Jump to content

Anti-Azerbaijani sentiment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Anti-Azerbaijani sentiment, Azerophobia, Azerbaijanophobia, or anti-Azerbaijanism has been mainly rooted in several countries, most notably in Russia, Armenia, and Iran, where anti-Azerbaijani sentiment has sometimes led to violent ethnic incidents. Anti-Azerbaijani sentiment is also deeply linked to anti-Turkish sentiment, due to Azerbaijan and Turkey share a strong alliance due to common Oghuz origin.[1]

By country

[edit]

Armenia

[edit]
Further information: Armenian–Azerbaijani War

In the early 20th century, the Transcaucasian Armenians began to equate Azerbaijanis (then called Caucasian Tatars) with the perpetrators of anti-Armenian policies such as the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, due to the Armenian–Tatar massacres of 1905–1906.[2][3]

On March 30, 1918,[4] during a Bolshevik takeover orchestrated by Stepan Shahumyan, an estimate of 3,000 to 10,000 Azerbaijanis were killed by Bolshevik troops and ethnic Armenian militias, while up to 2,500 Armenians were killed by ethnic Azerbaijani militias.[5][6]
Azerbaijani sources say that 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed.[4]

According to Firuz Kazemzadeh,

The brutalities continued for weeks. No quarter was given by either side: neither age nor sex was respected. Enormous crowds roamed the streets, burning houses, killing every pass-by who was identified as an enemy, many innocent persons suffering death at the hands of both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. The struggle which had begun as a political contest between Musavat and the Soviet assumed the character of a gigantic race riot.[7]

Nagorno-Karabakh

[edit]
Further information: First Nagorno-Karabakh War

After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, anti-Azerbaijani sentiment grew in Armenia, leading to harassment of Azerbaijanis there.[8] In the beginning of 1988 the first refugee waves from Armenia reached Baku. In 1988, Azerbaijanis and Kurds (around 167,000 people) were expelled from the Armenian SSR.[9] Following the Karabakh movement, initial violence erupted in the form of the murder of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis and border skirmishes.[10] As a result of these skirmishes, 214 Azerbaijanis were killed.[11]

On June 7, 1988, Azerbaijanis were evicted from the town of Masis near the Armenian–Turkish border, and on June 20, five villages that were mostly populated by Azerbaijanis were emptied in the Ararat Province.[12] Henrik Pogosian was ultimately forced to retire, blamed for letting nationalism develop freely.[12] Although purges of the Armenian and Azerbaijani party structures were made against those who had fanned or not sought to prevent ethnic strife, as a whole, the measures taken are believed to be meager.[12]

1993 was marked by the highest wave of refugees in Azerbaijan, when the Artsakh Defence Army occupied territories beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh.[13]

Post-war

[edit]
Destroyed cities of Aghdam and Jabrayil. Ilham Aliyev in front of the ruined Vagif Mausoleum in Shusha.

On January 16, 2003 Robert Kocharian said that Azerbaijanis and Armenians were "ethnically incompatible"[14] and it was impossible for the Armenian population of Karabakh to live within an Azerbaijani state.[15] Speaking on 30 January in Strasbourg, Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer said Kocharian's comment was tantamount to warmongering. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe President Peter Schieder said he hopes Kocharian's remark was incorrectly translated, adding that "since its creation, the Council of Europe has never heard the phrase "ethnic incompatibility".[15]

In 2010, an initiative to hold a festival of Azerbaijani films in Yerevan was blocked due to popular opposition. Similarly, in 2012 a festival of Azerbaijani short films, organized by the Armenia-based Caucasus Center for Peace-Making Initiatives and supported by the U.S. and British embassies, which was scheduled to open on April 12, was canceled in Gyumri after protesters blocked the festival venue.[16][17]

