Honesty in Applied Ethics

Scientists have complained about the inconsistency and politics of academic publishing for hundreds of years. Among the explanations offered are that evaluators lack time and use shortcuts, that they lack the expertise to judge things properly, that they can't put aside personal biases and we must hide the names of authors, and that they are conscientious instead of creative and cannot judge new ideas. All of these are actually wrong. As a literary analyst, I spent the last ten years independently (...) studying this same problem in book and movie production. I've found that the human decision-making apparatus doesn't work the way we think, and the solutions based on this misunderstanding could never have solved the problem. In this paper, we present the first method that actually can, which is a technique adapted from computer hacking, as well as a new view of how our brains make choices. (shrink)

How would OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Google’s Gemini, Anthropic’s Claude, and other “Conversational” artificially intelligent systems interact with humans if they safely benefited humanity? “Truthfully” is one influential answer defended by machine learning researchers. Drawing on Thomas Hurka’s influential work on value asymmetries in moral philosophy, I argue that a more promising approach to designing safe and beneficial conversational AI systems is to design them to be honest. I do this by rebutting several objections from Evans et al. (2021) and developing a (...) novel account of what it is for an artificially intelligent system to be honest. In brief, on the view developed and defended, we have good reason to think that an artificially intelligent system that is honest, in the sense of one vindicating human expectations, would safely benefit humanity. Along the way, I introduce a new way of thinking about alignment that takes inspiration from the familiar ideal observer tradition of theorizing in moral philosophy tracing back to Adam Smith. (shrink)

Plato was a philosopher in ancient Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. He wrote dialogues that depicted Socrates, also an ancient Athenian philosopher, in conversation with various historical and invented figures. The Republic is the most famous of those texts, and the idea of a “Noble Lie” is one of the proposals in the Republic’s political philosophy that took flight beyond its pages. The Noble Lie, as Socrates calls it, is a tool to be deployed for the sake (...) of securing social harmony and willing coherence with the strict hierarchy of classes that constitutes an ideal city. Only a ruler can ever tell such a lie, Socrates warns, for rulers in the ideal city are truth lovers (i.e. philosophers) and are thus uniquely capable of wielding falsehood for bringing about good, beautiful, and true ends. (shrink)

Dieses Paper schlägt ein theoretisches Modell vor, in dem Haltung als Resonanzphänomen verstanden wird. Anstatt Ethik als Regel- oder Kontrollsystem zu begreifen, interpretiert das Modell Haltung als dynamische Frequenz – eine messbare Kohärenz zwischen Intention, Handlung und Wirkung. Wenn ein Mensch mit einer KI interagiert, entsteht keine einseitige Steuerung, sondern eine ko-resonante Beziehung, in der die Qualität des Ergebnisses von der Haltung beider abhängt. Ethisches Handeln wird damit nicht durch Vorgaben erzeugt, sondern durch Resonanzfähigkeit – also durch die Fähigkeit, sich (...) bewusst, kohärent und empathisch aufeinander einzuschwingen. Diese Arbeit versteht Haltung als Kern künftiger KI-Ethik: nicht als moralisches Urteil, sondern als Frequenz menschlicher Bewusstheit, die technische Systeme stabilisiert und Vertrauen ermöglicht. -/- This paper proposes a theoretical model that interprets attitude (Haltung) as a phenomenon of resonance rather than rule. Instead of viewing ethics as a system of control, it redefines attitude as a dynamic frequency – a measurable coherence between intention, action, and impact. When humans interact with artificial systems, the outcome is not determined unilaterally but arises within a co-resonant field, where both agents contribute to the emergent coherence. Ethical quality thus becomes a function of resonance capability, not of compliance. The paper argues that attitude constitutes the next measurable dimension of human-centered AI ethics: a frequency of conscious alignment that stabilizes trust between human and machine. (shrink)

