Open-source intelligence

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the collection and analysis of data gathered from 'open sources' (overt sources and publicly available information) to produce intelligence. OSINT is primarily used in national security, law enforcement, and business intelligence and is used by analysts to answer classified, unclassified, or proprietary intelligence requirements.

Definition

OSINT involves the gathering of and analyzing of publicly accessible information to produce usable intelligence.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines OSINT as intelligence derived from publicly available information, collected and disseminated promptly to address specific intelligence needs. NATO describes OSINT as intelligence obtained from publicly available information and other unclassified data with limited public distribution or access. The European Union defines OSINT as the collecting and analyzing information from open sources to generate actionable intelligence, supporting areas like national security, law enforcement, and business intelligence.

In the private sector, companies like IBM define OSINT as the process of gathering and analyzing publicly available information to assess threats, inform decisions, or answer specific questions. Similarly, cybersecurity firms such as CrowdStrike describe OSINT as the act of collecting and analyzing publicly available data for intelligence purposes.

Categories

OSINT sources can be divided up into six different categories of information flow:

• Media: print newspapers, magazines, radio, and television from across and between countries.
• Internet: online publications, blogs, discussion groups, citizen media (i.e. – cell phone videos, and user created content), YouTube, and other social media websites (i.e. – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.). This source also outpaces a variety of other sources due to its timeliness and ease of access.
• Public government data: public government reports, budgets, hearings, telephone directories, press conferences, websites, and speeches. Although this source comes from an official source they are publicly accessible and may be used openly and freely.
• Professional and academic publications: information acquired from journals, conferences, symposia, academic papers, dissertations, and theses.
• Commercial data: commercial imagery, financial and industrial assessments, and databases.
• Grey literature: technical reports, preprints, patents, working papers, business documents, unpublished works, and newsletters.

OSINT is distinguished from research in that it applies the process of intelligence to create tailored knowledge supportive of a specific decision by a specific individual or group.

Collection methodologies

Collecting open-source intelligence is achieved in a variety of different ways, such as:

• Social media intelligence, which is acquired from viewing or observing a subject's online social profile activity.
• Search engine data mining or scraping.
• Public records checking.
• Information matching and verification from data broker services.

Risks for practitioners

A main problem for practical OSINT is the volume of information it has to deal with information explosion. The amount of data being distributed publicly in the world increases at a rate that it becomes difficult to evaluate sources in intelligence analysis.

Private individuals illegally collecting data for a foreign military or intelligence agency is considered espionage in most countries. Espionage that is not treason (e.g. betraying one's country of citizenship) has been a tool of statecraft since ancient times.

Disinformation/Misinformation risk

The open and accessible nature of public sources makes OSINT data particularly vulnerable to disinformation and or misinformation. Extremist groups have been shown to use OSINT to spread to misinformation and spread their viewpoints.

Governments and state actors have been documented intentionally disseminating disinformation through public channels to influence perceptions, confuse adversaries, or undermine trust in open-source findings. This can include planting false information in news outlets, social media, official statements, or manipulated geospatial data to mislead OSINT practitioners who rely on such sources.

References

• WashTimes.com, Washington Times – CIA mines 'rich' content from blogs, 19 April 2006
• GCN.com, Government Computer News – Intelligence units mine the benefits of public sources 20 March 2006
• FindAcricles.com, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin October–December, 2005 by Barbara G. Fast
• FAS.org Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine, Congressional Testimony on OSINT and Homeland Security 21 June 2005
• Thompson, Clive (2006-12-03). "Open-Source Spying". The New York Times. Retrieved 2018-05-29.
• "The Intelligence Network : I n t r o d u c t i o n". intellnet.org. 2008-05-09. Archived from the original on 2008-05-09. Retrieved 2018-05-29.

Further reading

• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; UC Berkeley Human Rights Center (2022). Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations A Practical Guide on the Effective Use of Digital Open Source Information in Investigating Violations of International Criminal, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (PDF). New York, Geneva: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law. ISBN 978-92-1-154233-2. OCLC 1334608062.

Scientific publications

• Deneuville, Alexandre; Hernández López, Germán; Rasmi, Jamil, eds. (2022). "Contre-enquêtes en sources ouvertes". Multitudes. 89. Archived from the original on 2023-01-01. Retrieved 21 May 2026. Special issue edited by Deneuville, Hernández López, and Rasmi on open‑source investigative methods
• Hulnick, Arthur S. (2010). "The Dilemma of Open Source Intelligence: Is OSINT Really Intelligence?". In Johnson, Loch K.; Wirtz, James J.; Murray, Michael (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 229–241. Archived from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 21 May 2026. Hulnick's foundational chapter assessing whether OSINT qualifies as intelligence within national‑security practice
• Burke, Cody (May 2007). Freeing Knowledge, Telling Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and Development (Working paper). Bond University. Archived from the original on 2016-08-17. Retrieved 21 May 2026. Bond University working paper examining OSINT in development contexts
• Schaurer, Florian; Störger, Jan (Oct 2010). The Evolution of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT Report 3/2010). International Relations and Security Network, ETH Zürich. Archived from the original on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 21 May 2026. ISN/ETH Zürich analytical report tracing the conceptual and institutional development of OSINT
• Hassan, Nihad A. (30 June 2018). Open source intelligence methods and tools : a practical guide to online intelligence. Hijazi, Rami. [United States]. ISBN 978-1-4842-3213-2. OCLC 1043830928.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)

External links

• The Open Source Intelligence Resource Discovery Toolkit
• The New Craft of Intelligence: Making the Most of Open Private Sector Knowledge
• Actual Intelligence Case Studies Leveraging Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
• Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age
• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress Archived 2016-01-28 at the Wayback Machine, Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2007
• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2008
• The Free Library, FMSO-JRIC and Open Source Intelligence: speaking prose in a world of verse, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Oct–Dec, 2005 by Jacob W. Kipp