On September 2, 2015, the Minister of Justice Arpine Hovhannisyan shared an article link on her personal Facebook page featuring her interview with the Armenian news website Tert.am where she condemned the sentencing of an Azerbaijani journalist and called the human rights situation in Azerbaijan "appalling". Subsequently, the minister came under criticism for liking a racist comment on the aforementioned Facebook post by Hovhannes Galajyan, editor-in-chief of local Armenian newspaper Iravunk; On the post, Galajyan had commented in Armenian: "What human rights when even purely biologically a Turk cannot be considered a human".[18]

Mosques in Armenia

[edit]
Further information: Islam in Armenia and List of mosques in Armenia
Blue Mosque, Yerevan

The Blue Mosque is the only functioning Persian mosque and one of the two remaining mosques in present-day Yerevan. In the opinion of the journalist Thomas de Waal, writing out Azerbaijanis of Armenia from history was made easier by a linguistic sleight of hand, as the name "Azeri" or "Azerbaijani" was not in common usage before the twentieth century, and these people were referred to as "Tartars", "Turks" or simply "Muslims". De Waal adds that "Yet they were neither Persians nor Turks; they were Turkic-speaking Shiite subjects of the Safavid Dynasty of the Iranian Empire". According to De Waal, when the Blue Mosque is referred to as Persian it "obscures the fact that most of the worshippers there, when it was built in the 1760s, would have been, in effect, Azerbaijanis".[19]

Tapabashy Mosque, Kond, Yerevan

The other remaining mosque in Yerevan, the Tapabashy Mosque, was likely built in 1687 during the Safavid dynasty in the historic Kond district. Today, only the 1.5 meter-thick walls and sections of its outer perimeter roof still stand. The main dome collapsed in the 1960s (1980's according to residents and neighbors), though a smaller dome still stands. The mosque was used as by Armenian refugees following the Armenian genocide, and their descendants still live inside the mosque today. According to residents, the Azerbaijanis of Yerevan held prayer services until they left for Baku in 1988 due to the tensions surrounding the war.[20] The remnants of the mosque are protected by the Armenian state as a historical monument.[21] In 2021, Armenia issued a tender to restore and reconstruct the historic Kond district including the mosque.[22]

In the Syunik Province of Armenia, the remaining mosques in the towns of Kapan, Sisian, and Meghri are maintained by the state under the Non-Armenian historical and cultural Monuments in Syunik designation.[23]

Polling

[edit]

According to a 2012 opinion poll, 63% of Armenians perceive Azerbaijan as "the biggest enemy of Armenia" while 94% of Azerbaijanis consider Armenia to be "the biggest enemy of Azerbaijan".[24] The root of the hostility against Azerbaijanis can be traced from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Georgia

[edit]

During Georgia's movement toward independence from the Soviet Union, the Azeri population expressed fear for its fate in an independent Georgia. In the late 1980s, most ethnic Azeris occupying local government positions in the Azeri-populated areas were removed from their positions.[25] In 1989, there were changes in the ethnic composition of the local authorities and the resettlement of thousands of migrants who had suffered from landslides in the mountainous region of Svaneti. The local Azeri population, accepting the migrants at first, demanded only to resolve the problem of Azeri representation on the municipal level. The demands were ignored; later the migrants, culturally different from the local population and facing social hardships, were accused of attacks and robbery against the Azeris,[26] which in turn led to demonstrations, ethnic clashes between Svans and Azeris, demands for Azeri autonomy in Borchali, and for the expulsion of Svan immigrants from Kvemo-Kartli.[27][28] The antagonism reached its peak during the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991–1992), when hundreds of Azeri families were forcibly evicted from their homes in Dmanisi and Bolnisi by nationalist paramilitaries. Thousands of Azeris emigrated to Azerbaijan in fear of nationalist policies.[28] In his speech in Kvareli, Gamsakhurdia accused the Azeri population of Kakheti of "holding up their heads and measuring swords with Kakheti".[29] The Georgian nationalist press expressed concern with regard to the fast natural growth of the Azeri population.[30]

