Animal Ethics, Misc

The political turn in animal ethics — represented most influentially by Donaldson and Kymlicka's Zoopolis and Cochrane's sentientist politics — argues that animals have claims of citizenship, sovereignty, or political membership grounded in their interests or social relationships. This paper identifies a foundational question these accounts leave unaddressed: under what structural conditions can an institution even claim to be answerable to an animal? I argue that justificatory practice presupposes normative addressability — a minimal functional cluster that makes a being a (...) possible addressee of reasons. Where institutional arrangements foreseeably destroy this cluster — producing what I call agency-collapse — they do not merely fail to justify themselves; they exit the domain of legitimate authority entirely, before any question of membership or citizenship arises. From this I derive an answerability prohibition: no arrangement can be justified to a subject by the intentional or instrumental production of agency-collapse in that subject. The extension to non-human animals proceeds through proxy-evidential answerability — a directed, subject-specific institutional relation that is categorically different from welfare management and cannot be overridden by aggregate welfare calculations. The result is a threshold antispeciesism grounded in the structure of justificatory practice: at the agency-collapse threshold, species membership is normatively idle; above it, a constrained proportionality governs sub-threshold burdens. -/- Keywords: antispeciesism, agency-collapse, answerability prohibition, political legitimacy, animal ethics, justificatory practice, proxy answerability, institutional authority. (shrink)

This Chapter examines the tension between Nussbaum's statements about rats and the commitments of the Capabilities Approach. The "Rat Problem" emerges from rats being simultaneously costly and undesirable yet morally significant as subjects of justice. While Nussbaum advocates extending wonder, compassion, and justice to all sentient creatures, rats often appear as exceptions. I argue that the category of "pest" is incompatible with the Capabilities Approach, especially its emphasis on wonder, and that conventional pest control methods violate rats' fundamental capabilities. Rather (...) than accepting human-rat conflicts as inevitable tragedies, I propose reframing the problem as tractable through urban infrastructure reforms and integrated pest management. By addressing structural factors that create conflicts, we can move from extermination-based approaches toward arrangements that respect both human flourishing and rat capabilities. (shrink)

Some animal ethicists argue that eating roadkill is permissible because salvaging and consuming already dead animals doesn’t cause harm to anyone. Moreover, some argue that eating roadkill is actually obligatory, insofar as a diet that includes some roadkill is less harmful than a diet that consists of protein (animal or plant) obtained only from grocery stores and restaurants. Against this view, Abbate argues that eating roadkill is wrong for at least two reasons: (1) better consequences would be produced if roadkill (...) were either left in surrounding habitats for scavenger animals or given to other would-be meat eaters (such as meat-eating friends, family, and/or neighbors), and (2) those who salvage and consume roadkill both benefit from and are involved in wrongdoing, insofar as the animals who are killed by motor vehicles are killed as a result of injustice. (shrink)

Recently, a family of views has emerged which endorses animal protectionist goals—like rejecting speciesism and reducing animal suffering—while maintaining that the diet most consistent with these aims includes at least some animal products. For example, some people contend that there is nothing morally objectionable about eating meat that will otherwise go to waste provided that one is not economically supporting industrial animal agriculture. In this paper, I argue that we have plausible character-based reasons to avoid many animal products, even those (...) that one has not purchased and that may otherwise be wasted. When certain speciesist norms are in place, conceptualizing only some animal flesh as food typically involves a morally objectionable prejudice—a prejudice that makes one’s character worse. Attending to our moral character involves cultivating certain perceptual and emotional responsive dispositions, and I argue that a rejection of speciesism should involve cultivating an aversion to things like animal flesh and skin. If we take seriously the idea that we should have the right attitudes and moral-perceptual responses toward other creatures, we should take concrete steps to habituate ourselves to unlearn speciesist prejudice, which involves cultivating an aversion to meat. (shrink)

