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³ Vo v. France, 40 Eur. Ct. H. R. 12, at para. 82 (2005).Google Scholar

⁴ Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H. R. 18, at para. 74 (2002).Google Scholar

⁵ Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), at para. 183 (1978).Google Scholar

⁶ Id. at para. 183.Google Scholar

⁷ In relation to the death penalty: Soering v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, No. 161), at para. 104 (1989), and the definition of torture: Selmouni v. France, 29 Eur. Ct. H. R. 403, at para. 101 (2009).Google Scholar

⁸ Free legal aid in civil cases: see Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at para. 26 (1979. For certain procedural matters in the French Administrative Court, see Kress v. France, VI Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 70 (2001); for pre-trial injunctions see Micallef, supra, note 2, at paras. 78-86.Google Scholar

⁹ Stafford v. the United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H. R. 32, at para. 68 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁰ For the clarification of the terms “family life,” see Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, 1979), McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 307B. Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, 1995); “private life,” see Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, supra note 4, Niemietz v. Germany, 251B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 29 (1995), Halford v. The United Kingdom, 32 Eur. Ct. H. R. at para. 43-46 (1997), reports of Judgments and Decisions, Judgment of 25 June 2007; and “home,” see Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 39 EUR. Ct. H. R. 17 (2004). So-called “environmental” case law also found its way into ECtHR's jurisprudence by means of evolutive interpretation; see Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, 34 EUR. Ct. H. R. 1 (2002).Google Scholar

¹¹ For an analysis of equality between children born in wedlock and outside of marriage see, Marckx v. Belgium, supra note 10; heterosexuals and homosexuals see Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, 1981); gender equality, see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, 1993).Google Scholar

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¹⁹ Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 420 (2001).Google Scholar

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³¹ European consensus links evolutive interpretation to external circumstances which can be verified.Google Scholar

³² Legitimacy of evolutive interpretation was challenged in Golder v. United Kingdom. In this case the ECtHR interpreted ECHR dynamically and stated that right to access court is to be protected under Article 6 of ECHR. Judge Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion stated that the Contracting Parties cannot be expected to comply with an obligation which is not articulated or defined. See Golder v. the United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, 1975). Separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, at para. 30.Google Scholar

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⁵⁵ In the beginning of the 20th century American lawyer Roscoe Pound defined mechanical jurisprudence and criticized it. He pointed out that “the marks of a scientific law are, conformity to reason, uniformity, and certainty. Scientific law is a reasoned body of principles for the administration of justice, and its antithesis is a system of enforcing magisterial caprice, however, honest, and however much disguised under the name of justice or equality or natural law.” See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Columbia Law Review 605 (1908). See also Posner, supra note 53, at 39-42.Google Scholar

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⁵⁸ Namely “[i]t cannot be right that the balance we in this country strike between freedom of the press and privacy should be decided by a Slovenian judge.” See Hoffmann, supra note 45, at 428.Google Scholar

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⁶⁶ Micallef, supra note 2.Google Scholar

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