Dispositions and Powers

Kant asserts that phenomena consist only in relations, a puzzling claim that appears difficult to reconcile with the reality of phenomenal change. This difficulty may be called the challenge of global relationality. This paper proposes a solution to this challenge by showing that Kant’s notion of relationality is grounded in the spatiality of phenomena and differs from typical contemporary accounts. A subset of empirical properties can be regarded as comparatively intrinsic, as they retain a genuine sense of intrinsicness while remaining (...) relational in space, and that real changes can take place in the phenomenal realm if they involve such properties. (shrink)

María Alvarez y la tradición de los two-way powers caracterizan la agencia por una marca modal: que su ejercicio esté up to the agent, que quepa hacer A o abstenerse de A. Queda abierta, sin embargo, la pregunta por su fundamento: ¿qué capacidad confiere ese poder de doble vía? La respuesta racionalista dominante lo funda en la racionalidad. Este artículo la disputa, y aporta un árbitro del que la literatura no disponía cuando formuló la tesis: la inteligencia artificial generativa. Estos (...) sistemas son racionales en su producto —producen inferencia articulada, indistinguible en forma de la humana— y sin embargo son de una sola vía: no cabe en ellos abstenerse. Si la racionalidad fundara el poder de doble vía, tales sistemas serían candidatos a la agencia; no lo son. El artículo sostiene una tesis acotada: lo que funda la doble vía no es la racionalidad, sino la capacidad de no precipitar el compromiso, de sostener abierto un resultado que ya podría cerrarse. Propone, como criterio discriminante, la prueba de la vía única: un sistema racional pero incapaz de diferir su propio cierre exhibe producto sin poder. La consecuencia es precisa: la razón opera dentro de un poder que no la presupone, y no al revés. (shrink)

There is widespread consensus that a view of nothing but powers or dispositional fundamental properties struggles to accommodate physical symmetries. An option is to expand the fundamental ontology admitting extra modal elements constraining the behaviour of physical systems. Another is to eliminate symmetries altogether deeming them as dispensable structures. Either option is problematic. The expansion strategy yields a problematic ontological inflation that undermines the explanatory ambitions of the powers view. The eliminativist approach, if unsupplemented, does not deliver a naturalistically respectable (...) view of symmetries and their role in contemporary physics. To avoid these problems, Samuel Kimpton-Nye (2023) has recently defended a promising solution to ground symmetries in powers taken collectively by defending a non-Humean Best System Account of nomic items. This paper critically examines Kimpton-Nye’s view of symmetries. We argue that it raises metaphysical and scientific concerns regarding their powerful grounds of symmetries and their physical features. As a more promising alternative, we argue for combining an ontology of fundamental powers with a deflationist account of symmetries. In contrast to Kimpton-Nye’s proposal, symmetries are not grounded collectively in powers, but they are epistemic, rule-prescribing principles in the Best Systems. Embracing the resulting view, we hold, is a better way to be a power theorist about symmetries. (shrink)

This working paper introduces and elaborates The Seven Existential Cages — a heuristic ontological framework developed within the Psycho-Cosmocide body of work at NATAKA Research Institute. The seven cages — Physical, Symbolic, Metaphysical, Technological, the Corridor of the Dead, the Cage of Absolute Unknowing, and the Cage of the Irreducible Other — are proposed as a diagnostic model of recurrent existential conditions observable across conscious and relational forms of life, within which the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV) operates. These conditions are (...) not exclusively human: they appear across a range of living organisms in varying degrees of complexity, and preceded every civilisation, every colonial encounter, and every technology. The paper develops each cage analytically, situates the framework within the wider Psycho-Cosmocide body of work, and positions the ontological cage architecture as a foundational diagnostic ground for the concept of Wonesis — the framework's proposed counter-movement of existential and cosmological reawakening. Philosophical, cosmological, and cross-species perspectives are integrated throughout. (shrink)

This paper argues that the deepest determinant of civilisational survival is neither military force nor economic wealth, but trust-based concentrated power rooted in ontological foundations. Drawing from the Psycho-Cosmocide framework and the cosmological vocabulary of the Lani people of West Papua, the paper develops a comprehensive theory of metaphysical power that distinguishes between coercive, symbolic, epistemic, and ontological dimensions of power, while demonstrating how trust integrates these dimensions into the most durable form of collective force across civilisational history. The paper (...) grounds this argument in Lani ontological architecture—AP, Ap-ap, Oʼgur, Muʼnggar, Aʼnggena, and Kugi—and traces the operation of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV) as a mechanism through which colonial power systematically destroys the internal conditions necessary for trust formation, converting the cosmologically intact Ap into Ap-ap: an ontological counterfeit that unknowingly performs the colonial order. The argument is situated in comparative engagement with the work of Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Walter Mignolo, Ibn Khaldūn, Enrique Dussel, Achille Mbembe, Martin Heidegger, Vine Deloria Jr., and Ubuntu philosophy. It argues that the Lani ontological framework both converges with and exceeds existing decolonial theory by providing a positive ontological architecture grounded in a living Indigenous tradition. The paper concludes that the Papuan experience of ontological dispossession reveals a wider civilisational crisis, and that the reconstruction of trust-based cosmobian life (a term coined within this framework and defined in the Key Conceptual Definitions section below) constitutes both a specifically Papuan liberation project and a contribution to the broader survival of civilisation itself. (shrink)