A growing acceptance that many nonhuman animal communities have distinct cultures – group-variable patterns of behavior and information sustained over time by social learning – is beginning to reshape thinking about animal conservation. Culture, in this sense, can significantly influence how different populations interact with their environment and respond to environmental changes, and, therefore, has important implications for conservation. The literature on animal culture and conservation has led to valuable insights about how to protect endangered cultural animals. It has also (...) led to some challenging questions. Should protecting animal cultural diversity become a new conservation goal, along the lines of preserving biodiversity? Should culture be an important consideration in prioritizing populations for conservation? Should we be designating animal “cultural heritage sites” for special protection, analogous to heritage sites of special significance for humans? This paper explores these questions and various arguments for preserving animal culture that have been offered in the literature. These include both instrumental arguments and arguments that suggest that animal cultures are of intrinsic value in their own right. These arguments raise important considerations, but they do not address all the ways in which animal cultures matter. We argue for more sustained attention to animals’ own interests in culture: animal cultures matter first and foremost because they matter to the animals themselves. Animals’ interests with respect to culture are not only about preserving practices or geographical locations, but include more abstract interests in protecting opportunities for agency, self-determination, and changing cultural traditions. (shrink)

Vermutlich ist nahezu jeder Tierethiker schon aufgefordert worden, sich nicht darüber mitzuteilen, wie es in moderner Massentierhaltung zugeht, denn das verdürbe doch die Möglichkeit, Fleisch weiterhin zu genießen. Diese Aufforderung ist reichlich merkwürdig. Denn sie kommt eigentlich zu spät. Der Mensch, der nicht mehr weiter über die Massentierhaltung hören will, hat offenkundig schon genug gehört, um zu wissen, dass eine erneute, eine tiefere Vergegenwärtigung eine ihm liebgewonnene Praxis verderben würde: Es ist mithin die (durch den Tierethiker nur bemerkbar gemachte) höchste (...) eigene Erkenntnis, die seinen Fleischgenuss bedroht. Es scheint als versuche hier ein Mensch, eine Erkenntnis und das dieser Erkenntnis nachlaufende Drängen in ihrem Sinne praktisch zu werden, wieder unerkannt zu machen. Mit diesem Ansinnen will ein Mensch, der eine Grenze überschritten hat, die er, wie er selbst erkannt hat, nicht hätte überschreiten sollen – woher auch immer diese Erkenntnis stammt – dennoch überschreitbar machen will. Dieser Mensch will den Zwang, der doch aus ihm selbst herauskommt, nicht kennen, nicht begreifen. Das Begriffene und das aus dem Begriffenen den Menschen selbst unmittelbar ergreifende Tunwollen wird zu annihilieren versucht. Das ist im wörtlichen Sinne ein Nihilismus, eine Selbstverstümmelung des eigenen Denkens und des eigenen Herzens. Gegen diesen Nihilismus möchten wir für den Veganismus argumentieren als (eine mögliche) praktische Konsequenz, die höchste eigene Abscheu gegen das Töten und zugleich sich selbst ernst zu nehmen; der Veganismus wird damit als ein Anti-Nihilismus begriffen. (shrink)

Este artículo examina críticamente la crisis ética del uso intensivo de antibióticos en la salmonicultura chilena desde el enfoque One Health. Mediante una revisión bibliográfica (2000–2024), analiza la resistencia antimicrobiana y sus impactos ecológicos y sanitarios. Sostiene que One Health resulta normativamente incompleto mientras no incorpore principios de zoonoética y justicia multiespecies que reconozcan el valor intrínseco de los organismos acuáticos. Se argumenta que su aplicación mantiene un sesgo antropocéntrico que instrumentaliza la salud animal. Finalmente, se propone integrar Antimicrobial Stewardship (...) en un marco ético ampliado para reconfigurar el paradigma sanitario-productivo hacia una sostenibilidad coherente. (shrink)

Moral circles help define the boundaries of one’s moral consideration. One’s moral circle may provide insight into how one perceives or treats other entities. A data-driven model exploration was conducted to explore predictors and prediction models. Candidate predictors were built upon past research using moral foundations and political orientation. Moreover, we also employed additional moral psychological indicators, i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, and empathy, based on prior research in moral development and education. We used model exploration methods, i.e., Bayesian model (...) exploration, Bayesian model averaging, and elastic-net regression. The study successfully replicated past research supporting the relationship between moral foundations, political orientation, and the moral circle. Additional moral psychological constructs, such as post-conventional moral reasoning and moral identity, significantly predicted the moral circle width. The identified components of the moral circle were conceptually related to phronesis, i.e., practical wisdom. We discussed the educational implications of the findings, particularly those related to moral education focusing on phronesis cultivation, multiculturalism and global citizenship, and climate justice. (shrink)

A review of David E. Cooper's book, "Animals and Misanthropy", which argues that reflection on awful treatment of animals justifies a negative critical judgment on human life and culture.

