue that practicing the moral virtue of open-mindedness rationally requires lowering confidence. And while there is no moral duty to be open-minded, it is on balance morally preferable to be open-minded, particularly in cases (like peer disagreement) where you have no epistemic reason to suspect that being open-minded will lead you astray. I close by explaining the ramifications of my claim for the relationship between moral and epistemic norms. (shrink)

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...) steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief. (shrink)

Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: the Solution Responses which deny Conciliationism is self-undermining and (...) attempt to provide arguments which demonstrate this; and the Skeptical Responses which accept that Conciliationism is self-undermining but attempt to mitigate this result by arguing this is either impermanent and/or not very worrisome. I argue that, by Conciliationism’s own lights, both kinds of responses (almost certainly) fail to save Conciliationism from being self-undermining. Thus, Conciliationism is (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining. This result is significant because it demonstrates that Conciliationism is likely hopeless: there is likely nothing that can save Conciliationism from this challenge. I further argue that Conciliationism, like any view, should be abandoned if it is (almost certainly) hopeless. (shrink)

I present a counterexample to Kirk-Giannini’s Dilemmatic Theory of gaslighting.

Parties to collective decisions in social and political life can have both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons to accept compromise agreements. According to one view, parties sometimes have non-instrumental epistemic reason for moral compromise. The strongest argument for this view asserts that the fact of disagreement between epistemic peers gives them reason to be more tentative about the beliefs in dispute. I argue that this epistemic peerhood argument fails. First, epistemic peerhood is unlikely to imply that parties should be more tentative (...) in their moral beliefs in conditions where the burdens of judgment make reasonable moral disagreement unsurprising. Second, even if epistemic peerhood does sometimes have this implication, this fact would generate reasons for correction rather than reasons for compromise. Reasons for compromise arise from the conflictual nature of disagreement in collective decision making, not from any evidentiary significance that disagreement may or may not have. (shrink)

Recent debates about disagreement’s significance have largely focused on its _epistemic_ significance. However, given how much attention has already been paid to its epistemic significance, we might well wonder: what significance might disagreement have when we consider other related normative domains? And, in particular, what significance might it have when we consider the broader _domain of inquiry,_ or what some thinkers have called either the “zetetic” or “erotetic” domain? In response, this paper suggest three things. Firstly, it suggests how we (...) might clarify the relations among the epistemic, erotetic, and zetetic domains of normativity, given their potential differences and incompatibilities. Then, it suggests that disagreement’s significance within inquiry can either be tied to erotetic norms or to either of two sorts of zetetic norms: vindication-directed or possession-directed norms. And finally, it suggests preferred answers to the question of what disagreement’s _distinctly_ zetetic significance might be, given the participating inquirers’ ordinarily-conceived zetetic standings and how their sets of dialectically accessible evidence might compare. (shrink)

Both aestheticians and social epistemologists are concerned with disagreement. However, in large part, their literature has yet to overlap substantially in terms of discussing whether there are viable conceptions of aesthetic peerhood and what the significance of aesthetic peer disagreement might be as a result. This article aims to address this gap. Taking cues from both the aesthetics and social epistemological literature, it develops several conceptions of aesthetic peerhood that are not only constituted by various forms of cognitive peerhood and (...) affective peerhood, but which are also framed by a specific model of ordinary peer disagreement. For each of these conceptions, it suggests what the significance of ordinary aesthetic peer disagreement might be and how future discussions about it might proceed for both aestheticians and social epistemologists alike. (shrink)

Recently, epistemologists have been much concerned with the question of whether or not we have to revise our beliefs if there are people whose epistemic position is as good as ours and who disagree with us. The results of such considerations, whatever they are, are sometimes said to be restricted to domains in which, unlike in politics or law, the relevant agents are not under any pressure to act in accordance with their beliefs, have no deeply held ideological beliefs, or (...) have no beliefs that stem from their particular aims or desires. In response to this, and with regard to the paradigmatic cases of politics and law, this article argues that there are no genuine political or legal disagreements: what we call a political or legal disagreement is either no disagreement at all but a mere clash of interest, or it is a an empirical, moral, or practical disagreement that is not genuinely political or legal. To the latter, epistemological insights apply; to the former, they do not. (shrink)