In The Possibility of Metaphysics, Jonathan hoped that a causal account of the persistence of compound entities might be forthcoming in future. I will argue that my account of causation in terms of reciprocal interaction (Ingthorsson 2002) allows us to understand the persistence and constitution of compound entities—roughly as these phenomena are standardly explained by the empirical sciences—as causal phenomena. Like other powers-based accounts, I characterise effects as the mutual manifestation of reciprocal interactions between powerful particulars. However, most friends of (...) powers follow the Aristotelian tradition in construing interactions between powerful particulars as unidirectional; one object acts while the other receives the influence. The problem is that modern science does not recognise any form of unidirectional action. It insists that whenever one object exerts an influence on another, the latter simultaneously exerts a proportional influence of the same kind on the first, but in the opposite direction. My account of causation accepts the reciprocity of causal interactions, and that allows me to include in the class of causal phenomena all physical bonds postulated by the sciences to explain the constitution of material entities and why they continue to constitute them over time. Such bonds are standardly described in terms of reciprocal interactions between constituent parts of any given compound. On my view, change, constitution, and persistence are merely different sides of the same coin: causation. (shrink)

What distinguishes things that are endowed with agency from those that lack it? Some scholars in the Aristotelian tradition suggest a distinction in terms of two kinds of powers: agents have both one-way and two-way powers; non-agents, by contrast, have only one-way powers. I call this view Aristotelianism. In this paper, I examine different ways to think of one-way and two-way powers. First, I argue that the conditional analysis faces a problem that resists well-known repair strategies for conditional analyses of (...) dispositions and abilities. Second, I argue that a prominent alternative to the conditional account, as well as variations of it, yield a certain form of Megarianism when combined with Aristotelianism: for non-agents, power collapses into actuality—that is, non-agents have the power to do something iff they manifest it. This might not be a knock-down argument against Aristotelianism, but does call for a reinvestigation of one-way and two-way powers. (shrink)

The notion of malfunction is critical to biological explanation. It provides a test-bed for the normative character of functional attribution. Theories of biological functioning must permit traits to operate but, at the same time, be judged as malfunctioning (in some naturalized, non-arbitrary sense). Whereas malfunctioning has attracted most attention and discussion in evolutionary etiological approaches, systemic and organizational ones have been less discussed. The most influential of the organizational approaches (by Saborido, Moreno and Mossio) takes a dual-order approach to malfunctions, (...) as a set of functions that fit first-order constitutive norms but fail to obey second-order regulatory ones. We argue that this conception is unnecessarily complicated (malfunctions do not need to arise as a result of two conflicting orders of norms) and too narrow (it excludes canonical cases of malfunctioning). We provide an alternative organizational account grounded on viability theory. The dynamics of the traits that constitute an organism define the normative field of its viability space: sugar must be replaced at certain rate, blood must be pumped at a certain pace, etc. A trait operates normatively when its effects on the viability space correlate positively with the normative field. Three senses of dysfunctionality might be distinguished: subfunctional operations are those that positively correlate with the normative field but quantitatively fail to match the required speed; malfunctional operations are those that do not positively correlate with the normative field; and, nonfunctional traits either don’t operate at all or operate with null effect on the normative field. (shrink)

This is the Author’s Accepted Manuscript for chapter 7 in V. Seifert, S. Ioannidis, S. Psillos (eds.), Laws and Powers in the Metaphysics of Science, Routledge (forthcoming 2026). I explore the metaphysical foundation of the principle of the uniformity of nature, especially the question of whether governing laws are indispensable or whether entities with powers are enough. I argue most worries about the latter stem from the prevailing assumption that to have a power P is to manifest M in stimulus (...) condition S. The worry is that entities with powers of that kind cannot account for the various scientific laws that describe the uniformity of nature. They might account for causal laws but not functional and conservation laws. I suggest the objection can be partly answered by showing that functional laws can be understood as causal under a physical interpretation; they are only functional when seen merely as mathematical equations. However, conservation laws are not causal, which opens for an indispensability argument for governing laws. But what is the ontology of governing laws? On most accounts they are second order entities supervening on first order properties. As has recently been pointed out (Hildebrand 2020), this presents laws both as grounded on, and grounding, first order properties. Ultimately, the powerful qualities view is proposed as a way to account for the uniformity of nature without postulating governing laws. (shrink)