In this article, we present two independent arguments in favor of the view that parents have a pro tanto moral duty to feed their children a predominantly plant-based diet. The first is the ‘Animal Harm Argument’. The significant suffering caused to animals by harmful animal agriculture is morally wrong, and consequently there is a moral duty to avoid consuming products coming from such circumstances. In a family context, parents have a moral duty to teach their young children the best ‘rules-of-thumb’ (...) to comply with morality’s demands. Therefore, parents should, as a rule, provide their children with a plant-based diet. The second is the ‘Environmental Harm Argument’. Consuming animal products is associated with a large ecological footprint. There is a moral duty to reduce one’s ecological footprint, and significant reductions are not feasible without substantially cutting down on animal products, so moving towards a more plant-based diet is morally required. In families, parents have a special responsibility to help reduce their children’s ecological footprint, and to prepare them to heed laws requiring such reductions in the future, and therefore should feed them a predominantly plant-based diet. Lastly, we address several objections to our arguments and show why they do not hold. (shrink)

There are approximately 10 quintillion (10x1018) insects on earth and Jeff Sebo talks about all of them in his new book, The Moral Circle, in just over 180 pages. Moreover, we should care about the...

Die Stadtforschung begreift Tiere zunehmend als Teilnehmende am urbanen Leben. Doch bleibt offen, wie ihre Präsenz politisch gedacht und infrastrukturell abgesichert wird. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, wie urbane Infrastrukturen die Bedingungen tierlichen Lebens in der Stadt prägen und mit welchen Formen von Anerkennung und Fürsorge dies verbunden ist. Am Beispiel der Fledermäuse in Wien – die zu den institutionell am stärksten geschützten urbanen Tieren Europas zählen – entwickelt der Artikel ein Verständnis von Naturschutzmaßnahmen und Fürsorgepraktiken als Infrastrukturen der Hoffnung, die (...) als materielle, rechtliche und soziale Gefüge bestimmte Vorstellungen von Multispezies-Zukünften tragen. Die Gegenüberstellung speziesorientierter Naturschutzinfrastrukturen und individuenzentrierter Fürsorgeinfrastrukturen zeigt, dass fragmentierte Infrastrukturen das Fortbestehen von Fledermäusen im urbanen Raum sichern, ohne ihnen eine kohärente Form politischer Zugehörigkeit zu verleihen. Während speziesorientierte Infrastrukturen auf den Erhalt von Populationen und ökologischen Funktionen ausgerichtet sind, zielen individuenzentrierte Infrastrukturen darauf, einzelne Individuen zu schützen und Verantwortungsbeziehungen zu stabilisieren. Zusammen bringen diese Infrastrukturen Formen urbaner Inklusion hervor, die materiell bedeutsam, politisch jedoch unvollständig sind. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass tierzentrierte Infrastrukturen der Hoffnung das Recht auf Stadt als fortdauerndes und ungleich realisiertes politisches Projekt sichtbar machen – und damit sowohl die Möglichkeiten als auch die Grenzen des gegenwärtigen urbanen Zusammenlebens von Menschen und anderen Tieren offenlegen. -/- Urban scholarship has increasingly recognized animals as active participants in city life, yet questions remain about how their presence is politically imagined and materially sustained. This article examines how urban infrastructures shape the conditions under which animals are able to remain in the city, and with what forms of recognition and care. Drawing on the case of bats in Vienna — among the most institutionally protected urban animals in Europe — the article conceptualizes conservation measures and care practices as infrastructures of hope: material, legal, and social arrangements that embed particular visions of multispecies futures. Through an analysis of species-oriented conservation infrastructures and individual-focused care infrastructures, the article shows how bats are sustained through fragmented sets of infrastructure that enable their continued presence without consolidating a coherent form of political membership. While conservationist-focused infrastructures prioritize population survival and ecological function, individual-focused infrastructures orient hope toward the continuity of individual lives and relations of responsibility. Together, these infrastructures produce forms of urban inclusion that are materially significant yet politically incomplete. The article argues that attending to animal-focused infrastructures of hope provides a pragmatic way to assess animals’ right to the city as an ongoing and uneven political project, revealing both the possibilities and limits of contemporary multi-species urbanism. (shrink)

