¹ The perspective articulated by Allison, G. T.. Essence of Decision (Boston, 1971), p. 39Google Scholar, characterises most approaches: ‘For thirteen days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union stood “eyeball to eyeball”….The United States was firm but forebearing. The Soviet Union looked hard, blinked twice, and then withdrew without humiliation’ This paralleled the early analyses of the crisis. See, for example, Schlesinger, A. M. Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), ch. 30–1Google Scholar; Hilsman, R., To Move a Nation (New York, 1967), chs. 13–16.Google Scholar

² However, most analysts do give some credence to the claim that both the Soviet Union and Cuba viewed the missiles as a deterrent against a US invasion of Cuba. References to this motive can be found, for example, in Allison, , Essence of Decision, pp. 47–50, 239Google Scholar; Brune, L. H., The Missile Crisis of October 1962 (Claremont, CA, 1985), p. 28Google Scholar; Dinerstein, H. S., The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962 (Baltimore, 1976), pp. 176–7Google Scholar; Dominguez, J. I., To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 35–6Google Scholar; Garthoff, R. L., Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Revised Edition (Washington, D. C, 1989), pp. 21–2Google Scholar; Matthews, H. L., Revolution in Cuba (New York, 1975), p. 208Google Scholar; Paterson, T. G., ‘Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro’, in Paterson, Thomas G. (ed.), Kennedy's Quest for Victory (New York, 1989), pp. 136–41Google Scholar; Szulc, T., Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York, 1986), pp. 578–9.Google Scholar For a good discussion of the possible Soviet motives for placing missiles, see Blight, J. G. and Welch, D. A., On the Brink (New York, 1989), pp. 116–17, 294–6.Google Scholar An alternate list is provided by Brune, , Missile Crisis, pp. 15–32.Google Scholar

³ Much new data have become available because of three major conferences on the missile crisis. Edited transcripts and analyses of the first two conferences can be found in Blight and Welch, On the Brink. The first included nearly all the living members of the ExComm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council, formed by President Kennedy on 16 Oct. 1962) and the second included many of these men and three Soviet experts. Transcripts of the third conference – held in Moscow in January 1989, with participation by US, Soviet and Cuban delegates – will be available in Welch, D. A. and Allyn, B. J. (eds.), Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27–28, 1989, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (forthcoming).Google Scholar See also Allyn, Bruce J. et al. , ‘Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,’ International Security (12 1989).Google Scholar

⁴ Mankiewicz, F. and Jones, K., With Fidel (New York, 1975), pp. 150–1.Google Scholar Castro has held several positions in Cuba. During the missile crisis he was Prime Minister of Cuba. In 1974, at the time of the Mankiewicz–Jones interview, he was First Secretary of the Communist Party and President of Cuba.

⁵ Allison, , Essence of Decision, p. 239Google Scholar; Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 249–50, 294–5Google Scholar; Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 6–10Google Scholar; Matthews, H. L., Fidel Castro (New York, 1970), p. 227Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, pp. 578–9.Google Scholar

⁶ Mikoyan, Sergo, ‘La Crisis del Caribe, en retrospectiva’, América Latina, no. 4 (04 1988), p. 45Google Scholar; also comments made by Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation at the Moscow conference, 27 January 1989 (during the conference). Certainly, Soviet leaders relied on several sources of intelligence to develop their analysis of an impending US invasion. While the Soviet conclusion seems to have coincided with the Cuban assessment, it is not clear how much influence the Cuban view had. See Soviet comments in Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 238, 249, 258.Google Scholar On the expulsion, see Smith, W., The Closest of Enemies (New York, 1987), p. 80Google Scholar; Morley, M. H., Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (New York, 1987), pp. 155–8.Google Scholar

⁷ Franqui, Carlos, Family Portrait With Fidel, trans. MacAdam, Alfred (New York, 1984), p. 185Google Scholar, claims that Adzhubei gave Castro the report in person. Matthews, , Revolution in Cuba, p. 208Google Scholar, writes that Castro received Adzhubei's information from a copy of a report submitted to Khrushchev that was sent to Havana.

⁸ Thomas, H., The Cuban Revolution (New York, 1977), p. 607Google Scholar; Matthews, , Revolution in Cuba, p. 208.Google Scholar For a report of earlier comments by Cardona see Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, p. 141.Google Scholar

⁹ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 6Google Scholar; Chang, L. (ed.), Chronology of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C., 01 1989) p. 42Google Scholar; interviews with Cuban officials; ‘Moscow Missile Crisis Conference, 27–9 January 1989: Official Cuban Transcription,’ pp. 35–6. (Hereafter cited as ‘Cuban Transcript.’)