This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

In his book Meinungsverschiedenheiten (engl.: Disagreement) Marc Andree Weber defends a probability based conception of epistemic peerhood. Starting from this conception he proves the equal weight thesis, which prescribes that one should allocate the same weight to the beliefs of epistemic peers as to one's own beliefs. – In the present article I provide a much shorter proof. For that purpose I first formalize Weber's definition and thesis and I close the argumentative gap between the two of them by making (...) relatively few additions. Toward the end, I will document the differences between Weber's proof and my proof and indicate the relevance of a second proof. No judgmental assessment will be sought. (shrink)

Extending Alvin Plantinga’s model of warranted belief to the beliefs of groups as a whole, I argue that if the dogmatic beliefs of the Catholic Church are true, they are also warranted. Catholic dogmas are warranted because they meet the three conditions of my model: they are formed (1) by ministers functioning properly (2) in accordance with a design plan that is oriented towards truth and reliable (3) in a social environment sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed. (...) I show that according to Catholic doctrine the authoritative spokespersons of the Church—ecumenical councils and popes—meet these conditions when defining dogmas. I also respond to the objection that the warrant of Catholic dogmas is defeated by the plurality of non-Catholic Christian sects that deny Catholic dogmas. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of the resolution of deep disagreements. It argues that although it is impossible to resolve them rationally through traditional argumentation, as Fogelin has pointed out, this does not entail that suspending judgment is the only way to overcome them. The article proposes an alternative strategy termed “hinge revision”, which consists in examining and modifying the fundamental commitments that give sense to the disagreement, thereby dissolving its problematic character. It is argued that although this strategy does (...) not constitute a form of rational resolution, it does represent a rational way of overcoming deep disagreements without halting theoretical progress. This proposal allows us to understand the abandonment of certain problems following the emergence of new conceptual frameworks. The paper concludes that this strategy offers a legitimate alternative to the suspension of judgment and contributes to a new understanding of deep disagreements. (shrink)

(OPEN ACCESS) This paper establishes moral duties for intermediaries of political advertising in election campaigns. First, I argue for a collective duty to maintain the democratic quality of elections which entails a duty to contain some forms of political polarization. Second, I show that the focus of campaign ethics on candidates, parties and voters—ignoring the mediators of campaigns—yields mistaken conclusions about how the burdens of the latter collective duty should be distributed. Third, I show why it is fair to require (...) intermediaries to contribute to fulfilling this duty: they have an ultimate filtering position in the campaign communication process and typically benefit from political advertising and polarization. Finally, I argue that a transparency-based ethics of campaign advertising cannot properly accommodate a concern with objectionable polarization. By contrast, I outline the polarization-containing implications of my account, including a prohibition on online targeted advertising, and intermediaries’ duties to block hateful political advertising. (shrink)

Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown (...) to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested. (shrink)

When we first meet Kim Wexler in Better Call Saul we see someone who appears to offer a moral counterbalance to Jimmy McGill. She encourages him to stay within the boundaries of the law, and to stop committing trademark infringement to spite Howard from HHM, for example. With each season we get to know Kim better and gradually we see that Kim’s real objections to Jimmy’s lies and scams are often more practical than moral. However, there are a number of (...) occasions across the seasons of the show where there does seem to be a real conflict between Kim and Jimmy’s moral beliefs. Deep and seemingly irresolvable disagreement with others about moral matters is something we all experience in our lives. It may be a paradigmatic disagreement over whether abortion is morally permissible, or a disagreement over whether it’s always wrong to lie to a client. Cases of moral disagreement are especially troubling when the person who disagrees with us is someone who we take to be just as informed about the issue, smart, and open-minded. Are we justified in maintaining the same confidence in our belief after learning of our disagreement with someone just as capable of reasoning about the matter and just as informed? Should we suspend judgment about what the right view is? The same questions arise when the disagreement concerns nonmoral beliefs, such as whether some action poses too much risk to one’s career. In this chapter I will take a look at different answers to these questions through an examination of some disagreements between Kim and Jimmy and how they respond to them in the short term and in the long term. Some of the disagreements are primarily moral disagreements. Others are not clearly moral, but instead primarily about risks and career decisions. As we will see, whether we are justified in maintaining the same confidence in our belief upon discovering the disagreement may depend on the type of disagreement. (shrink)