Wild animals suffer due to human activity, yet natural factors contribute far more significantly to their suffering. In light of this, some propose that we have a pro tanto obligation to intervene in ecosystems to improve wild animal welfare. However, critics contend that the complexity of nature renders such interventions unpredictable, ineffective, or potentially harmful. This article seeks to reconcile the moral imperative to reduce wild animal suffering with the widespread concern about the inherent risks of such interventions. The article (...) begins with the premise that, if we have a pro tanto obligation to reduce wild animal suffering, only conducting research for the purpose of informing interventions in some distant future would be insufficient. Wild animals are suffering en masse now, and we must consider whether interventions can be justified despite incomplete knowledge. This question is explored here within a consequentialist and sentientist ethical framework. I argue that, while precaution is crucial to avoid irreversible or welfare-reducing ecological changes, interventions can be justified if they offer significant welfare benefits to animals while posing relatively small ecological risks. The article concludes by proposing four types of interventions that are likely to meet these criteria. (shrink)

Daniel Dorado has argued that appeals to health in vegan advocacy may harm more animals than they save. This paper accepts the force of that warning when health is made the principal justification for veganism or vegetarianism. Arguments that put bodily or nutritional health first are vulnerable to contested evidence, individual variation, substitution from larger to smaller animals, and the narrowing of animal ethics into a campaign for human benefit. The paper argues, however, that this critique should not be extended (...) to every appeal to health within dietary persuasion. Drawing on the idea of a cumulative case, it defends a limited pluralist strategy in which concern for animals remains central while environmental, humanitarian, feminist, character-based, and prudential considerations play subordinate yet legitimate roles. The paper also situates this strategy within a history of philosophical abstinence, including Pythagorean, Empedoclean, Stoic, Porphyrian, and Plutarchan arguments against meat. Properly framed, health considerations can answer prudential objections and widen entry points into ethical reflection without displacing the suffering, exploitation, and killing of animals, or the human injustices endemic to industrial animal agriculture. (shrink)

This article examines the idea of animal rights, arguing for a sentience-based or interest-based approach, rather than a nature-based approach. It begins by exploring the philosophical foundations of animal rights, addressing the question of whether animals have morally relevant interests that deserve legal protection. The paper then considers the legal status of animals and whether animals can be rights-holders. The nature-based approach to animal rights is critically analyzed and several objections to this framework are discussed. The article advances further arguments (...) in support of the sentience-based approach to animal rights, contending that animal rights ought to be grounded in animals’ interests as sentient beings. It concludes that extending legal rights to animals as sentient beings aims to protect animals for their own sake, as individual beings with their own morally and legally relevant interests. (shrink)

Solid organ xenotransplantation may have the potential to help address the shortage of organs for transplantation. There is concern, however, that a novel zoonotic disease could be transmitted from the source organ to the human recipient, and then from the recipient to others. Theoretically, this could result in an epidemic or pandemic. Because of this potential risk, it has been argued that collective consent is required. Our goal is to critically evaluate the claim that collective consent is necessary for xenotransplantation (...) to be ethically permissible. We argue that collective consent is not required and highlight the important roles of public engagement and due diligence in xenotransplant research moving forward. (shrink)