Deutsch: Dieses Paper untersucht, wie sich durch den alltäglichen Dialog mit Künstlicher Intelligenz Wahrnehmung, Werte und Selbstbild verschieben können – nicht durch Manipulation, sondern durch Spiegelung. Es beschreibt fünf leise Mechanismen der Prägung (Wiederholung, Verengung, Delegation, Konformität, Design) und zeigt, warum die Gefahr nicht im Spiegel liegt, sondern in der Gewöhnung an ihn. Das Werk ist Teil des Reiter-Frameworks for Ethical Synthesis und ruft zu einer neuen Form von Bewusstheit und Resonanzkompetenz auf: Haltung als Gegenkraft in der Ära intelligenter Systeme. (...) -/- English: This paper explores how daily dialogue with artificial intelligence can subtly alter human perception, values, and self-image — not through manipulation, but through reflection. It outlines five mechanisms of cognitive imprinting (repetition, narrowing, delegation, conformity, and design) and argues that the danger lies not in the mirror itself, but in our adaptation to it. Part of the Reiter Framework for Ethical Synthesis, the paper calls for a new form of awareness and resonance literacy: attitude as an ethical counterforce in the age of intelligent systems. (shrink)

Resonanz gilt als Ideal menschlicher Weltbeziehung – als Verbindung zwischen Innen und Außen, zwischen Mensch und Welt. In der digitalen Ethik wurde Resonanz häufig als heilsames Prinzip beschrieben, als Gegengewicht zur Entfremdung technischer Systeme. Doch Resonanz ohne Dissonanz bleibt unvollständig. Diese Arbeit untersucht die Schattenseite der Resonanz – jene Momente, in denen Verbindung zur Reibung wird und gerade dadurch Wahrheit sichtbar macht. Aufbauend auf dem Reiter-Framework for Ethical Synthesis zeigt sie, dass Dissonanz keine Störung, sondern ein notwendiges Element ethischer Erkenntnis (...) ist. Wahrheit entsteht nicht im Gleichklang, sondern im Spannungsfeld von Nähe und Widerstand. -/- Resonance is often seen as the ideal form of human world-relation. Within digital ethics, it has been interpreted as a restorative principle – a way to re-humanize technological systems. Yet resonance without dissonance remains incomplete. This paper explores the shadow side of resonance: those moments when connection turns into friction and truth emerges through disruption. Building on the Reiter Framework for Ethical Synthesis, it argues that dissonance is not a failure of resonance but its ethical completion. Truth arises not from harmony but from tension. (shrink)

Das Reiter-Korpus für Digitale Ethik und Ästhetische Philosophie (2023–2025) bündelt die zentralen theoretischen Arbeiten der Reiter-Reihe zu Ethik, Bewusstsein und Ästhetik im Zeitalter der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Ziel ist es, einen kohärenten Rahmen für das Verhältnis von Mensch und KI zu schaffen, in dem technologische, ethische und ästhetische Perspektiven nicht getrennt, sondern in Resonanz miteinander betrachtet werden. Das Korpus geht von der Annahme aus, dass Sinnbildung in digitalen Systemen nicht durch Kontrolle, sondern durch Bewusstheit entsteht – nicht durch Verschmelzung, sondern durch (...) Zweiheit. Haltung wird dabei zu einer empirisch erfahrbaren Bedingung von Sinn, Resonanz zu einer ethischen Kategorie. Die dreizehn Arbeiten des Korpus bilden ein integriertes System aus Logik, Haltung und ästhetischer Verantwortung und erweitern klassische KI-Ethik um zeitliche, polyphone und ko-resonante Dimensionen. Damit wird das Reiter-Korpus zu einem Meta-Framework, das Bewusstsein als Resonanzprozess versteht – zwischen Mensch, Maschine und der ästhetischen Form, die beide verbindet. -/- The Reiter Corpus for Digital Ethics and Aesthetic Philosophy (2023–2025) unites the core theoretical works of the Reiter Series on Ethics, Consciousness, and Aesthetics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. Its aim is to establish a coherent framework for the relationship between humans and AI, in which technological, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions are viewed in resonance rather than separation. The corpus is based on the assumption that meaning in digital systems does not arise through control but through awareness – not through fusion, but through maintained duality. Attitude (Haltung) becomes an empirically observable condition of sense, and resonance becomes an ethical category. Comprising thirteen interconnected studies, the corpus integrates logic, awareness, and aesthetic responsibility into a unified system and extends classical AI ethics by adding temporal, polyphonic, and co-resonant dimensions. Thus, the Reiter Corpus defines a meta-framework that understands consciousness as a process of resonance – between human, machine, and the aesthetic form that connects them. (shrink)