¹⁰ Morley, , Imperial State and Revolution, pp. 191–202Google Scholar; Rich, D., The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Evolution and Enforcement, A Study Prepared for the Commonwealth Countries (Washington, D.C., 07 1988), pp. 24–37.Google Scholar

¹¹ Lansdale, Brig. Gen., ‘Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) – Review of Operation Mongoose,’ 25 07 1962, p. 5Google Scholar; classified Top Secret; partially declassified 5 Jan. 1989; available at the National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.) which obtained it through the Freedom of Information Act. (Hereafter cited as ‘25 July 1962 Memorandum’.)

¹² Ibid., p. 4.

¹³ Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, ‘The Cuba Project’, 18 January 1962 (Program Review for The President and ten others: hereafter cited as ‘The Cuba Project’), p. 1; classified Top Secret; partially declassified 5 Jan. 1989; available at the National Security Archive (Washington, D.C), which obtained it through the Freedom of Information Act. Also see: Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report, No. 94–465, US Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 Nov. 1975 (hereafter cited as Assassination Report), p. 139.

¹⁴ ‘The Cuba Project,’ p. 2.

¹⁵ Quoted in Assassination Report, p. 146; also see pp. 139–47.

¹⁶ ‘25 July 1962 Memorandum’, p. 5. Also see Morley, , Imperial State and Revolution, pp. 149–50Google Scholar; Schlesinger, A. M. Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York, 1978), pp. 512–17, 575Google Scholar; Fuentes, N., Nos Impusieron La Violencia (Havana, 1986)Google Scholar; Paterson, , ‘Fixation with Cuba’, pp. 137–8.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Assassination Report, pp. 71–135. Also see Schlesinger, , Robert Kennedy, pp. 517–37.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Mikoyan, , ‘La Crisis del Caribe’, p. 45.Google Scholar

¹⁹ ‘Cuban Transcript’, pp. 33–5.

²⁰ Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, p. 161.Google Scholar

²¹ Dennison, R. L., CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis 1962, Serial: 000119/J09H, 29 04 1963, The Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia, p. 153.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as CINCLANT Account.) This document is available at the National Security Archive.

²² Ibid., pp. 17, 39–40. For an insightful article about the significance of the CINCLANT Account, see Hershberg, James G., ‘Before the “Missiles of October”: Did Kennedy Plan Military Strike Against Cuba?’, Diplomatic History (forthcoming).Google Scholar Also see his ‘Before the Missiles of October’, The Boston Phoenix, 8 April 1988.

²³ CINCLANT Account, pp. 20–1.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁵ ‘Dorticos en la ONU: En Defensa de Cuba’, Bohemia, 12 10 1962, pp. 48ffGoogle Scholar; ‘Excerpts From Cuban President's Speech in the UN’, New York Times, 9 10 1962, p. 14.Google Scholar

²⁶ Allison, , Essence of Decision, p. 47Google Scholar; Abel, E., The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 102–3Google Scholar; Cotayo, N. L., El Bloqueo a Cuba (Havana, 1983), pp. 314–15.Google Scholar The exercises began on 21 October, at which point they were in reality no longer exercises but prepositioning for a possible invasion.

²⁷ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 30–1.Google Scholar

²⁸ Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 621.Google Scholar

²⁹ ‘Cuban Transcript,’ p. 35.

³⁰ Cotayo, , El Bloqueo, pp. 308–13.Google Scholar For a description of some of the press and congressional demands see Thomas Paterson, G. and Brophy, William J., ‘October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962’, Journal of American History, vol. 72 (06 1986)Google Scholar; Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, pp. 621–2Google Scholar; Abel, , Missile Crisis, pp. 12–13Google Scholar; Allison, , Essence of Decision, p. 188Google Scholar; Chayes, A., The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1974), pp. 8–10.Google Scholar

³¹ ‘Cuba Está Lista Para La Batalla Decisiva’, Bohemia, 9 09 1962, pp. 58–9.Google Scholar

³² Mankiewicz, and Jones, , With Fidel, p. 148.Google Scholar Exile writer Carlos Franqui, then editor of Revolution, recounted that Cuba had reports on 20 October that ‘all US troops in Florida were on full alert, and there was a general mobilization’. Franqui, , Family Portrait, p. 189.Google Scholar

