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Fergana massacre

Coordinates: 40°54′03″N 71°45′28″E / 40.90083°N 71.75778°E / 40.90083; 71.75778
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Fergana Massacre
Part of the exile of the Meskhetian Turks and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
LocationFergana Valley, Uzbek SSR
Date3 June 1989 (1989-06-03)–12 June 1989 (1989-06-12)
(1 week and 2 days)
TargetMeskhetian Turks
Attack type
pogrom
Deathsover 100[1][a]
Injuredover 1,000[1]
PerpetratorsUzbek nationalist mobs[b]
AccusedKGB-led mafia[6][7]

The Fergana massacre happened in 1989, after riots broke out between the Meskhetian Turks exiled in Uzbekistan and the native Uzbeks. Hundreds of Meskhetian Turks were killed or injured, around 1,000 properties were destroyed and tens of thousands of Meskhetian Turks fled to other Soviet republics.[8][9] Subsequent pogroms targeted Jews and Armenians.[10]

Over 100 people were killed in the pogroms, and over 1,000 were wounded and 752 houses destroyed. The pogrom has been described as "one of the worst rounds of ethnic violence in the former Soviet Union"[11] and received considerable international attention.[12]

Background

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See also: Deportation of the Meskhetian Turks

In 1944, the Meskhetian Turks were deported by the Soviet regime from the Georgian SSR to Central Asia, mainly to the Uzbek SSR. Unlike most other minorities deported in the Stalin era, they were not allowed to return to their homeland. By the time of the start of the pogroms, Before the massacre, about 100,000 Meskhetian Turks lived in Uzbek SSR.[1] While the Meskhetian Turks peititioned the government to allow them to return to their homeland, or at least somewhere in the Georgian SSR, they were unable to.[13] The Uzbek SSR enjoyed an extremely high level of autonomy compared to the rest of the Soviet Union, and while nationalism among smaller ethnic groups was discouraged, Uzbek nationalism grew in power, especially under the Sharof Rashidov administration.[14] Uzbek nationalist sentiments grew in response to the prosecutions of people involved in the cotton scandal.[15] Ethnic tensions existed long before the start of the pogrom, but became more pronounced during glasnost. For example, on 4 December 1988, there was a rally in the Uzbek SSR where people displayed banners with slogans disparaging other ethnicities, calling on Russians to return to Russia and for Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea,[16][17] and in February 1989 a group of around 100 people were thwarted in an attempt to launch a pogrom.[17]

The Uzbek mobs that took part in the pogrom focused on Meskhetian Turks (and to a lesser extent, Crimean Tatars) for several reasons: Russians enjoyed the protection of Moscow and attacking them would result in significantly more backlash, the Korean community was very organized and had accumulated guns for self-defense in the event that they were targeted for a pogrom,[18] and Crimean Tatar-Uzbek relations were slightly better than Meskhetian Turk-Uzbek relations.[19][20] Widespread resentment of Meskhetian Turks developed due to the perception that they had a higher standard of living than Uzbeks.[21][22]

Attacks

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The attacks on Meskhetian Turks took place from mid May to early June 1989 across numerous parts of the Fergana Valley. The riots started with a brawl in Quvasoy and spread across the valley, with most of the violence taking place in the cities of Fergana, Margilon, and Toshloq. Later violence spread to other cities such as Kokand.[23]

Early attacks in Quvasoy

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From May 16 to 18, 1989, small-scale fighting took place between Meskhetian Turk and Uzbek youth in Quvasoy.[c] By May 23, the fighting in Quvasoy resumed and proceeded to escalate over the next two days the fighting resumed and escalated into major clashes that lasted two days. Hundreds of Meskhetian Turks and Uzbek were involved in the fights. After a crowd of Uzbeks tried to attack a majority-minority neighboorhood and launch a pogrom, the authorities forced them to disperse. Around 300 police officers from other regions were summoned to help stop the pogrom. Over the course of the wave of violence, 58 people were injured, 32 of which required hospitalization. One police officer, Ikrom Abdurakhmanov, died in the hospital from his injuries. Rumors spread that Meskhetian Turks were attacking Uzbek women and children, invigorating mobs to continue attacks.[16]