Power theorists are divided among those who think that a dispositionalist metaphysics imbues the physical world with a dynamic and active aspect, and those who deny that. So far there has been little success in clarifying the exact nature of the two positions and their disagreement beyond trading metaphors. In this paper we suggest that one way to elucidate the idea that powers are dynamic and active is to think that a robust conception of change must play a central role (...) in power-based explanations. We use the grounding of modality as an example. We claim that friends of dynamic powers should embrace a specific version of Dispositionalism, one in which the modal facts change over time. We then argue that this view entails an especially strong version of Necessitism and Permanentism. In turn, according to an influential view in the philosophy of time, this amounts to adopting a Moving Spotlight Theory of time. We provide some details of this power-based moving spotlight theory, its features, and potential flaws. (shrink)

According to the principle No Upwards Essence, there are no cases in which some essentially depends on, yet grounds. One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue that DE only violates No Upwards Essence in the presence of further contentious assumptions that proponents of DE are not necessarily forced to accept. And second, I argue (...) that No Upwards Essence should not be adopted: The extant arguments in favor of the principle are wanting, and it is subject to counterexamples. (shrink)

This paper argues that Åsa Burman’s concept of telic power in nonideal social ontology can be deepened by integrating Michel Foucault’s account of power in both his mid-period work on governmentality and his later work on ethics. Telic power is the ability of individuals to act in relation to shared ideals. It emerges from two distinct but interrelated sources: (1) the internalization of ethical ideals through subject-formation and (2) governmentality as a structuring of conduct through rational norms and practices. To (...) capture how ideals circulate across both registers, I introduce the notion of ethical discourse – the socially embedded circulation of exemplary ideals and role models. Ethical discourse functions both as a medium of normalization and as a resource for self-formation. Drawing on feminist critiques of gendered ideals, such as postwar femininity, and a critique of neoliberalism, I argue that Foucault’s dual account of subjectivation and governmentality clarifies and expands Burman’s schema of telic and structural power, offering a richer framework for nonideal social ontology. (shrink)

A version of panpsychism emerges from a critical overview of the metaphysics of properties. The “powerful qualities theory,” according to which all concrete properties are equiprimordially powerful and qualitative, enjoys a general advantage over other major theories of properties. But it faces some issues. Chief is the Collapse Argument: the powerful qualities theory struggles to define powerful qualities in a way that distinguishes them conceptually from pure powers. But this issue is avoided by a variant of the powerful qualities theory (...) which makes powerful qualities “powerful qualia”: essentially dispositional instances of phenomenal consciousness. I reject a few attempts to sever the link between this powerful qualia theory of properties and panpsychism. The result, and the view I endorse, is a version of panpsychism: a panpsychism of powerful qualia. (shrink)

The Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) attempts to reconcile the eternalist picture of spacetime with the A-theorist’s commitment to a privileged, dynamically shifting present. Yet, MST faces longstanding challenges concerning metaphysical obscurity, motion, rate, and epistemic mismatch. Recent “wave-theoretic” successors developed by Kristie Miller and Nikk Effingham attempt to resolve these issues by reinterpreting the spotlight as an intrinsic structural feature of spacetime; either by identifying the present as a crest of causal manifestation, or as an occurrence of object constitution. This (...) thesis argues that while both models improve upon the obscurity of MST’s metaphorical spotlight, neither fully satisfies a reasonable set of desiderata needed for a defensible account of temporal passage. After identifying this need, I develop a theory dubbed the Manifest Constitutional Wave (MCW), a hybrid wave model that integrates Miller’s causal manifestation framework with Effingham’s relativized constitutional ontology, while avoiding their respective liabilities. MCW grounds passage in a dual-aspect, neutral-monist modal field whose dispositional structure reciprocally manifests both causal efficacy and object-constitution synchronously and diachronically across Cauchy surfaces intrinsic to the spacetime manifold. This avoids the need for super-time, dissolves the motion and rate problems, blocks epistemic mismatch without invoking philosophical zombies, and prevents perspectival collapse by distinguishing global modal manifestation from relativized local phenomenology. By showing that neither existing wave theory meets all criteria for a viable successor to MST, and by demonstrating how MCW addresses the full taxonomy of desiderata and A-theoretic objections, my thesis concludes that the Manifest Constitutional Wave provides the most metaphysically coherent account of temporal passage available within a wave-theoretic, eternalist framework.** -/- **This work is the author's undergraduate honors thesis. (shrink)

I offer a new argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism. The argument rests on three premises, which are plausible and intuitive, or so I argue. Given that acceptance of the premises commits one to a metaphysics that combines a causal powers ontology with a Humean conception of the laws of nature, I propose calling the resulting account of free will “semi-Humean compatibilism”.