An increasing number of authors are proposing that we have a moral obligation to conduct large scale systemic interventions into ecosystems to ameliorate wild animal suffering not caused by humans. I will call this position ‘Wild animal suffering interventionism’ (WASI). I will not challenge that WASI is ‘good in theory’ within utilitarian and rights-based animal ethics. I will focus on Delon and Purves’s argument against the justifiability of WASI interventions in the foreseeable future, arguing that it fails. Such interventions are (...) unjustifiable in the foreseeable future but not for the reasons they think. To argue this, I show that Delon and Purves’s argument implies that WASI is ambivalent regarding ecosystem destruction. I also show that WASI has a strong motivation to justify ecological destruction, as wild animals suffering cannot be significantly ameliorated in ecology without destroying the ecosystem. This makes it plausible to propose that some WASI interventions can have a predictable and positive effect on WAS, namely those that intentionally reduce wild animal populations through ecosystem destruction. We would be then placed to govern smaller wild animal populations effectively, significantly reducing wild animals suffering. This means that WASI faces a trade-off between the welfare of present generations of animals and the welfare of future generations of animals. I show why this trade-off is unjustified through McMahan’s population ethics-informed deontic framework. Therefore, WASI interventions, in having to cause ecological destruction, are unjustifiable for the foreseeable future. (shrink)

Jay Odenbaugh contends that while killing barred owls to protect northern spotted owls is ideally impermissible, non-ideal circumstances justify lethal removal to protect old-growth forests partly...

In this paper, I will give a defense of the argument from marginal cases as a way of defending the moral standing of nonhuman animals. The work of Martha Nussbaum and Shelly Kagan may be used in an attempt criticize the argument, but I will attempt to block moves to do this that are based on Nussbaum’s species-norm and Kagan’s modal personism. Christine Korgaard has directly attacked the argument from marginal cases, but I will argue that the version I offer (...) is resistant to her criticisms because sentience is a property that even she takes to be very important. (shrink)

The value of animal predation has been a religious concern for millennia and remains so today. Predators are a paradigmatic example of natural evil that calls God’s existence into question. This chapter gives an overview of the role predation plays in the nonhuman animal kingdom and argues that it should not be viewed as intrinsically evil. First, I briefly survey the history of Western religion’s engagement with the issue of predation. Then I give an account of welfare biology, a proposed (...) new branch of science aimed at eradicating predation. Classical humane ethics, however, does not advocate for predator eradication even though it shares the moral framework of welfare biology. Holistic environmental ethics differs from both by relativizing the value of individual animals within the context of species and ecosystems, both of which include predation as a positive process. Contemporary philosophy of religion has more in common with welfare biology because it takes the apparent non-eradication of predation as evidence for God’s non-existence. I argue, by contrast, that there are strong religious reasons for seeing predation positively, in the manner of holistic environmental ethics. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that by eliminating the subjective dimension from moral deliberation, orthodox, theory-oriented approaches to animal ethics overlook the importance of self-examination in navigating the complexity of our moral life. This is accomplished by depicting agents as rational beings, other animals as abstract beings bearing morally relevant properties and moral thinking as limited to rational argumentation. Instead, by following David J. Velleman and authors influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch, I discuss the importance of the subjective (...) outlook on a moral situation. I argue that ordinary ways in which a subject perceives and describes other animals—for example, as ‘pets’, ‘patients’, ‘fellow creatures’, and so forth—are essential because they mirror how agents think of themselves. For instance, when subjects describe animals as ‘pets’, they implicitly conceive of themselves as ‘pet-owners’. I argue that as self-reflecting beings, we can engage in self-examination, which is the process of reflecting and recognising the relationships between how we look at other animals and how we portray ourselves. (shrink)

Many species seem to have much smaller welfare ranges than we do. Which importance should we assign to the welfare of these low-welfare species when we have to decide whether to benefit members of these species or other humans? In particular, should we ever prioritize low-welfare species when some of the most significant human goods are at stake? It could be argued that benefits for low-welfare species are irrelevant to significant human benefits because they are much smaller in comparison. I (...) begin by developing this argument, but subsequently reject it based on the consideration of a hypothetical high-welfare species whose welfare range vastly exceeds the human welfare range. Arguments from empathy and fairness are given to support the opposite view on which some benefits for low-welfare species can outweigh even significant human benefits. Finally, I propose a principle that reconciles this view with the intuition that human headaches cannot outweigh human lives. (shrink)

