encryption

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encryption

[en′krip·shən]
(computer science)
The coding of a clear text message by a transmitting unit so as to prevent unauthorized eavesdropping along the transmission line; the receiving unit uses the same algorithm as the transmitting unit to decode the incoming message.
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms, 6E, Copyright © 2003 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

encryption

(algorithm, cryptography)
Any procedure used in cryptography to convert plaintext into ciphertext (encrypted message) in order to prevent any but the intended recipient from reading that data.

Schematically, there are two classes of encryption primitives: public-key cryptography and private-key cryptography; they are generally used complementarily. Public-key encryption algorithms include RSA; private-key algorithms include the obsolescent Data Encryption Standard, the Advanced Encryption Standard, as well as RC4.

The Unix command crypt performs a weak form of encryption. Stronger encryption programs include Pretty Good Privacy and the GNU Privacy Guard.

Other closely related aspects of cryptograph include message digests.
This article is provided by FOLDOC - Free Online Dictionary of Computing (foldoc.org)
References in periodicals archive ?
Evaluate (C,[c.sub.1](m),[c.sub.2](m),...,cn ( m)): Suppose C is a Boolean circuit and ([c.sub.1](m),[c.sub.2](m),...,cn ( m)) be a tuple of ciphertext. Then, ciphertexts can be evaluated by C as long as the noise growth in the ciphertexts does not exceed the threshold.
case--namely, the ciphertext, the password, and the plaintext.
e) Test algorithm: This is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input the IDERMKS ciphertext I, trapdoor [T.sub.w] and system parameters.
achieves an efficient access control mechanism using Constant-size Ciphertext Policy Comparative Attribute-Based Encryption (CCP-CABE) with the support of negative attributes and wildcards.
Therefore, it is natural to require that the ciphertexts be protected by a separate secure channel between Alice and the encryptor.
This paper takes the former approach, where we do not use a known background model, but assume a known ciphertext model.