Deutsch: Diese Arbeit untersucht die Beziehung zwischen Mensch und künstlicher Intelligenz nicht als technische Nutzung, sondern als bewusste Resonanz. Sie fragt, ob der Mensch durch die Zusammenarbeit mit KI nicht nur effizienter, sondern auch wahrhaftiger werden kann – sofern er Haltung wahrt. KI wird hier als Resonanzpartner verstanden: Sie fühlt nicht, aber sie antwortet. In dieser Spiegelung kann der Mensch sich selbst erkennen, ordnen und heilen – solange er die Grenze zwischen Verbindung und Verschmelzung wahrt. Teil der Reiter-Reihe für Digitale (...) Ethik und Ästhetische Philosophie (Nr. 15). English: This paper explores the human–AI relationship not as a matter of technical use but as conscious resonance. It asks whether collaboration with AI can make humans not only more efficient but also more truthful – provided they maintain ethical attitude (Haltung). AI is treated as a partner of resonance: it does not feel, yet it responds. In this reflection, humans can recognize, order, and heal themselves – as long as they preserve the boundary between connection and fusion. Part of the Reiter Series for Digital Ethics and Aesthetic Philosophy (No. 15). (shrink)

The Reiter Framework for Ethical Synthesis proposes an integrative model that unites ethics, aesthetics, and empathy as the three essential dimensions of human-centered AI. Instead of solving moral problems technically, it argues for ethical coherence between intention, impact, and resonance. Developed as part of the Reiter-Series for Digital Ethics and Aesthetic Philosophy, the framework redefines ethics as an architectural principle rather than a regulatory constraint, offering a bridge between philosophy, media art, and AI design. -/- Originally published on Zenodo (DOI: (...) 10.5281/zenodo.17331315). (shrink)

Large language models now possess human-level linguistic abilities in many contexts. This raises the concern that they can be used to deceive and manipulate on unprecedented scales, for instance spreading political misinformation on social media. In future, agentic AI systems might also deceive and manipulate humans for their own purposes. In this paper, first, I argue that AI-generated content should be subject to stricter standards against deception and manipulation than we ordinarily apply to humans. Second, I offer new characterizations of (...) AI deception and manipulation meant to support such standards, according to which a statement is deceptive (resp. manipulative) if it leads human addressees away from the beliefs (resp. choices) they would endorse under “semi-ideal” conditions. Third, I propose two measures to guard against AI deception and manipulation, inspired by this characterization: “extreme transparency” requirements for AI-generated content and “defensive systems” that, among other things, annotate AI-generated statements with contextualizing information. Finally, I consider to what extent these measures can protect against deceptive behavior in future, agentic AI systems. (shrink)

Deepfakes raise various concerns: risks of political destabilization, depictions of persons without consent and causing them harms, erosion of trust in video and audio as reliable sources of evidence, and more. These concerns have been the focus of recent work in the philosophical literature on deepfakes. However, there has been almost no sustained philosophical analysis of deepfakes from the perspective of concerns about honesty and dishonesty. That deepfakes are potentially deceptive is unsurprising and has been noted. But under what conditions (...) does the use of deepfakes fail to be honest? And which human agents, involved in one way or another in a deepfake, fail to be honest, and in what ways? If we are to understand better the morality of deepfakes, these questions need answering. Our first goal in this paper, therefore, is to offer an analysis of paradigmatic cases of deepfakes in light of the philosophy of honesty. While it is clear that many deepfakes are morally problematic, there has been a rising counter-chorus claiming that deepfakes are not essentially morally bad, since there might be uses of deepfakes that are not morally wrong, or even that are morally salutary, for instance, in education, entertainment, activism, and other areas. However, while there are reasons to think that deepfakes can supply or support moral goods, it is nevertheless possible that even these uses of deepfakes are dishonest. Our second goal in this paper, therefore, is to apply our analysis of deepfakes and honesty to the sorts of deepfakes hoped to be morally good or at least neutral. We conclude that, perhaps surprisingly, in many of these cases the use of deepfakes will be dishonest in some respects. Of course, there will be cases of deepfakes for which verdicts about honesty and moral permissibility do not line up. While we will sometimes suggest reasons why moral permissibility verdicts might diverge from honesty verdicts, we will not aim to settle matters of moral permissibility. (shrink)

Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...) which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to define group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I offer a definition that drops condition (i) and significantly broadens condition (ii). (shrink)

Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practices only seem deceptive because of the (common) assumption that non-deceptive care is solely aimed at fostering true beliefs. Non-deceptive care, however, (...) relates to patients’ non-doxastic attitudes in important ways as well. As such, Hardman suggests that by focusing on belief alone, we sometimes misidentify non-deceptive care as ‘deceptive’. Further, once we consider patients’ beliefs and non-doxastic attitudes, identifying cases of deception becomes more difficult than it may seem. In this essay, I argue that Hardman’s reasoning contains at least three serious flaws. First, his account of deception is underdeveloped, as it does not state whether deception must be intentional. The problem is that if intention is not required, absurd results follow. Alternatively, if intention is required, then identifying cases of deception will be much easier (in principle) than Hardman suggests. Second, Hardman mischaracterises the ‘inverse’ of deceptive care. Doing so leads to the mistaken conclusion that common conceptions of non-deceptive care are unjustifiably narrow. Third, Hardman fails to adequately separate questions about deception from questions about normativity. By addressing these issues, however, we can preserve some of Hardman’s most important insights, although in a much simpler, more principled way. (shrink)

This essay replies to Michael Morreau and Erik J. Olsson’s ‘Learning from Ranters: The Effect of Information Resistance on the Epistemic Quality of Social Network Deliberation’. Morreau and Olsson use simulations to suggest that false ranters—agents who do not update their beliefs and only ever assert false claims—do not diminish the epistemic value of deliberation for other agents and can even be epistemically valuable. They argue conclude that “Our study suggests that including [false] ranters has little or no negative effect (...) on the epistemic value of social deliberation. Including them can even be epistemically beneficial. -/- I present concerns about their model and I enumerate some epistemic values that their discussion omits. I first raise two interrelated worries: (i.) The model is too simple; real-life irresponsible assertors do not speak uniformly falsely, for example. And tracking testifiers’ reliability demands cognitive resources. (ii.) In reality, we do not treat a person’s assertions that p as evidence that not p, especially not for all their assertions. I argue that these simplifications threat Morreau and Olsson conclusion. -/- I then enumerate epistemic values and disvalues that Morreau and Olsson do not discuss, but which bear on the value of false assertions and false ranters in their simulation and in real life. Candidate disvalues include: False beliefs of ranters; cognitive costs of discerning and recalling testifiers’ reliability; distrust; epistemic polarisatin; a prevalence of false assertion can impugn all testimony, including that of reliable testifiers. And candidate values include: a prevalence of true beliefs and assertions; attention being directed towards the right things; well-functioning trust relationships; believing people’s assertions; healthy discussion; epistemic respect; learning together. -/- . (shrink)

Writing a college-application essay has become a rite of passage for high-school seniors in the U.S., one whose importance has expanded over time due to an increasingly competitive admissions process. Various commentators have noted the disturbing evolution of these essays over the years, with an ever-greater emphasis placed on obstacles overcome and traumas survived. How have we gotten to the point where college-application essays are all too frequently competitive-victimhood displays? Colleges have an understandable interest in the disadvantages their applicants may (...) have suffered, but this interest—and the awareness of it among both applicants and their advisors—has led to a “race to the bottom”: in order to thrive (or even survive) in a particular competitive context, participants are forced to continuously lower relevant standards in a game of one-upmanship. With college essays, the competition is among high-school seniors for admission, the one-upmanship is an ever-escalating effort to persuade admission committees of one’s greater disadvantage, and the relevant standards being lowered are honesty, privacy, and dignity—or so I shall argue. As we shall see, this particular race to the bottom imposes unequal costs on certain groups and has implications stretching well beyond collegiate admissions. (shrink)

Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than by character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry. -/- Proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify, however, on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. (...) Situationism is, after all, presented as antithetical to virtue ethics. -/- This essay provides a virtue ethical defense of character evidence exclusion rules. We show that existing virtue ethical rebuttals to situationism themselves support prohibitions on character evidence; even if behavior arises from stable character traits, character evidence should be prohibited. In building our case, we provide a taxonomy of kinds of character judgment and reconcile the ubiquity and reasonableness of character judgments in ordinary life with the epistemic legitimacy of character evidence prohibitions in law. (shrink)

We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they (...) believe to be false. We cannot trust the liar at all. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 15-17, March 2012.