³³ Castro, F., ‘The Duty of a Revolutionary is to Make the Revolution: The Second Declaration of Havana’, in Kenner, Martin and Petras, James (eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (New York, 1969), pp. 85–106 (esp. p. 104)Google Scholar; Dominguez, , To Make the World Safe for Revolution, pp. 115–16Google Scholar; Erisman, H. M., Cuba's International Relations (Boulder, Colo., 1985), pp. 20–1.Google Scholar

³⁴ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 111.Google Scholar

³⁵ Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 617Google Scholar; Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, p. 152.Google Scholar

³⁶ Szulc, , Fidel, p. 582.Google Scholar

³⁷ Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 238, 251, 252, 297–9Google Scholar; Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, p. 152Google Scholar; Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 820.Google Scholar

³⁸ Castro told Tad Szulc that ‘in the same way that the United States had missiles in Italy and Turkey…we had the absolutely legal right to make use of such measures in our own country’. Szulc, , Fidel, p. 582.Google Scholar

³⁹ In a statement on 4 September he cautioned against the introduction of ‘offensive ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba’. On the 13th he warned against Cuba becoming ‘an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union’. See: Hilsman, , To Move a Nation, p. 171Google Scholar; ‘The President's News Conference of September 13’, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 674–5.Google Scholar One authoritative Soviet view of President Kennedy's statements – by Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the Soviet foreign minister at the time – focused only on the aspects of bellicosity in what Kennedy said, and ignored any mention of the implicit warning against placing ballistic missiles or combat troops in Cuba. See, Gromyko, Anatoly, ‘The Caribbean Crisis, Part 1’, in Pope, Ronald R. (ed.), Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham, Md., 1982), pp. 165–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Garthoff, R. L., Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 8 (fn. 9)Google Scholar; Dominguez, , To Make the World Safe for Revolution, p. 36.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, pp. 80–1, 166–8Google Scholar; Mankiewicz, , and Jones, , With Fidel, p. 152.Google Scholar

⁴² ‘Balance del Primer Encuentro con La Realidad Soviética’, 23 May 1963; reprinted in Castro, F., La Revolutión de Octubre y La Revolutión Cubana: Discursos 1959–1977 (Havana, 1977). p. 91.Google Scholar

⁴³ Julien, Claude, ‘Sept Heures Avec M. Fidel Castro’, Le Monde, 22 03 1963, p. 6.Google Scholar Also see, Matthews, , Fidel Castro, p. 225.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Mankiewicz, and Jones, , With Fidel, p. 152Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, p. 580Google Scholar; Cabrera, Carlos, ‘The October 1962 crisis: “It's Ridiculous to Claim That We Wanted to Provoke a Nuclear War”’, (interview with Rafael Hernández), Granma Weekly Review, 26 02 1989, p. 9.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as Hernández interview.)

⁴⁵ Franqui, , Family Portrait, p. 188Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, p. 583.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 610Google Scholar; Hilsman, , To Move a Nation, pp. 164–5, 201–2Google Scholar; Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, pp. 796–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ This was how Aleksandr Alekseev, who was soon to become the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, claims to have understood Castro. See Alekseev, Aleksandr, ‘Karibskii Krizis: kak eto bylo (The Caribbean Crisis: As It Really Was)’, Ekho Planety, no. 33 (Moscow, 11 1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Bernstein, Barton J., ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 95 (Spring 1980), p. 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The estimate of time necessary to prepare a missile for firing was made by Soviet military officials at the 1989 Moscow conference.

⁴⁹ Mankiewicz, and Jones, , With Fidel, p. 152.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ ‘Cuban Transcript,’ p. 38.

⁵¹ Domínguez, , To Make the World Safe for Revolution, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar Rafael Hernández describes the Cuban intention graphically: ‘From our point of view, the crisis signified for Cuba an act of asserting our claim, to the extent that the world was presented a vision of holocaust – precisely the perspective that faced Cuba in its unequal confrontation with the United States.’ Hernández, Rafael, ‘La Crisis de Octubre de 1962: Lección y Parábola’, America Latina, no. 4 (04 1988), p. 36.Google Scholar

⁵² Matthews, , Revolution in Cuba, pp. 209–10Google Scholar; Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, pp. 613–14Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, pp. 578–80Google Scholar; Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 238–9.Google Scholar

⁵³ ‘Cuban Transcript,’ pp. 45–6. (The ORI was the precursor of the Cuban Communist Party, and was formed out of Castro's 26th of July Movement, the university-based Revolutionary Directorate, and the old Communist Party or Partido Socialista Popular.) Also see, Alekseev, ‘Karibskii Krizis’. Franqui, (Family Portrait, p. 189)Google Scholar recalled that there were only five Cuban officials involved. Four on his list are the same as on Aragonés's, but Franqui's list deletes Aragonés and Blas Roca, and includes Ramiro Valdés.