This essay attempts to answer a simple but largely neglected elemental question: why does Spinoza endorse essences? I begin by delineating three perennial metaphysical problems, namely those of individuation, change, and persistence, after which I analyze the way in which they function as the deeply ingrained backdrop that motivates Spinoza’s essentialism, allowing him to develop a sophisticated conceptual framework on which he builds his ethics proper. I end by discussing the relationship between Spinoza’s essentialism and modality and argue that while (...) Spinoza anticipates certain contemporary lines of thought, giving an account of modality is not high on his agenda: his necessitarianism is a by-product of building a philosophical system motivated by other metaphysical concerns. (shrink)

I argue that, for Mengzi, the kind of knowledge that features in expressions of the form ‘knowing N’, where N is a noun or a noun phrase, is not a kind of belief but is instead a capacity for intelligently performing relevant actions. My argument proceeds by showing that, first, Mengzi is committed to the view that a person knows N iff she is relevantly capable and, second, that the best explanation for this is that the kind of knowledge involved (...) in knowing N is a capacity. Finally, I motivate such a practicalist interpretation by arguing that it offers us a general but informative explanation of what it is that knowing N makes the knower capable of doing. (shrink)

This paper presents a complete and revised theoretical framework for Psycho-Cosmocide — a term coined to describe the most comprehensive yet structurally invisible form of colonial violence ever perpetrated against Indigenous peoples: the systematic destruction of a people's entire cosmological framework and their lived relationship with reality. The concept first appeared in Papuan Tragedy: 300 Warnings from the Edge of Extinction, published in June 2025, where it was introduced as a diagnostic framework emerging from the ongoing catastrophe in West Papua. (...) It was subsequently developed and formalised as a standalone theoretical contribution and published on PhilPapers in November 2025. -/- This revised and expanded edition deepens the foundational architecture in response to that reception and to the continuing urgency of the subject matter. The paper sets out seven key contributions to decolonial and civilisational theory. The twenty foundational reasons establishing the necessity of the concept are organised into five analytical clusters. First, Wone — the primordial Lani cosmological ordering principle — is established as the philosophical basis of the entire framework and situated comparatively alongside the Greek Logos, the Egyptian Maʿat, the Chinese Dao, the Hebrew Dabar, the Polynesian Mana, and the Lakota Wakan Tanka, demonstrating both the universality of the problem the framework addresses and the irreplaceable specificity of its Lani origin. Second, precise definitions are developed for the four terms constituting the framework — Wone, Psyche, Psycho, and Cosmocide — alongside their full etymological genealogy and philosophical positioning. Third, the Lani ontological vocabulary — Ap, Ap-ap, Oʿgur, Muʼnggar, Aʿnggena, and Kugi — is presented as a comprehensive philosophical system providing the most granular Indigenous perspective on the destruction caused by Psycho-Cosmocide at the levels of the self, ancestry, shadow, ordering spirit, and community. Fourth, the complete mechanism of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV), operating through six stages of infection and three categories of carrier, is set out. Fifth, the Eight Atlases of Human Reality are presented as simultaneous sites of cosmological disruption. Sixth, the Dynamic Atlas Model of civilisation survival and collapse is presented together with the Noah's Ark function — the minimum survival package required to preserve a cosmological world from destruction. Seventh, the three available paths for individuals living within the CPCV are mapped: compliance, resistance, and Wonesis. -/- Taken together, these contributions represent not merely a revision but a maturation. The framework has evolved from identifying the wound to mapping its entire structure, its historical depth, and its contemporary digital frontier — including the terminal phase of digital cosmological mining. The paper includes a substantive engagement with civilisational collapse theory, a full treatment of the twenty foundational reasons for why the term was coined, the complete mythological and analogical arsenal through which the framework is communicated, the final thesis on the four possible futures for the human species, and the eight pillars of Wonesis as the only available orientation that the evidence honestly permits. (shrink)

Questions concerning the metaphysical foundations of science lie at the heart of philosophy of science and are one of the most exciting and active areas of research. The metaphysics of science provides insight into how we perceive the world and the nature of our existence and is core to our prevailing epistemology. This book introduces the central questions in the metaphysics of science and in turn offers a fresh exploration of key notions such as dispositional properties, natural kinds, laws of (...) nature, causation and properties. The book also charts the modern historical development of the subject from its origins in logical positivism through to the latest research. (shrink)

In this paper, I will focus on Peirce’s views on aesthetics and some of its anthropological implications. Though Peirce never developed a systematic account of aesthetics, he was aware of its importance for ethics and logic (C.P. 8.225–8.256). The paper addresses Peirce’s notion in C.P. 5.314–315, that a “man is the thought”, from the view of his aesthetics. My intention is to show that Peirce’s views on the “qualities of feeling” and on aesthetic experience in general may have interesting philosophic-anthropological (...) implications. (shrink)