Although ethnic oppression in the 1990s did not take place on a wide scale, minorities in Georgia, especially Azeris, Abkhazians, and Ossetians, encountered the problem of dealing with nationalist organisations established in some parts of the country. Previously not prone to migrating, Azeris became the second-largest emigrating ethnic community in Georgia in the early 1990s, with three-quarters of these mainly rural emigrants leaving for Azerbaijan and the rest for Russia. Unlike other minority groups, many remaining Azeris cited attachment to their home communities and unwillingness to leave behind well-developed farms as their reason to stay.[30] Furthermore, Georgian-born Azeris who immigrated to Azerbaijan at various times, including 50,000 Georgian-born spouses of Azerbaijani citizens, reported bureaucratic problems faced in Azerbaijan, with some unable to acquire Azerbaijani citizenship for nearly 20 years.[31]

Iran

[edit]

Several scholars have argued that the development of modern Iranian nationalism during the late Qajar and Pahlavi periods was influenced by an Aryanist conception of national identity that privileged Persian language and culture while marginalizing the country's non-Persian peoples, including Azerbaijanis. Political scientist Alireza Asgharzadeh argues that the state-building projects of both the Pahlavi monarchy and, to a significant extent, the Islamic Republic promoted a homogenizing national narrative centered on Persian linguistic and cultural dominance, while portraying Iran's ethnic and linguistic diversity as a challenge to national unity.[32] [33][34][35]According to Asgharzadeh, the racialized interpretation of Arya and Aryanism in modern Iran granted a privileged position to Persian identity and contributed to assimilationist policies directed toward non-Persian communities, including Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch and Turkmens.[36][37] Scholars of Iranian ethnic humor have noted that Azerbaijani Turks have frequently been targets of negative stereotypes in Persian-language jokes and popular culture. In a study of 1,000 Persian jokes, Bakhtiar Naghdipour found that ethnic jokes constituted one of the most common categories of humor in Iran and reflected tensions between ethnic minorities and the dominant majority in the country's multiethnic society.[38] Academic literature on contemporary Iran has further observed that so-called "Turkish jokes" frequently portray Iranian Turks (Azerbaijanis) as unintelligent or foolish.[39] Such stereotypes have at times been expressed through derogatory terms such as Tork-e Khar ("Donkey Turk"), drawing on the longstanding association of donkeys with stupidity in Persian folklore and idioms.[40][41][42]

Despite constituting one of Iran's largest ethnic groups, Azerbaijani Turks do not have a system of public primary or secondary schools in which Azerbaijani serves as the language of instruction. [43] Although Article 15 of the Constitution of Iran permits the teaching of regional and ethnic languages and their literature, scholars and human rights organizations have noted that Persian remains the sole language of instruction throughout Iran's public school system and that constitutional provisions regarding mother-tongue education have largely remained unimplemented.[44][45][46][47]

Critics have argued that the lack of mother-tongue education for Azerbaijani-speaking children contributes to linguistic assimilation and places non-Persian-speaking students at a disadvantage during their early years of schooling.[48]

In 2006, a cartoon controversy with regard to Azerbaijani people led to widespread unrest after a state-owned newspaper depicted an Azerbaijani-speaking cockroach, a portrayal widely perceived as racist and dehumanizing.[49][50][51][52] Several observers argued that the protests reflected deeper grievances than the cartoon itself. Writing shortly after the events, Emil Souleimanov noted that the controversy was "not an isolated affair" and was rooted in longstanding stereotypes within Persian popular culture that portrayed Azerbaijanis as unintelligent, backward, and objects of ridicule because of their language and accent.[53] Contemporary reports likewise observed that Azerbaijanis had long been the subject of ethnic jokes and mockery in Iranian media and popular discourse, contributing to the intensity of the public reaction.[54][55]