⁵⁴ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 17Google Scholar; Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 609.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Dominguez, , To Make the World Safe for Revolution, p. 40Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, p. 583Google Scholar; interviews with Cuban officials in 1988 and 1989.

⁵⁷ There are discrepancies in reports of how many bombers arrived in Cuba and were operational. According to the CINCLANT Account (p. 15), 42 bombers were shipped to Cuba, and 11 were completely assembled and two were partially assembled when Cuba agreed to return them on 20 Nov. But former Cuban Army Chief of Staff Sergio del Valle recalled in an interview on May 18, 1989 with Bruce Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch that there were only twelve bombers in Cuba: 3 unassembled ones in Cuban hands and nine assembled ones controlled by the Soviets.

⁵⁸ ‘Cuban Transcript,’ pp. 79–80; and interviews in January 1989 with Cuban delegates at the Moscow conference. Castro noted on 19 November 1962, that ‘owing to their [the IL-28S] limited speed and low flight ceiling, they are antiquated equipment in relation to modern means of anti-aircraft defence’, Office of Public Information, United Nations, ‘Text of Communication dated 19 November 1962 from Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba to Acting Secretary-General U Thant’, Press Release SG/1379, 20 11 1962, p. 2.Google Scholar Also see Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 104 (fn. 183).Google Scholar Sergo Mikoyan said in an interview on 30 January 1989 that none of the nuclear warheads on the island could have been refitted as bombs for the IL-28S, and that there were no nuclear bombs delivered to Cuba.

⁵⁹ In his 4 September statement, President Kennedy warned that if there were any evidence of ‘any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country…the gravest issues would arise’. Hilsman, , To Move a Nation, p. 171.Google Scholar Also see Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 120–1.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ ‘Cuban Transcript,’ pp. 45–6, 56.

⁶¹ On this point also see Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 24–5.Google Scholar

⁶² ‘Cuban Transcript,’ pp. 46–8, 55–6, 75. The agreement, which was to be a five-year renewable pact, allegedly stipulated that the Soviets had no right of sovereign immunity over the missile bases. But Franqui contends (Family Portrait, p. 187) that the land on which the missiles were based became Soviet property.

⁶³ Matthews, , Revolution in Cuba, p. 208.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Gilly, A., Inside the Cuban Revolution, trans. Gutierrez, Felix (New York, 1964), p. 48Google Scholar, as quoted in Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 630.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Dinerstein, , Making of a Missile Crisis, p. 217.Google Scholar Also see: Mankiewicz, and Jones, , With Fidel, pp. 149–50Google Scholar; Alekseev, ‘Karibskii krizis’.

⁶⁶ Hoy, 23 Oct. 1962.

⁶⁷ ‘Cuban Transcript’, p. 81.

⁶⁸ CINCLANT Account, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Based on interviews with the Cuban delegates to the 1989 Moscow conference. Also see Matthews, , Fidel Castro, p. 232.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Interview on 30 January 1989. Also see Garrido, Mario H., ‘General of the Army Dimitri Yazov: I Have My Uniform, Ready to Fight’. Granma Weekly Review, 23 04 1989, p. 8.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Hoy, 25 Oct. 1962.

⁷² Kennedy, R. F., Thirteen Days (New York, 1969), p. 109Google Scholar; Abel, , Missile Crisis, pp. 194–95.Google Scholar

⁷³ CINCLANT Account, pp. 55–6.

⁷⁴ ‘Cuban Transcript’, pp. 43, 83. Interestingly, at the Moscow conference del Valle's estimate was translated initially as ‘800,000’, and this was readily accepted by US participants as credible once they learned that there were 40,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. During the crisis, the US estimate of Soviet military strength on the island ranged from 10,000 to 16,000. See Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 35–6.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Szulc, , Fidel, p. 584Google Scholar; Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 84Google Scholar; ‘Documentos de la Crisis Mundial’, Bohemia, 2 11 1962, p. 52.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ The officer seems to have been Lt. General (then Major General) G. A. Voronkov. See Juarez, Adela Estrada, ‘The General Who Gave the Order to Fire’, Granma Weekly Review, 23 04 1989, p. 8.Google Scholar Another officer, Major General Igor Statsensko, has also been cited as the local Soviet commander responsible for the shootdown. See Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 82–5.Google Scholar Also Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 310–11.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Chang, , Chronology, p. 226.Google Scholar The CINCLANT Account (p. 14) reported that the guns were 57 mm, and that no low level plane had been hit.