After the attacks, local authorities organized an emergency meeting to discuss how to contain the violence.[25]

Toshloq

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The next wave of the pogrom began on June 3. That morning, in what has been described as the most aggressive attack, a crowd of young Uzbeks attacked Meskhetian Turks and set fire to their houses in the town of Toshloq.[d] The first murders took place in this village. That day, 56 people were killed, 43 of whom were Meskhetian Turks.[26][27][25][28]

The next morning, the Meskhetian Turks in Toshloq were gathered on buses and given rides to the building that housed the district party committee to shelter there. Rioters began attacking the building where the Meskhetian Turks were sheltered and held the building under siege for over four hours, injuring 15 police officers who tried to defend the Meskhetian Turks. Eventually both the city party committee building and the local police department were destroyed.[25]

Margilan

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On the morning of June 4, a rally gathered near a movie theater in Margilan. The crowd demanded that the first secretary of the city Communist Party come and listen to their demands. The secretary came and listed to their demands and encouraged them to remain calm, but the crowd insisted that the city hand over all Meskhetian Turks that were sheltering in government buildings and release everyone that had been arrested for attacking Meskhetian Turks. The government refused to hand over the Meskhetian Turks. By the afternoon that same day, the crowd managed to breach the city committee building where Meskhetian Turks had been sheltering. The crowd proceeded to ransack the building. However, the Meskhetian Turks who previously had been sheltering there had been moved to another place by the time the pogromists breached the building.[29]

A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR was adopted on the introduction of a curfew on June 4 in a number of districts of the Fergana region.[30][31][32]

Fergana city

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On June 4 in the city of Fergana, pogromists armed with sticks and metal poles gathered in the city center in the morning, smashing cars and kiosks. The crowd surrounded the building of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, attempting to break through the cordon and throwing stones. A small group managed to enter the building.

On June 5, spontaneous rallies continued in central Fergana, on Lenin Square and near the Fergana Regional Party Committee building. A crowd managed to break into the building of the Regional Party Committee of Uzbekistan, but the Meskhetian Turks had already been evacuated. Pogroms and arson attacks on houses belonging to Meskhetian Turks continued in the city and surrounding areas. On June 5, youth groups also gathered in Quvasoy, but their attempts to start a clash were thwarted by police. Pogroms in Fergana continued on June 5, but by the end of the day, internal troops and police managed to stop them.

Kokand

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At a Communist Party building in Kokand, a large crowd demanded the release of 400 people arrested for involvement in pogroms and were being held awaiting prosecution.[33] Several people in the crowd were shot.[34]

On June 7, more than 5,000 villagers from nearby districts set off for Kokand in trucks, buses, and tractor trailers. About 1,500 Meskhetian Turks lived there; many of them had attempted to leave the city in the preceding days, but were detained and sent back by police posts set up on the outskirts. A crowd seized a brick factory and the police department building, which was soon recaptured by police. Sixty-eight prisoners were forcibly released from the pretrial detention center (according to other sources, they were released by the authorities at the crowd's demand). Hoping to escape, the Turks hid in a motor pool and a sanatorium, but despite this, there were still casualties among the Turkish population. The pogromists sacked and burned their homes, as well as those of local Uzbeks. In several settlements of the Kirovsky district, police stations were seized and service weapons were stolen.[35][36]

On the morning of June 8, violence erupted again in Kokand and surrounding villages. A crowd took over the Kokand railway station; the proceeded to drain fuel from a tank and threatened to set it on fire and blow up nearby tanks unless pogromists who had been arrested were released and the Meskhetian Turks and police officers trying to protect them were handed over. Pogromists managed to take control of the Novokokand chemical plant, and other local enterprises, but Soviet troops managed to take back control of the facilities. As attacks consisting of looting and arson on Meskhetian Turk homes continued, the homes of police officers who tried to stop the violence were also attacked. In the end, the Meskhetian Turks who remained in the area had to be evacuated by helicopter.[37]

In Kokand, 23 people were killed, of which 14 were residents of Kokand.[38]