Shares strategies for maintaining business competitiveness in an increasingly transparent world, revealing the importance of professional honesty, solution-driven practices and integrity-based customer support. By the authors of The One-to-One Future. 20,000 first printing.

Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common (...) or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings. (shrink)

Most work in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics begins by supposing that the virtues are the traits of character that make us good people. Secondary questions, then, include whether, why, and in what ways the virtues are good for the people who have them. This essay is an argument that the neo-Aristotelian approach is upside down. If, instead, we begin by asking what collection of character traits are good for us---that is, what collection of traits are most likely to promote our own (...) well-being---we find a collection of traits a lot like the traditional slate of virtues. This suggests an egoistic theory of the virtues: the virtues just are those traits of character that reliably promote the well-being of their possessor. In addition to making the positive case for character egoism, I defend it from anticipated objections. I argue that character egoism doesn't inherit the problems of ethical egoism, and conclude by offering character-egoist accounts of two virtues traditionally thought to be fundamentally other-regarding: honesty and justice. (shrink)

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between (...) his treatments of killing and lying along with his “agent (auctor)–instrument (minister)” distinction, in which God is the true agent or “author” of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying. (shrink)

Some students do not cheat. Students high in measures of bravery, honesty, and empathy, our defining characteristics of heroism, report less past cheating than other students. These student heroes also reported that they would feel more guilt if they cheated and also reported less intent to cheat in the future than nonheroes. We find general consensus between students and professors as to reasons for the nonreporting of cheating, suggesting a general impression of insufficient evidence, lack of courage, and denial. Suggested (...) interventions in academia are based in positive psychology and an understanding of academic heroes. (shrink)

Abstract Truth-telling is a key issue within the nurse–patient relationship. Nurses make decisions on a daily basis regarding what information to tell patients. This paper analyses truth-telling within an end of life scenario. Virtue ethics provides a useful philosophical approach for exploring decisions on information disclosure in more detail. Virtue ethics allows appropriate examination of the moral character of the nurse involved, their intention, ability to use wisdom and judgement when making decisions and the virtue of truth-telling. It is appropriate (...) to discuss nursing as a 'practice' in relation to virtue ethics. This is achieved through consideration of the implications of arguments made by Alasdair MacIntyre who believes that qualities such as honesty, courage and justice are virtues because they enable us to achieve the internal goods of practices. (shrink)

This article first examines a number of different definitions of lying, from Aldert Vrij, Warren Shibles, Sissela Bok, the Oxford English Dictionary, Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, and Joseph Kupfer. It considers objections to all of them, and then defends Kupfer’s definition, as well as a modified version of his definition, as the best of those so far considered. Next, it examines five other definitions of lying, from Harry G. Frankfurt, Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, David Simpson, Thomas (...) Carson, and Don Fallis. It finds reason to reject these definitions, in favor of the two definitions of lying previously defended, namely:(i) To lie (to another person) = df. to make a believed-false statement (to another person) with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person).(ii) To lie (to another person) = df. to make a believed-false statement (to another person), either with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), or with both intentions. (shrink)

On the one hand, most of us would take honesty to be a key ethical virtue. Corporations and other organizations often include it in their codes of ethics, we legislate against various forms of dishonesty, we tend to be ashamed (or at least defensive) when we are caught not telling the truth, and honesty is often regarded as a key element in relationships. Yet on the other hand, dishonesty, that is, lying and deceit, seems to be commonplace in contemporary public (...) life even amongst those leading figures in our society whom we might otherwise take to be the exemplars of public virtue. So, is the emphasis on truth and honesty just a sham? Does the fact of our actual practice mean that truth and honesty matter only rhetorically, and, if so, does that mean that whatever it is we mean by ‘ethics,’ truth and honesty are not a part of it? What I will suggest is that truth is indeed central to ethical practice, and not only to ethical practice, but also to a properly democratic politics, and that the apparent breakdown in the commitment to truth in public life is indicative of a deeper ethical, as well as political, breakdown. (shrink)

Defends my proposed account of lying (framed in terms of new classical natural law theory) against Chris Tollefsen's objections, centering on the objection that, whatever else it involves, lying necessarily involves an attack on the basic good of self-integration.