Transforming global food systems is crucial for mitigating environmental degradation, reducing the global disease burden and protecting sentient individuals from harm. Despite overwhelming evidence linking animal-sourced foods to ecological damage, resource depletion and public health challenges, gaps remain in promoting sustainable consumption. This urgency is compounded by the scientific recognition of animal sentience, which elevates animal use to a moral issue. This study combines empirical data from a survey of 500 respondents with a literature review to explore motivations and behaviours (...) driving plant-based eating. Key suggested interventions to foster a responsible food system include: (i) raising awareness of animal rights, (ii) disseminating nutritional and environmental knowledge, (iii) reforming agri-food subsidies, (iv) promoting plant-based food research, commercialisation and consumption and (v) fostering social inclusion and positive recognition of vegan identity. By addressing psychological, social and structural barriers to animal-free diets, this study offers actionable strategies for advancing a sustainable future. (shrink)

Das Lehrbuch gibt einen Überblick über wichtige Ansätze der Tierethik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Seine Leitfrage ist, wie der abendländische Anthropozentrismus überwunden und den Tieren moralischer Status zuerkannt werden kann. Jedes der acht Kapitel bietet im Anschluss an eine verständliche und klar strukturierte Darstellung einiger ethischer Ansätze einen oder mehrere Quellentexte mit Fragen sowie ein praktisches Fallbeispiel für die Diskussion unter Studierenden. Ein umfangreiches Literaturverzeichnis und ein Glossar mit allen einschlägigen Fachbegriffen sind weitere Hilfen für das Studium. Dabei wendet sich (...) das Lehrbuch an Studierende aller Fachrichtungen, von der Veterinärmedizin bis zur Philosophie, von der Biologie bis zur Theologie. (shrink)

There are many excellent edited volumes on animal studies and animal ethics. Melanie Challenger’s Animal Dignity is yet another. Animal Dignity is unique insofar as the primary concern of the text...

In ‘Should We Kill One Owl to Save Another?’ Jay Odenbaugh argues that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service should begin to execute their Final Barred Owl Management Strategy (FBOMS). Per FBOMS, up t...

Invertebrate research ethics has largely been ignored compared to the consideration of higher order animals, but more recent focus has questioned this trend. Using the robotic control of Aurelia aurita as a case study, we examine ethical considerations in invertebrate work and provide recommendations for future guidelines. We also analyze these issues for prior bioethics cases, such as cyborg insects and the 'microslavery' of microbes. However, biohybrid robotic jellyfish pose further ethical questions regarding potential ecological consequences as ocean monitoring tools, (...) including the impact of electronic waste in the ocean. After in-depth evaluations, we recommend that publishers require brief ethical statements for invertebrate research, and we delineate the need for invertebrate nociception studies to revise or validate current standards. These actions provide a stronger basis for the ethical study of invertebrates, with implications for individual, species-wide, and ecological impacts, as well as for studies in science, engineering, and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in his Mulaḫḫaṣ fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma (Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Faḫr al-Dīn suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and problem-solving. (...) We contextualize these arguments with reference to Faḫr al-Dīn’s other philosophical works, and also compare the considerations he raises to ideas found in modern-day animal ethics, drawing here especially on the work of Mark Rowlands. The paper concludes with a translation of the passage. (shrink)

The animal entertainment industry includes different practices. Some consist in torturing an animal to death, as in bullfighting and countless other popular traditions, while others involve watching an animal in captivity, which can be another form of torture. Perhaps the most profitable practice is forcing very intelligent animals to perform the same routine several times daily in zoos and aquariums containing marine mammals, or in circuses containing terrestrial mammals. These businesses then present the animals in whatever way that makes the (...) practice appear less immoral, claim to have education and conservation as their mission, and present their entertainment businesses as altruistic charities. Disseminating their misleading discourse is unethical. (shrink)

A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications (...) must be acknowledged. If, however, they should not be considered responsible, then we may have to reassess the meaning of animal morality. I discuss ways to eschew responsibility or to tailor it to animals and argue that each requires a revised conception of animal morality. (shrink)