Attacks in other regions

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Smaller-scale attacks on Meskhetian Turks also took place in other cities and towns such as Andijon,[29] Namagan,[39] and Surkhtepa.[29]

Andijon oblast

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On June 4, in the village of Surkhtepa, located within the Akhunbabaev district of the Andijon oblast, pogromists expelled Meskhetian Turks from their homes and then set their home on fire.[29]

Namagan oblast

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On the afternoon of June 11, in the center of Namagan oblast, around 300 people armed with improvised weapons such ranging from sticks and stones to axes and bottles of gasoline headed for areas populated by Meskhetian Turks, but were stopped at a railroad station by the police. The crowd threw stones at the militia instead after refusing to back down.[40]

Tashkent oblast

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In Yangibod, Tashkent oblast, hooligans chanting "Death to Turks" tried to storm the Meskhetian section of the town, but after the police fired warning shots they dispersed.[40]

Damage

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According to the commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, 103 people died during the pogrom, including 52 Meskhetian Turks and 36 Uzbeks and over 1,000 people were injured,[41] including at least 137 servicemen of the internal troops and at least 110 police officers were wounded,[42] one of whom (Tashkul Suvankulov)[43] later died from his injuries from when he was stabbed by a pogromist during an attack in Kokand.[44] 757 residential buildings, 27 government facilities, and 275 vehicles[45] were burned and looted. However, these numbers are likely an underestimate to downplay the scale of the casualties.

While Meskhetian Turks were the primary targets of the pogrom, several Crimean Tatars were killed by the mobs of attackers in a chaos, and Soviet airlifts of civilians from the areas of the pogrom to Tajik SSR evacuated both Meskhetian Turks and Crimean Tatars.[46]

Aftermath and reactions

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Government reactions

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Authorities in Moscow and Tashkent quickly claimed that the riots were planned by the mafia, the political enemies of Russian President Gorbachev or by Uzbek nationalists.[6] Nikolai Ryzhkov expressed shock that the attackers included local-level party officials.[12] MVD Colonel Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Nechaev,[43][e] who had previously witnessed the Sumgait pogrom in the Azerbaijan SSR remarked that the Sumgait pogroms "did not even come close to the Fergana nightmare."[47]

An initial 17,000 Meskhetian Turks were evacuated by the Soviet Army in the immediate aftermath of the pogroms, and another 70,000 left almost immediately thereafter.[48] Most of the airlifts took place between June 9 and June 18.[41]

Due to allegations that alcohol played a role in the events, authorities in Quvasoy oblast took the step of temporarily banning sales of alcohol.[49]

Meskhetian Turk reactions

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After the pogroms, around 200 Meskhetian Turks rallied outside the Supreme Soviet requesting to meet with Gorbachev so they could tell him that want wanted to return to their homeland in Georgia.[50] Following the pogroms, the majority of Meskhetian Turks, about 70,000, went to Azerbaijan, whilst the remainder went to various regions of Russia (especially Krasnodar Krai), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.[8][51]

Uzbek reactions

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The scope of Uzbek nationalist sentiments against other minorities increased after the massacre, with Armenians and Jews being the target of a new round of attacks in 1990.[52][53] Numerous eyewitnesses report hearing mobs chant "Down with the Russians, home with the [Crimean] Tatars, and to Hanoi with the Koreans!"[54]

Perpetrators

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While it is generally agreed that the vast majority of the attackers were Uzbeks, there are allegations that some of the attackers were representatives of other nationalities from outside the Uzbek SSR who wore Uzbek national garb as they participated in the attacks to inflame ethnic tensions and weaken local-level Uzbek authorities.[5]

Motives

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According to the most common version of events, the pogrom originated at a market over a quarrel over a bowl of strawberries when allegedly a Meskhetian Turk customer knocked over a plate of strawberries belonging to an Uzbek saleswoman,[55] or alternatively, a dispute arose about the price of the strawberries.[56] It is unclear to what extent religion influenced the attacks;[12] both Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks are predominantly Sunni Muslim.[20] Some attackers were rumored to have shouted Islamic slogans during the attacks, but others were seen drinking vodka.[12]