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

While many have argued that moral disagreement poses a challenge to moral knowledge, the precise nature of this challenge is controversial. Indeed, in the moral epistemology literature, there are many different versions of ‘the’ argument from moral disagreement to moral scepticism. This paper contributes to this vast literature on moral disagreement by arguing for two theses: 1. All (or nearly all) moral disagreement arguments share an underlying structure; and, 2. All moral disagreement arguments that satisfy this underlying structure cannot establish (...) moral scepticism because this underlying structure leads to a previously unrecognized reductio ad absurdum. In short, I argue that this reductio argument (very likely) refutes all versions of the moral disagreement to moral scepticism argument in one fell swoop. (shrink)

Many of our ideological, political, moral, religious, aesthetic, scientific beliefs, as well as those concerning everyday life, are controversial; other people do not share them. As a rule, that does not bother us much: we tend to retain our contestable beliefs even if we ascribe no less skill and well-informedness to those who represent other points of view than to ourselves. But is that really reasonable? Shouldn't we often admit that we might be as wrong as others? And if we (...) do, shouldn't this consequently lead us to give up many of our beliefs in favor of agnostic attitudes? Marc Andree Weber argues that in the face of disagreement with equally competent and well-informed interlocutors we should almost always refrain from insisting on our controversial beliefs – with the few exceptions being all the more remarkable. (shrink)

When you learn that you disagree with an epistemic peer, what should you believe about the proposition you disagree about? The epistemology of peer disagreement has made considerable progress in answering this question. But to this point, we have largely neglected a significant resource which can help us to determine how peers who disagree can rationally respond to their disagreement. Closely examining actual disagreements in scientific and nonscientific contexts can help us to understand why peers find themselves in disagreement. And (...) knowing why you disagree with your peer can help you to understand how you can rationally respond to your disagreement. Examining specific scientific and nonscientific disagreements shows us that some peers disagree because they disagree about what evidence is relevant to the proposition they disagree about. Dual disagreements about propositions and evidence can be found in numerous areas of disagreement, including ethical, political, philosophical, and scientific arenas. When you find yourself in these dual disagreements, you can rationally believe that your belief is rational and that your peer’s belief, though it diverges from yours, is also rational. But some philosophers have suggested that this situation in which you and your peer have rational beliefs and recognize each other as holding rational beliefs is impossible. A primary motivation for thinking that at least one of you must be believing irrationally is the thesis of Uniqueness about rationality, which states that at most one doxastic attitude can be rationally held given a body of evidence. However, when you consider the epistemic context of your actual disagreements with your peer carefully, you need not think that at least one of you is believing irrationally, even if Uniqueness is true. In response to your disagreement with a peer who disagrees with you both about what evidence is relevant to the proposition you disagree about and the proposition itself, you can even rationally hold a belief which splits the connection between your evidence and your evidence about your evidence. When we consider their epistemic contexts in full relief, peers in disagreement can simultaneously be believing rationally, even if only one of them is right. -/- . (shrink)

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...) with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy. (shrink)

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues. This amounts to a fascinating and disturbing kind of intellectual scepticism. A crucial piece of the sceptical argument, however, is that our opponents on such topics are epistemic peers. In this paper, I examine the reasons for why we might think that our opponents really are such peers, and I argue that those reasons are either too weak or too strong, (...) implying absurd conclusions. Thus, there is not a compelling case for disagreement-based intellectual scepticism. (shrink)

This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.

In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would be acceptable and unproblematic to regard as (...) epistemic. (shrink)

The paper is a defense of the thesis that there are situations in which morally virtuous persons who are epistemic peers may disagree about what to do without either person being rationally required to change his or her judgment (a version of the Steadfast position in the epistemology of disagreement debate). The argument is based in part on similarities between decisions of virtuous agents and other practical decisions such as a baseball manager’s decision to change pitchers during a game. In (...) both cases, the role and responsibilities of the person making the decision and the complexities of the decision favor the Steadfast position. At the end of the paper, the argument for this position is compared with discussions of traditional arguments against moral objectivity that are based onmoral disagreements, and it is suggested that they involve rather different considerations. (shrink)