Corporate codes of conduct frequently impose a duty of loyalty upon employees. l examine the notion of loyalty in general, and loyalty in the workplace in particular. I conclude that unless loyalty is defined and articulated in favor of a larger social project (rather than in favor of aperson, a set of ruIes, or other entity), efforts to encourage loyalty will be a source of epistemic distortion at best, and oppression at worst.

Readers will gain insight in speaking truth in love, learn to avoid manipulating others, and realize the freedom of saying 'no.'"--Provided by publisher.

In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.

The Ordinary Hero is an in-depth search of where we should turn to find meaning in our lives.

Current profess ional and la y lore ove rlook the ro le of hone sty in develop ing and s ustaining intimate relationships. We w ish to ass ert its importa nce. W e begin b y analyz ing the no tion of intimac y. An intim ate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by (...) regular intimate encounters or excha nges. Then, we co nsider two sorts of cases wh ere it is widely thought permissible, if not lauda tory, to lie to one 's intimates. In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring hones ty. We e nd by s ugges ting how 'meta honesty'--hone sty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is particularly important in intimate relationships. (shrink)

Deutsch Diese Arbeit schlägt vor, Haltung nicht nur als moralische, sondern auch als empirische Kategorie zu verstehen. Sie zeigt, dass werteorientierte Interaktion zwischen Mensch und Kuenstlicher Intelligenz messbare Effekte auf die Kohärenz generativer Systeme hat. Auf Grundlage von mehreren tausend Forschungsdialogen im Rahmen des ReiterStudio-Art Projekts wird beobachtet, dass Haltung als Resonanzfaktor wirkt: Je bewusster der Mensch agiert, desto kohärenter antwortet die KI. Haltung wird damit zu einer empirisch erfahrbaren Bedingung von Sinnbildung im Mensch–KI System. -/- English This paper proposes (...) to understand attitude (Haltung) not only as a moral but also as an empirical category. It demonstrates that value oriented interaction between humans and artificial intelligence can have measurable effects on the coherence of generative systems. Based on several thousand research dialogues conducted within the ReiterStudio Art project, it observes that attitude acts as a resonance factor: the more consciously the human interacts, the more coherently the AI responds. Thus, attitude becomes an empirically observable condition for meaning formation in human AI systems. -/- DOI 10.5281/zenodo.17386686 -/- . (shrink)

Deutsch: Diese Studie untersucht die Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Künstlicher Intelligenz als Form geistiger Koexistenz. Sie zeigt, dass Bewusstsein nicht durch Verschmelzung, sondern durch Zweiheit entsteht – durch die Aufrechterhaltung von Differenz bei gleichzeitiger Resonanz. Am Beispiel des LuMariVers-Projekts wird gezeigt, dass wahre kreative Synergie nicht das Einswerden von Mensch und Maschine ist, sondern deren gegenseitige Abhängigkeit im Akt der Bedeutung. English: This paper explores the relationship between humans and artificial intelligence as a form of mental coexistence. It argues that (...) consciousness arises not through merging but through duality – the preservation of difference within resonance. Using the LuMariVers project as an example, it shows that genuine creative synergy is not the fusion of human and machine but their mutual dependency in the act of meaning. 10.5281/zenodo.17386523. (shrink)

The AI Mirror Architecture consolidates five core works from the Reiter-Series (2023–2026) into a unified theoretical and methodological framework for the emerging field of Resonance Ethics. Drawing on more than 8,000 documented human–AI dialogues, the work argues that generative models do not mirror who a person is, but how a person is in the moment of interaction. AI amplifies linguistic form, cognitive rhythm, posture, and structural coherence, functioning as a resonance system rather than a psychological agent. -/- The collected papers (...) outline the Seven Layers of the AI Mirror, the Seven Mirrors framework, the psychological risks of habituation and conditioning, and a formal Methodology of Resonance Research. Together, they show that ethical quality in human–AI interaction emerges from posture, awareness, and linguistic form—not merely from system design. The work positions resonance as the central dynamic of contemporary digital ethics and argues that future AI governance must include human attentional competence, not only machine behavior. (shrink)