Welcome to the second volume of the Balkan Analytic Forum’s proceedings, featuring contributions from BAF2: Dispositions and BAF2+: Dispositions and Values. It is a pleasure and honor to co-edit these proceedings with Dr. Miroslava Trajkovski for the second consecutive year. This volume showcases the vibrant intellectual community and the spirit of curiosity that animate the Balkan Analytic Forum. Now entering its third year, the Forum continues to foster regional philosophical community and international scholarly exchange while engaging global philosophical conversations. Rooted (...) in analytic philosophy, it also seeks to bridge traditions, welcoming approaches that connect analytic methods with phenomenological, historical, and other philosophical perspectives and traditions. Reflecting this commitment to intellectual breadth, the essays collected here engage the concept of dispositions through a variety of philosophical methods and traditions. They explore dispositions as epistemological, ontological, and ethical phenomena, theorizing their nature and function within domains including evidentiary reasoning, cosmological theorizing, virtue ethics, aesthetic experience, and philosophy of mind. The Forum’s vibrant intellectual community owes immense gratitude to Dr. Miroslava Trajkovski, whose leadership and unwavering commitment have created a collaborative space where philosophical curiosity thrives. The Balkans’ rich intellectual history reminds us that philosophical vitality often emerges at the intersection of traditions. The Forum carries that spirit forward in the work collected here. -/- Emily C. McWilliams. (shrink)

Abstract. Pure powers ontologies hold that all or many fundamental natural properties are completely powerful. Their nature is exhausted by the various causal, dispositional, and nomic roles they play. I discuss an underappreciated challenge against the pure powers view based on considerations from physics: How can we harmonise the complete powerfulness thesis and the manifest qualitatively structural, geometrical, and mathematical character of physical properties? I identify and assay five approaches that could answer this question: (i) eliminativism, (ii), the identity view, (...) (iii) emergentism, (iv) essentialism, and (v) prioritarianism. Any satisfactory answer to the challenge should preserve the primacy of the powerful over the qualitative, and it should avoid collapsing the pure powers view into one of its competitors. I argue that each of (i) – (v) either fails to meet such desiderata or raises new problems for the pure powers view. -/- Resumen. Las ontologías de potencias puras sostienen que todas o muchas de las propiedades naturales fundamentales son completamente poderosas. Su naturaleza se agota en los diversos roles causales, disposicionales y nómicos que desempeñan. Analizo un desafío subestimado contra la perspectiva de las potencias puras basado en consideraciones de la física: ¿Cómo podemos armonizar la tesis de la potencia completa y el carácter manifiesto cualitativamente estructural, geométrico y matemático de las propiedades físicas? Identifico y ensaya cinco enfoques que podrían responder a esta pregunta: (i) eliminativismo, (ii) la perspectiva de la identidad, (iii) emergentismo, (iv) esencialismo y (v) prioritarismo. Cualquier respuesta satisfactoria al desafío debe preservar la primacía de lo poderoso sobre lo cualitativo y debe evitar colapsar la perspectiva de las potencias puras en una de sus competidoras. Argumento que cada uno de (i) a (v) no cumple con dichos desiderata o plantea nuevos problemas para la perspectiva de las potencias puras. (shrink)

It has long been a philosophical problem to explain the commonly accepted distinction between two kinds of qualities: primary and secondary. While the roots of this debate can be traced back to Plato’s Euthyphro, it was John Locke who, more clearly than others, articulated the distinction and introduced the terms “primary quality” and “secondary quality.” Similar distinctions, under labels such as “primary affections,” “primary attributes,” or “original qualities,” also appear in the writings of earlier thinkers, including Galileo Galilei, Robert Boyle, (...) and René Descartes. This article’s focus is not on the historical development of the distinction, but rather on Crispin Wright’s contemporary and well-known “Judgment-Dependent” account of this distinction, which aims to provide a criterion for determining whether a quality should be regarded as secondary. -/- Metaphysically, a primary quality is often understood as a quality whose instantiation or existence is constituted, or metaphysically determined, by something independent of human responses formed under certain conditions, such as seeing, smelling, or touching. Typical examples include shape, extension, motion, solidity, and number. These qualities are said to be objective because, for instance, if an object’s surface is square-shaped, it has this shape regardless of whether one perceives it as such. In other words, such qualities are mind-independent. Epistemologically, knowledge that an object’s surface is square-shaped is not infallible precisely because the fact that the object possesses this quality is independent of how one perceives it or what one believes about it. Therefore, even if one’s beliefs about these qualities are formed under optimal conditions, they can still be false. -/- By contrast, a secondary quality is one whose instantiation or existence depends on how one perceives, judges, or responds to it. Typical examples include color, taste, smell, and sound. Consequently, these qualities are often considered subjective. For example, whether an object is red appears to depend on how it looks or how one sees it under certain conditions. Thus, the quality of being red is said to be mind-dependent. Epistemologically, knowledge that an object is red can be infallible because the object’s having that quality depends on one’s perception: if one’s beliefs about these qualities are formed under optimal conditions, they will be guaranteed to be correct. -/- Wright’s judgment-dependent account offers a criterion for determining whether a given quality is treatable as secondary or “judgment-dependent,” as Wright prefers to call it. By employing this account, he aims to answer two fundamental questions: one metaphysical and one epistemological. If the account successfully shows that a quality is judgment-dependent, Wright can claim that facts about whether an object has that quality are metaphysically determined by the judgments of a suitable subject. The epistemological question, that is, how the subject knows such facts, is answered by appealing to the subject’s direct knowledge of her own judgments. In what follows, this account is introduced step by step and then applied to several crucial cases. (shrink)