Other theories

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Jewish writer Boris Yusupov claimed that the pogrom took place because Meskhetian Turks were ordered by authorities in Moscow to attack the Bukharan Jewish community but they refused, so the KGB ordered an attack on them instead.[57] According to another theory, the Crimean Tatars may have been the original intended target of the attacks.[58] Theories that the pogroms were deliberately engineered by KGB are often considered far-fetched given the severe pre-existing ethnic tensions and the fact that the pogrom started in the small town of Quvasoy instead of somewhere more significant.[59]

Long term effects

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The pogroms had the effect of fragmenting the Meskhetian Turk community,[60][58] who were dispersed as refugees to various other Soviet republics. In contrast, the Crimean Tatar movement to repatriate grew more powerful, reinforcing their desire to leave Central Asia.[58] The local Jewish community was also incredibly alarmed by the massacre and hastened their exodus from Uzbekistan.[61][62] Meskhetian Turks who fled Central Asia for Krasnodar were targeted for a pogrom again, this time by Russian Cossacks, but it was much smaller than the Fergana pogrom.[63][64]

While the Crimean Tatars were able to secure the right of return to their homeland, the Meskhetian Turks were denied their right of return.[8][51] The desire to return to Crimea had always been a "push" factor in increasing Crimean Tatar desire to return to their homeland, the fear of another pogrom created a new "pull" factor from desire to leave the Uzbek SSR.[46] Many Crimean Tatars who previously did not want to return changed their mind after the massacre,[46] realizing that it could have been them.[58] Speculation remains that the Crimean Tatars may have been the original intended target of the attacks.[58]

The pogrom has been described as potentially an attempt at genocide.[65] Russian mistrust of Islam also heighted as result of the massacre.[66]

See also

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Footnotes

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  1. ^ Estimates of the death toll vary: Historian Yegor Gaidar indicated there were 103 deaths,[2] The Economist reports a death toll of 112,[3] while historians Bradley Mayhew, ‎Simon Richmond, ‎Richard Plunkett indicate that the death toll was at least 150.[4]
  2. ^ Allegations remain that representatives of other nationalities wearing Uzbek garb were involved in the attacks.[5]
  3. ^ Often spelled as Kuvasay and occasionally as Kuvasi. Misspelled by the New York Times as Kubasai.[24]
  4. ^ Often spelled as Tashlak.
  5. ^ Occasionally spelled Nechayev.