During 2012, fans of Tractor Sazi, an Azerbaijani-dominated football club, chanted slogans protesting discrimination against Iranian Azerbaijanis and criticizing the government's response to the East Azerbaijan earthquakes. Security forces responded by arresting numerous participants.[56] Azerbaijani activists have also increasingly faced harassment by Iranian authorities because of their efforts to promote Azerbaijani cultural and linguistic rights.[57][58]

In 1990s, during which Iran was blamed by Azerbaijan for supporting Armenia in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, despite the Iranian government claiming to have helped Azerbaijan,[59][60] several scholars have argued that Iran's policy toward Armenia has been shaped by geopolitical and domestic security concerns. Despite religious differences between Shi'a-majority Iran and Christian-majority Armenia, Iranian policymakers have often viewed Armenia as a strategic counterbalance to Azerbaijani and Turkish influence in the South Caucasus. Researchers have noted that Tehran has historically been concerned about the potential impact of Azerbaijani nationalism on Iran's large Azerbaijani population, as well as the possibility that changes in regional borders could reduce Iran's strategic access to Armenia and the wider Caucasus.[61][62]

According to scholars of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations, concerns regarding the emergence of a stronger Azerbaijani state, the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus, and the potential mobilization of Azerbaijani ethnic identity within Iran have repeatedly influenced Tehran's regional policies.[63][64]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ https://www.azernews.az/nation/188580.html
  2. ^ Croissant, Michael (1998). The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 8. ISBN 0275962415.
  3. ^ Willem van Schendel, Erik Jan Zürcher. Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century. I.B.Tauris, 2001. ISBN 1-86064-261-6, ISBN 978-1-86064-261-6, p. 43
  4. ^ a b Azerbaijan America Alliance.
  5. ^ Smith, Michael (April 2001). "Anatomy of Rumor: Murder Scandal, the Musavat Party and Narrative of the Russian Revolution in Baku, 1917–1920". Journal of Contemporary History. 36 (2): 228. doi:10.1177/002200940103600202. S2CID 159744435. The results of the March events were immediate and total for the Musavat. Several hundreds of its members were killed in the fighting; up to 12,000 Muslim civilians perished; thousands of others fled Baku in a mass exodus
  6. ^ The leaders of the Tartars at Baku were convinced that they would easily disarm the Armenian soldiers, because they were somewhat shut up in Baku, but they were sadly mistaken in their calculations. After a bloody battle which lasted a whole week the Armenians remained masters of the city and its oil wells. They suffered a loss of nearly 2,500 killed, while Tartars lost more than 10,000. The commander of the military forces of the Armenians was the same General Bagradouni, who, although he lost both of his legs during the fight, continued his duties until September 14, when the Armenians and the small number of Englishmen who came to their assistance, were forced to abandon Baku to the superior forces of the Turco-Tartars, and retreat toward the city of Enzeli in the northern Caucasus.  Pasdermadjian1918 pp. 193
  7. ^ Croissant, Michael P. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. p. 14.
  8. ^ Cornell, Svante (2010). Azerbaijan Since Independence. M.E. Sharpe. p. 48. ISBN 978-0765630032.
  9. ^ Barrington, p. 230
  10. ^ Barrington, Lowell (2006). After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial & Postcommunist States. University of Michigan Press. p. 231. ISBN 0472068989.
  11. ^ Окунев, Дмитрий. ""Меня преследует этот запах": 30 лет армянским погромам в Баку". Газета.Ru (in Russian). Retrieved January 12, 2020.
  12. ^ a b c Svante E. Cornell (1999). "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict" (PDF). Silkroadstudies. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 18, 2013. Retrieved January 28, 2013.