The idea that abilities should be understood as a modal tie between one's motivational states and one's actions is at the core of the most prominent views of abilities. I develop a novel challenge against such views of ability arguing that all these accounts cannot properly account for inabilities and compulsions.

This book argues for the place of capacities within an grounds of meaning, not method. Yet it is questions of method that should concern the modern empiricist: can capacities be measured? Cartwright argues that they are measured if anything is. Stanford University's Gravity-Probe-B will measure capacities in a cryogenic dewar deep in space. More mundanely, we use probabilities to measure capacities, and the assumptions required to ensure that probabilities are a reliable instrument are investigated in the opening chapters of this (...) book, where the early methods of econometrics set a model. The last chapter applies lessons about probabilities and capacities to quantum mechanics and the Bell inequalities. The central thesis throughout is that capacities not only can be admitted by empiricists, but indeed must be - otherwise the empirical methods of modern science will make no sense. (shrink)

Non‐reductive theories of powers/dispositions/capacities/potencies/potentialities are of much interest within contemporary metaphysics. There have been many discussions that attempt to explicate their nature as well as numerous others which suggest their application. Here, I focus on providing an introduction to the former, the metaphysics of non‐reductive powers, whilst briefly commenting on the latter, their applications. Therefore, the paper will offer a map of the debates and positions taken within present discussion.

Dispositionalism is the view that it is possible that p iff sometimes, something has an iterated potentiality to be such that p. Recently a formidable challenge has been raised against it: the paradox of necessary perfect masks (Vetter & Busse 2022). A mask is perfect if it guarantees that, come what may, the manifestation will not come about as long as the mask is present, and it is necessary if it cannot be removed or destroyed. This generates a contradiction for (...) Dispositionalism. -/- In this paper, I offer a novel solution to the paradox, which I call the Degree Solution. As the name suggests, it is centred around the role that degrees of potentiality play in grounding modality. My strategy to dispel the paradox comprises of three steps. First, I will argue that degrees of potentialities play a role in grounding modal truths: only non-zero potentialities ground modal truths. Then, I will argue that that degree of potentialities are extrinsic second order properties of potentialities –– and, in particular, that they depend on the modal status of both their stimuli/disposition partners and masks. I will argue that necessary perfect masks reduce the degree of a potentiality to zero, thereby preventing them from grounding a modal truth and preventing the contradiction to arise. Thirdly, I argue that there are zero-degree potentialities, that they are not ad hoc and have genuine explanatory power. They offer the theory important expressive resources to make sense of our intuitions concerning cases of ‘impossible dispositions’ (Jenkins & Nolan 2013) and perhaps also the resources to account for the truth and falsity of some non-vacuous counter-possible and counter-nomic conditionals. Necessary perfect masks are not the ‘big bad bug’ of dispositionalism. On the contrary, taking them seriously leads us to discover new and welcome features of the theory. -/- . (shrink)

Stephen Mumford puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role is in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties--from the solubility of sugar to the belief that zebras have stripes. Mumford discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. His clear, straightforward, realist account reveals (...) them to be less mysterious than they seem, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws. (shrink)

Dispositions come in degrees. Powers theorists have suggested that this is explained by the fact that powers come in degrees, too. Degrees of powers have usually been characterised in terms of the robustness of the modal connection between power, stimulus, and manifestation. However, modal strength cannot account for all our comparative judgements between dispositions. In this paper, I argue that there is also a different kind of degrees of powers, which I dub intensity. Intensity is connected to the relation between (...) the magnitude of stimuli and manifestations. I first develop a number of models for intensity degrees; then, I argue that intensity is conceptually independent from modal strength, and that it can do important explanatory work. (shrink)

We often say that persons had, have, or will have the power to do certain things. But do we have reasons to ascribe powers to inanimate objects as well? And if we do, is there any difference between ascribing a power and understanding what an object is disposed to do? Are objects’ powers dispositions in this sense? In this paper I shall argue that we need to distinguish powers from dispositions for certain theoretical purposes. Most ‘disposition terms’ in ordinary language (...) do not express causal powers; and many powers cannot be expressed by a conventional disposition term. It is true that when we say that objects are disposed to do this or that, powers are involved. But the converse does not hold because having a power does not entail that objects are disposed to do or to act upon others in certain ways. (shrink)

I argue that the thoroughly algorithmic nature of current AI systems (such as LLMs) is no obstacle to their being conscious. To this end, I present a picture on which current AI systems comprise dispositional properties which realize categorical phenomenal properties where the latter, in turn, provide the identity conditions for their dispositional realizers. This mutual ontological dependence, or, symmetrical grounding, at the heart of the proposal yields a novel picture of (AI) consciousness that avoids epiphenomenalism and is more permissive (...) regarding the specific nature/functional organization of conscious systems than has been previously suggested. This, in turn, suggests an epistemology of AI consciousness focused on investigating the high-level behaviours of AI systems rather than their low-level functional organization. (shrink)

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, (...) and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes. (shrink)

2025 update of the entry "Properties".