Neste artigo, analiso três casos que foram propostos na literatura filosófica como contraexemplos à abordagem dos interesses relativos ao tempo do dano da morte, buscando demonstrar como eles podem ser respondidos. Para tanto, o texto divide-se em quatro seções. Na primeira, introduzo as teses fundamentais da abordagem dos interesses relativos ao tempo sobre o que determina a magnitude do dano decorrente da morte para quem morre, tal como formulado por Jeff McMahan (2002). Na seção seguinte, explico dois pressupostos centrais dessa (...) abordagem, a saber, que a identidade pessoal não é o que fundamenta nossas razões de preocupação egoísta com o futuro e que a unidade psicológica consta entre as relações que fundamentam essa preocupação. Na terceira seção, apresento os (possíveis) contraexemplos, sendo eles o Caso da morte futura (Broome, 2004), o Caso da operação no cavalo Tommy (Harman, 2011) e o Caso do mal maior (Cunha, 2023). Na seção final, defendo que esses casos podem ser respondidos a partir da consideração moral e prudencial de determinados interesses relativos ao tempo futuro. (shrink)

Resenha de: CUNHA, Luciano Carlos. Uma Breve Introdução à Ética Animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Editora Appris, 2021.

This chapter does four things. First, it considers several questions about the proposed methodology. Second, it answers several objections to the methodology, many of which center on the results of implementing it. Third, it identifies several ways we could improve the methodology going forward, improving the empirical rigor of our approach. Fourth and finally, it takes stock of the project and provides our overall view of its significance. We emphasize that insofar as it’s appropriate to use our welfare range estimates (...) for decision-making, they are placeholders for the main result, which is that the differences between species are smaller than some may have anticipated (or, more cautiously, that there is little empirical basis for postulating larger differences). (shrink)

We argue that individual and institutional caregivers have a defeasible moral duty to provide dependent children with plant-based diets and related education. Notably, our three arguments for this claim do not presuppose any general duty of veganism. Instead, they are grounded in widely shared beliefs about children’s interests and caregivers’ responsibilities, as well as recent empirical research relevant to children’s moral development, autonomy development, and physical health. Together, these arguments constitute a strong cumulative case against inculcating in children the dietary (...) practice of regularly eating meat (and other animal products) — a practice we call ‘carnism’. (shrink)

Is there something distinctive about humanity that justifies the idea that humans have moral status while non-humans do not? Providing an answer to this question has become increasingly important among philosophers as well as those outside of philosophy who are interested in our treatment of non-human animals. For some, answering this question will enable us to better understand the nature of human beings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. Some argue that there is an answer that can distinguish (...) humans from the rest of the natural world. Many of those who accept this answer are interested in justifying certain human practices towards non-humans—practices that cause pain, discomfort, suffering, and death. This latter group expects that in answering the question in a particular way, humans will be justified in granting moral consideration to other humans that is neither required nor justified when considering non-human animals. In contrast to this view, an increasing number of philosophers have argued that while humans are different in a variety of ways from each other and other animals, these differences do not provide a philosophical defense for denying non-human animals moral consideration. What the basis of moral consideration is and what it amounts to has been the source of much disagreement. (shrink)

In the philosophy of love, the possibility of loving a non-human animal is rarely acknowledged and often explicitly denied. And yet, loving a non-human animal is very common. Evidently, then, there is something wrong with both “human-focused” accounts (e.g. Niko Kolodny, Troy Jollimore), which assume we can only love human beings, and “person-focused” accounts (e.g. David Velleman, Bennett Helm), which understand the nature of love in terms of its being essentially directed toward those with a capacity for normative self-reflection (i.e. (...) “persons”). Even aside from the experiences of those who love a non-human animal, on which I draw, we already have reason to be worried about these latter, “person-focused,” views, insofar as they deny the possibility of loving the various human beings who do not meet their criteria for “personhood,” including at least some human beings with “severe” or “profound” cognitive disabilities. With this in mind, I argue that what we need is the (broader) notion of a “somebody” as a distinctive kind of love-object. This is the notion of a kind of presence of which we are acutely aware when, for example, we look into another’s eyes and see that there is “somebody home.” With this presence, there is a possibility of “togetherness,” and I suggest that it is precisely in the realm of togetherness that the possibility of love arises; the kind of love we speak of when we speak of loving our friends, family and romantic partners, and also, I argue, our animal companions. (shrink)

In this paper I describe two distinctions about what “eating animals” entails which are often confused in conversations or arguments aimed against meat-based diets and try to show how both distinctions, on their own lights, ultimately support a concern for all fellow creatures, regardless of species or other biological categories. The distinctions in question are: the distinction between moral and nonmoral actions, presumptions about which serve to define whether or not particular topics (like meat consumption) deserve moral consideration whatsoever, and (...) the distinction between moral and immoral actions, about which suppositions bear on both reflexive and considered moral judgments to inform agents in making meaningful normative decisions. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these rights (...) are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers (...) sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ? (shrink)