References

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  1. ^ a b c "POPULATION TRANSFER: The Tragedy of the Meskhetian Turks". Cultural Survival. March 1992.
  2. ^ Gaidar 1993, p. 297.
  3. ^ "Return of the Meskhetians". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. Retrieved 2026-03-01.
  4. ^ Mayhew, Richmond & Plunkett 2000, p. 35.
  5. ^ a b Starr 2014, p. 225.
  6. ^ a b Artemenko, V.; Kaipbergenov, A. (14 October 1989). "Острые углы «жемчужины»". Pravda (in Russian). No. 287. p. 2.
  7. ^ Sullivan 2017, p. 79.
  8. ^ a b c UNHCR 1999b, 20.
  9. ^ "MVD Says Pogroms Not Growing". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116): 47. 19 June 1989.
  10. ^ Berg 1998, p. 27.
  11. ^ Drobizheva et al. 2015, p. 289.
  12. ^ a b c d Leitzinger 1997, p. 31.
  13. ^ Sheehy, Ann; Nahaylo, Bohdan (1973-07-01). The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet treatment of some national minorities. Minority Rights Group. pp. 26–27. ISBN 978-0-903114-17-2.
  14. ^ Lovell-Hoare, Sophie; Lovell-Hoare, Max (2013). Uzbekistan. Bradt Travel Guides. ISBN 978-1-84162-461-7.
  15. ^ Stanton et al. 2012, p. 315.
  16. ^ a b Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 170.
  17. ^ a b Golovkov 1989, p. 29.
  18. ^ Derluguian 2005, p. 170.
  19. ^ Williams 2015, p. 134.
  20. ^ a b Starr 2014, p. 188-189.
  21. ^ Remnick, David (1989-06-10). "5,000 REPORTEDLY RIOTING IN UZBEKISTAN TOWN". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2026-03-03.
  22. ^ Trier, Tarkhan-Mouravi & Kilimnik 2011, p. 27-28.
  23. ^ Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 170-173.
  24. ^ Clines, Francis X. (1989-06-07). "57 REPORTED DEAD IN UZBEK VIOLENCE". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 10 October 2023. Retrieved 2026-02-14.
  25. ^ a b c Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 171.
  26. ^ Jalālzaʼī 2002, p. 170.
  27. ^ Trier & Khanzhin 2007, p. 118.
  28. ^ "Брифинг в МВД СССР". Pravda. No. 158. 7 June 1989. p. 8.
  29. ^ a b c d Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 172.
  30. ^ Starr 2014, p. 189.
  31. ^ "7,718 Weapons Reported Seized in Uzbekistan". Los Angeles Times. Associated Press. 1989-06-17. Retrieved 2026-03-03.
  32. ^ "Shatalin on Curfew, Events". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116): 48. 19 June 1989.
  33. ^ Bennigsen-Broxup, Marie (January 1990). "The Riots in Uzbekistan". Index on Censorship. 19 (1): 30.
  34. ^ Abramson 1997, p. 18.
  35. ^ "Unrest Spreads to Kokand". Daily Report: Soviet Union (109): 23. 8 June 1989.
  36. ^ Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 173-176.
  37. ^ Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 174.
  38. ^ "More on Arrests, Violence". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116): 50. 19 June 1989.
  39. ^ Collins 2006, p. 118.
  40. ^ a b "Uzbek MVD Colonel Cited". Daily Report: Soviet Union (118): 55-56. 21 June 1989.
  41. ^ a b Trier, Tarkhan-Mouravi & Kilimnik 2011, p. 27.
  42. ^ Grigorev, Viktor (1994). Феномены "перестройки": чрезвычайное положение (in Russian). Verdikt. p. 12.
  43. ^ a b Golovkov 1989, p. 30.
  44. ^ Kurdaev, Tofik (1996). Книга народной памяти: о турках (in Russian). Казахстан. p. 72. ISBN 978-5-615-01807-7.
  45. ^ Golovkov 1989, p. 28.
  46. ^ a b c Williams 2021, p. 438.
  47. ^ "Continued Coverage of Crisis Events in Fergana". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116): 46. 19 June 1989.
  48. ^ Arnold 2016, p. 88.
  49. ^ "17 Jun Paper on Fergana Events". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116): 51. 19 June 1989.
  50. ^ "Besiege Soviet Parliament Building". Daily Report: Soviet Union (116). 19 June 1989.
  51. ^ a b UNHCR 1999b, 21.
  52. ^ Drobizheva et al. 2015, p. 275.
  53. ^ Krichevsky, Lev (28 December 2006). "Money, not Muslims, concerns Uzbek Jews". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved 2026-03-07.
  54. ^ Williams 2015, p. 139.
  55. ^ Abashin & Bushkov 2004, p. 193.
  56. ^ Drobizheva et al. 2015, p. 274.
  57. ^ Sullivan 2017, p. 78-79.
  58. ^ a b c d e Trier & Khanzhin 2007, p. 617.
  59. ^ Starr 2014, p. 192-193.
  60. ^ Trier & Khanzhin 2007, p. 14.
  61. ^ Ochildiev, Pinkhasov & Kalontarov 2007, p. 218.
  62. ^ Katz, Zev (1991). "Soviet Aliya to Israel: Dimensions, Composition, Jewish Identity". Humanistic Judaism. 19 (4). Humanistic Judaism, Incorporated: 22–23.
  63. ^ McAuley 1997, p. 136.
  64. ^ Arnold 2016, p. 89-90.
  65. ^ Daniels 2005, p. 928-931.
  66. ^ Critchlow 2018, p. 78.

Bibliography

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40°54′03″N 71°45′28″E / 40.90083°N 71.75778°E / 40.90083; 71.75778

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