This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

The view that powers possess counterfactual information about their possible, mutual manifestations.

Metaphysical grounding is often presented as a relation of directed dependence analogous to causation. The relationship between causation, properties, and laws of nature is hotly debated. I ask: what is the relationship between grounding, properties, and laws of metaphysics? I begin by considering the grounding analogue of Humean quidditism. Finding it implausible, I turn to the primitive-laws account of grounding, recently defended by Jonathan Schaffer and others. I argue this view is also unsatisfactory. I then present several possible dispositionalist-like accounts (...) and characterize the notion of a power to ground. I argue for three important conclusions: (i) each property essentially confers grounding powers; (ii) non-fundamental properties can be defined structurally in a particular sense, elucidating the claim that they are ‘nothing over and above’ the fundamental; and (iii) fundamental properties play a central role in grounding the grounding facts. Finally, it is significant that, combined with a causal powers-account of causal explanation, the door is open to a unified account of the metaphysics of causation and grounding: both flow from the natures of fundamental properties. (shrink)

The paper examines the potentialities-centred interpretation of quantum theory developed by David Bohm in his 1951 book Quantum Theory and aims to situate it within a general ontological framework, focusing on Charlie Martin's views.

In our daily lives, as in science and in all other domains, we encounter huge numbers of dispositions (tendencies, potentials, powers) which are realized in processes such as sneezing, sweating, shedding, melting. Among this plethora of what we can think of as ‘mere dispositions’ is a subset of dispositions in whose realizations we have an interest – a car responding well when driven on ice, a rabbit’s lungs responding well when it is chased by a wolf, and so on. We (...) call the latter ‘capabilities’ and we attempt to provide an ontological account of what capabilities are that is of sufficient generality to serve a variety of purposes, for example by providing a useful extension to ontology-based research in areas where capabilities data are being collected in siloed fashion. (shrink)

This is a critical analysis of Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers, by Michel Ghins.

Strong emergentists about mental properties of conscious experience typically hold that these are ontologically “over and above” and distinct in kind as compared to physical properties. Powers-based account of strong emergence offer a promising framework for elucidating the ontological “over and above”-ness of strongly emergent properties. However, they do not automatically ensure the desired non-physicality. In this paper, I argue that a conception of properties as powerful qualities has in-built resources for capturing both the ontological “over and above”-ness and the (...) kind distinctness in a unified way. I begin by illustrating powers-based accounts of strong emergence. Then I defend the superiority of a powerful qualities-based account of strong emergence over two standard approaches recovering the distinctness in kind of strongly emergent mental properties: the via negativa strategy, and the anti-materialist strategy. I conclude that a conception of powerful qualities is a surprising yet natural ally for the proponent of strongly emergent mental properties. (shrink)

The system-property or ‘cybernetic’ theory of goals and goal-directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system-property theory needs to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals. However, it proves to be difficult to formulate a counterfactual analysis of goal-directedness that is counterexample-free, non-circular, and non-trivial. These difficulties closely mirror those facing reductionists about dispositions, though the parallels between the two debates have been overlooked in (...) the literature. After outlining those parallels, the paper considers what goal theorists might learn from the dispositions debate. In particular, the paper discusses the need for a realist, non-reductionist account of goal-directedness, and explores the idea that properties of goal-directedness are themselves dispositions or ‘powers’ of a certain sort. (shrink)

Even though the talk of causal bases is commonplace in traditional and contemporary discussions about dispositions, the concept of causal bases has never been systematically investigated. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing the causal-grounding account. This account takes two roles as definitory for causal bases. First, causal bases are possible causes of disposition manifestations. Second, causal bases are metaphysical grounds of disposition instantiations. In this paper, we show that the causal-grounding account (CGA) achieves crucial distinctions (for example (...) between causal bases and manifestation conditions), captures relevant traditional features of causal bases, and can be invoked to support the causal efficacy of disposition instantiations. At the same time, CGA does not require that causal bases have to be categorical or intrinsic. This, in turn, allows us to remain neutral concerning fundamental properties, the existence of dispositional or extrinsic causal bases, multi-track dispositions, and the reducibility of dispositions. This neutrality grants the suitability of our account for different philosophical projects and discussions. (shrink)