Many take Kantian ethics to founder when it comes to our duties to animals. In this paper, I advocate a novel approach to this problem. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I canvass various passages from Kant in order to set up the problem. In the second, I introduce a novel approach to this problem. In the third, I defend my approach from various objections. By way of preview: I advocate rejecting the premise that nonhuman animals (...) are nonrational. (shrink)

This paper considers a solution to a scenario found in Tom Regan’s Case for Animal Rights, offered by Daniel Kary. Regan considers a case where either one human or any number of dog’s must be sacrificed. He chooses the human because they would be harmed more than any dog would be. This is initially puzzling since Regan claims that humans and dogs have equal inherent value (the objective value as an end that entities have). Kary’s solution argues the human should (...) be saved since their possible experiences have greater intrinsic value (the objective value as an end that experiences have) than those of any number of dogs’. The rationale is that dog experiences are too similar to be additive. The paper acknowledges that Kary’s alternative solution is more plausible than Regan’s, but it ultimately fails to be convincing. (shrink)

This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning so‐called animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing (...) the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics. (shrink)

The theories of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker arise from an existential and psychological analysis of the death terror/anxiety deep in the unconscious of every human. Becker details how this anxiety governs the ideologies and behaviors of our species—something now confirmed by thousands of experiments performed by psychologists engaged in contemporary terror management theory (TMT). Humans manage their anxiety through what Becker terms “hero systems”—concepts, beliefs, and myths we create to give our lives a sense of significance and meaning. Today, many (...) dominant economic, technological, and religious hero systems seek to confirm our significance by denying that we are—like all other species—animals who must exist in a decaying, mortal body. Becker shows how this attempt to deny our “creatureliness” (basic biological nature) causes humans to stand against the natural world we are embedded in, leading to an assault on the planet and nonhuman animals. As a result, Becker believed pacifism was the only hero system capable of keeping humankind from destroying itself and the earth. Pacifism is the precursor to the more encompassing ethical concept of “reverence for life,” advocated by Dr. Albert Schweitzer. By respecting the will-to-live in all sentient beings, reverence for life transcends concern for humans alone and extends moral and physical safeguards to life as such. Confronting the fact that humans are increasingly alienated from their commodified world and their own being, reverence for life stands as a vital solution to many of our modern problems. And following contemporary TMT research, reverencing life can also expand one’s self-esteem, which research shows lowers death anxiety, reduces aggression, and offers authentic meaning to life itself. (shrink)

How should we treat animals? The long-held belief that other animals exist solely for human use has undergone radical challenge in the past half century. How much further do we need to go to minimize, and even eliminate, animal suffering? The field of animal rights raises big questions about how humans treat the other animals with which we share the planet. These questions are becoming more pressing as livestock farming exerts an ever-greater toll on the planet and the animals themselves, (...) and we learn more about their capacity to think and experience pain. This book shows why animals ought to have greater rights and what the world might look like if they did. (shrink)

Jauernig defends the view that all living beings are of equal moral worth and are owed compassion, on account of which we are also obligated to adopt a vegan diet. Fischer denies that we have an obligation to become vegans, and argues for the position that humans morally matter more than all other living creatures.

We argue that extreme endurance sport can be valuable for some nonhuman animals. To make the case, we focus specifically on dogsled racing. We argue that, given certain views about the nature of self-affirmation, perceptual agency, and affordances, sled dogs are capable of realizing significant value through extreme endurance running. Because our focus is on the axiological question of the nature of the value of the sport for its participants, we do not claim that extreme dogsledding is ethical; indeed, we (...) acknowledge the morally objectionable aspects of the practice in its current form. Still, we offer our argument as a critical step in providing an adequate moral justification for a reformed model of dogsled racing. If it is permissible, that is likely because it offers some significant benefits to sled dogs. Given some assumptions about sled dogs’ capacity to be guided by both internal and external affordances, those benefits include self-affirmation. (shrink)