  13. ^ Geukjian, Ohannes (2012). Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 199. ISBN 978-1409436300.
  14. ^ "Nagorno-Karabakh: Timeline Of The Long Road To Peace". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 2, 2012.
  15. ^ a b "Newsline". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 3, 2003. Retrieved January 31, 2013.
  16. ^ "Azerbaijani Film Festival Canceled In Armenia After Protests". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. April 13, 2012. Retrieved January 28, 2013.
  17. ^ Soghoyan, Yeranuhi (April 11, 2012). "Gyumri Mayor Permits Anti-Azerbaijani Film Protest; Bans Local Environmentalists". Hetq online. Retrieved February 15, 2013.
  18. ^ https://epress.am/en/2015/09/07/armenian-newly-appointed-justice-minister-criticized-for-liking-racist-comment.html Armenian Newly Appointed Justice Minister Criticized for 'Liking' Racist Comment
  19. ^ de Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-8147-1945-9..
  20. ^ Arpi Maghakyan, "Old Yerevan Should be Rebuilt in Kond" (December 19, 2005). . Hetq Online
  21. ^ Arpine Haroyan, Hovhannes Nazaretyan (August 13, 2018). "Kond: A City Within a City". evnreport.com. Dating back to 1687, the Thapha Bashi mosque, the remnants of which only remain in Kond is listed as a historical monument and is protected by the Armenian state. When Muslims left Armenia at the beginning of the 20th century, the mosque became a residence for many survivors of the Armenian genocide. One can still see the influence of Persian architecture that fortunately remain intact. As the residents recall, the "huge dome" of the mosque collapsed more than two decades ago, several years after the Spitak Earthquake.
  22. ^ "The Third Attempt of Reconstruction". construction.am. February 11, 2021.
  23. ^ Lusine Kharatyan (September 2019). "Policies on Cultural Heritage of National Minorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia". caucasusedition.net. The non-Armenian historical and cultural monuments in Syunik Province of Armenia are located near the towns of Kapan, Meghri, Sisian, including Muslim (six sites) cemeteries, mausoleums, mosques, and an Orthodox church. The "Historical Environment and Historical-Cultural Museum Preserves Protection Service" NCSO of the Ministry of Culture of Armenia is responsible for the maintenance of the monuments, which are regarded as state property.
  24. ^ "The South Caucasus Between The EU And The Eurasian Union" (PDF). Caucasus Analytical Digest #51–52. Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich. June 17, 2013. p. 21. ISSN 1867-9323. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 29, 2013. Retrieved July 3, 2013.
  25. ^ Jonathan Wheatley (September 2009). Интеграция национальных меньшинств в регионах Грузии Самцхе-Джавахети и Квемо Картли (in Russian). European Centre for Minorities.
  26. ^ Tom Trier & Medea Turashvili. Resettlement of Ecologically Displaced Persons Solution of a Problem or Creation of a New Eco-Migration in Georgia 1981 – 2006 Archived 2018-09-23 at the Wayback Machine. ECMI Monograph #6. August 2007
  27. ^ Alexander Kukhinadze. "Ethnic Minorities in Eastern and Southern Georgia" (in Russian). Memorial. Archived from the original on July 16, 2011. Retrieved August 21, 2006.
  28. ^ a b "Georgia's Armenian and Azeri minorities". Report 178 Europe. November 22, 2006. Archived from the original on February 9, 2011.
  29. ^ (in Russian) Sergey Markedonov The Land and Will of Zviad Gamsakhurdia Archived 2013-07-29 at the Wayback Machine // Institute of Political and Military Analysis. 4 April 2007.
  30. ^ a b Mamuka Komakhia. Ethnic Minorities in Georgia Archived 2015-10-03 at the Wayback Machine. Diversity.ge.
  31. ^ Ulviyya Akhundova. Serve but Don't Expect Citizenship[permanent dead link]. Zerkalo. 4 July 2012.
  32. ^ Asgharzadeh, Alireza (2007). Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1–20, 197–220.
  33. ^ Zia-Ebrahimi, Reza (March 2016). The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-54111-4.