The recent so-called crisis of replication continues to dominate psychology’s methodological landscape. It is argued here that the apparent renaissance of Popperian thinking that characterises some of the key responses to the crisis of replication is fundamentally flawed. In essence, there is a serious lack of any sustained and rigorous treatment of ontology that underpins much of the current debate about replication and Popper’s falsificationist approach. The overriding problem is that the replication debate reflects the methodologist tendency for mainstream psychologists (...) to avoid or gloss over crucial ontological questions. In contradistinction, this article (a) underscores the primacy of ontology; (b) delineates and applies a critical realist stratified ontology to psychology; (c) utilises the latter as a springboard from which to argue for Popper’s methodological “retirement”; and (d) revindicates the indispensability of context and the subtlety of psychological phenomena in arguing for the intrinsic limits of replication and experimentalism in general. (shrink)

Knowledge of causal laws is expensive and hard to come by. But we work hard to get it because we believe that it will reduce contingency in planning policies and in building new technologies: knowledge of causal laws allows us to predict reliably what the outcomes will be when we manipulate the factors cited as causes in those laws. Or do they? This paper will argue that causal laws have no special role here. As economists from JS Mill to Robert (...) Lucas and David Hendry stress, along recently with philosophers like James Woodward and Sandra Mitchell, they can do the job only if they are invariant under the manipulations proposed. But then, I shall argue, anything that is invariant under the proposed manipulations will do this job equally well. There seems to be nothing special about causal-law knowledge in and of itself that makes it particularly valuable for policy and technology prediction. What seems to matter is invariance alone, not causality. But what guarantees invariance and how do we know when it will obtain? Here certain kinds of causal laws do have a special place – those underwritten either by what I have called ‘nomological machines’ or by what I have called ‘capacities’. Capacities and nomological machines have a double virtue that makes them invaluable for policy planning. First, the causal laws they give rise to will be invariant so long as they obtain; and second, they typically have visible markers we can come to recognize that tell us when they obtain. The markers for nomological machines are shakier than those for capacities, though, since capacities are often tied to markers by well-established empirical laws. Capacities have their own drawback however, which is the final topic of this paper: the causal laws that are guaranteed by a capacity connect the obtaining of a capacity with its exercise. But Hume argued that no distinction can be made between the obtaining of a power and its exercise. (shrink)

The rapid pace of technological advancements offers an essential field of research for a deeper understanding of man’s relationship with artifacts of her design. These artifacts designed by humans can have various mental and physical effects on their users. The human interaction with the artifact is not passive; on the contrary, it exhibits a potential that reveals the inner dispositions of human beings and makes them open to new creations. In this article, we will examine the impact of technology on (...) human life through the dispositional compatibilism perspective of the contemporary philosopher Kadri Vihvelin, arguing for a system of metaphysics in which ontology of properties depend on dispositions. In this context, the emerging phenomenon of dispositional compatibilism opens the door to developing new philosophical ideas for evaluating the concepts of compatibilism and freedom in the context of technology. Thus, it is emphasized that although technological devices shape human life, new and unforeseen powers may emerge due to human-artifact interaction. This article will examine the idea of dispositional compatibilism by specifically considering human interaction with text-based AI applications. The ability of AI to collaborate with human thought patterns is a meaningful example of the observation of dispositional compatibilism. In conclusion, the article aims to address the effects of technology on human freedom by approaching the human-artifact relationship from a dispositional perspective. It also aims to defend the claim that technological artifacts can positively contribute to human freedom from the perspective of dispositional compatibilism. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand the meaning of reality (in science) on the basis of the concepts of persistence and resistance. It first supports the ontological view that reality consists of persistent potentialities, which resist being excluded from existence. A study of the cases of the Higgs boson and the hypothetical Ϝ-particle helps to illustrate how real entities persist and resist. The paper then suggests that, perceptually speaking, the results of ordinary perception or observational processes persistently appear under (...) appropriate conditions, and they resist disappearance even when the appropriate conditions are not completely prepared. Finally, it argues that, epistemologically speaking, a truthful theory resists being falsified and persists across replicable observations and experiments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...) judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones. (shrink)

Dispositions (powers, potentialities) have become popular in metaphysics in recent years, and some of their proponents are advertising them as the best metaphysical grounds for modality. This project has a logical as well as an ontological side: dispositionalists offer modal and counterfactual semantics that make no use of possible worlds. I argue that, as a result of their counterfactual semantics, dispositionalists are in fact committed to entities that play the same theoretical role as possible worlds. Roughly, the claim is that (...) certain counterfactuals (ones that concern 'very large' states) force the dispositionalist to posit world-sized states that play the theoretical role of worlds. As a result, dispositionalists can (and perhaps should) make use of the mainstream framework (Kripke frames and the Lewis–Stalnaker counterfactual semantics) even if they ground all modal facts in dispositions. (shrink)