  34. ^ "Iran: More than Persia". Reuters. Archived from the original on June 21, 2025. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  35. ^ Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity. University of Texas Press. 2014. doi:10.7560/757493. ISBN 978-0-292-75749-3.
  36. ^ Asgharzadeh, Alireza (2007). Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles. Palgrave Macmillan.
  37. ^ Shaffer, Brenda (September 2000). "The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran". Nationalities Papers. 28 (3): 449–477. doi:10.1080/713687484. ISSN 0090-5992.
  38. ^ Naghdipour, Bakhtiar (2014). "Jokes in Iran". Folklore. 59: 105–120. doi:10.7592/FEJF2014.59.naghdipour.
  39. ^ "Iran's "Self-Deprecating Modernity": Toward Decolonizing Collective Self-Critique". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 2021.
  40. ^ "Iranian Azeris: A Giant Minority | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  41. ^ "Donkey". Encyclopaedia Iranica.
  42. ^ Abedinifard, Mostafa (August 2021). "Iran's "Self-Deprecating Modernity": Toward Decolonizing Collective Self-Critique". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 53 (3): 406–423. doi:10.1017/S0020743821000131. ISSN 0020-7438.
  43. ^ Shaffer, Brenda (September 2000). "The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran". Nationalities Papers. 28 (3): 449–477. doi:10.1080/713687484. ISSN 0090-5992.
  44. ^ "Ministry of Education: Language discrimination against ethnic minorities persists". Center for Human Rights in Iran. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  45. ^ "Examining family language policy through realist social theory". Language in Society. Cambridge University Press. 2024.
  46. ^ "Examining family language policy through realist social theory". Language in Society. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  47. ^ "The Long Struggle of Iran's Azerbaijani Community". CIRSD. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  48. ^ "Discrimination against ethnic minorities in the constitution". Iran Human Rights Review. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  49. ^ "Iran shuts paper over cartoon". Al Jazeera. May 23, 2006.
  50. ^ "Azeris protest cockroach cartoon". UPI. May 28, 2006.
  51. ^ Wood, Graeme. "Iran: A Minority Report". The Atlantic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  52. ^ Ali M. Koknar (June 6, 2006). "Iranian Azeris: A Giant Minority". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  53. ^ Souleimanov, Emil (June 14, 2006). "The "Cartoon Crisis" in Iranian Azerbaijan: Is Azeri Nationalism Underestimated?". CACI Analyst.
  54. ^ "Azeris unhappy at being butt of national jokes". The New Humanitarian. May 25, 2006.
  55. ^ "Iran daily resumes publication". Al Jazeera. October 28, 2006.
  56. ^ "Security forces' attack on Azeri fans marks rising ethnic tension in Iran – Turkish News". Hürriyet Daily News. December 13, 2012.
  57. ^ "The mass arrests of Azerbaijani activists in Iran". Al Arabiya English. July 9, 2018.
  58. ^ "Iran: Repression of Azeri Minoritiy | Human Rights Watch". February 14, 2025. Retrieved May 31, 2026.
  59. ^ "Iranian Official: We Helped Azerbaijan In Karabakh War | Eurasianet". eurasianet.org.
  60. ^ Taleblu, Behnam Ben (October 7, 2020). "Will Iran's past become prologue for Nagorno-Karabakh?". Axios.
  61. ^ Cornell, Svante E. (2009). "Iran and Its Two Neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan: Resuming Relationships under America's Suspicious Eyes". Iran and the Caucasus. 13 (2): 383–399. doi:10.1163/157338410X12625876281541.
  62. ^ Aghazada, M.M. (2023). "Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations After the Second Karabakh War: Features and Trends". Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. 23 (4): 719–733. doi:10.22363/2313-0660-2023-23-4-719-733.
  63. ^ Ahmadoghlu, Ramin (2019). "Azerbaijani National Identity in Iran, 1921–1946: Roots, Development, and Limits". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 10 (3): 253–278. doi:10.1080/21520844.2019.1656455.
  64. ^ Asgharzadeh, Alireza (2007). Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles. Palgrave Macmillan.
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Anti-Azerbaijani_sentiment&oldid=1357265233"