⁷⁸ ‘October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm’, International Security, vol. 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987/1988), pp. 63, 65, 68Google Scholar; Kennedy, , Thirteen Days, pp. 107–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Ellsberg, Daniel, ‘The Day Castro Almost Started World War III’, New York Times, 31 10 1987, p. 27.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, p. 72.Google Scholar In contrast, McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara argued that the likely response to a continued stalemate would have been a ‘turning of the screw’, an extension of the quarantine to include nonmilitary items. See Ibid., pp. 83–4, 189–90.

⁸¹ Alekseev, ‘Karibskii krizis’,

⁸² Confirmation of this comes indirectly from Alekseev. In ‘Karibskii krizis’, he claims that all 42 missiles and warheads for them were in place. In an interview on 28 January 1989 he said that Castro reviewed the manuscript of his article prior to publication, and had corrected any errors of fact. Presumably, then, Castro believed even until recently that all the missiles and warheads were on the island.

⁸³ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 36–7 (fn. 63), 207–9.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Keller, Bill, ‘62 Missile Crisis Yields New Puzzle’, New York Times, 30 01 1989.Google Scholar At the 1989 conference, Alekseev claimed to have helped draft the cable, and that no such demand was in it.

⁸⁵ LeoGrande, William, ‘Uneasy Allies: The Press and the Government During the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Occasional Paper No. 3, Center for War, Peace and the News Media, New York University, 1987, pp. 21, 42.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Che Guevara was reportedly preparing for guerrilla war in Pinar del Río. See Matthews, , Revolution in Cuba, p. 212.Google ScholarFranqui, reports (Family Portrait, p. 193)Google Scholar that Cuban uncertainty about a US invasion increased tension, and he claims that this led Castro to fire the Soviet SAM missile that brought down the U-2. That claim now is accorded little credence, in part because he locates the firing in western Cuba, hundreds of miles from the actual SAM missile site in Oriente Province. But as an apocryphal story, it may suggest why Castro initiated the use of anti-aircraft guns.

⁸⁷ Mikoyan, , ‘La Crisis del Caribe’, p. 55.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ There are still unresolved conflicting accounts of an alleged firefight between Cuban and Soviet troops. See Hersh, Seymour M., ‘Was Castro Out of Control in 1962?’, Washington Post, 11 10 1987, p. H2Google Scholar; Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 310–11.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ ‘Message to Chairman Khrushchev Calling for Removal of Soviet Missiles from Cuba, October 27, 1962’, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy 1962, pp. 815–14Google Scholar; Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 106–14.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ ‘Fija Fidel Las Cinco Garantías Contra La Agresión a Cuba’, Revolución, 29 10 1962.Google Scholar Also see, U Thant, ‘Summary of my meeting with President Dorticos, Premier Castro of Cuba and Foreign Minister Roa in [Havana] 10:00 A.M., October 31, 1962’, UN Archives, DAG-1/5.2.2.6.2:1, unpaginated.

⁹¹ U Thant, ‘Summary of my meeting, October 31, 1962’.

⁹² ‘Nuestro Derecho a la Paz se Está Abriendo Paso en El Mundo’, Verde Olivo, 11 11 1962, pp. 14, 15.Google Scholar This speech by Castro included a transcription of the 30 October meeting with U Thant. In his notes of that meeting, U Thant said that the remarks were those of Castro, not Dorticos. See, U Thant, ‘Summary of my meeting with President Dorticos, Premier Castro and Foreign Minister Roa in Havana, October 30, 1962’, UN Archives, DAG-1/5.2.2.6.2:1, unpaginated.

⁹³ Interview, 30 Jan. 1989.

⁹⁴ Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 636Google Scholar; Abel, , Missile Crisis, p. 213Google Scholar; Franqui, , Family Portrait, p. 196.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ There is some doubt about this report, because Soviet delegates at the 1989 Moscow conference asserted that the troops were Soviet, dressed in Cuban uniforms. For a discussion of this controversy, see Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 100–01 (fn. 175).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Alekseev, ‘Karibskii krizis’; Mikoyan, , ‘La Crisis del Caribe’, p. 55Google Scholar; interview with Mikoyan, 30 Jan. 1989; Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 267–8.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Julien, , ‘Sept Heures Avec M. Fidel Castro’, pp. 1, 6.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Matthews, , Fidel Castro, p. 232Google Scholar; Robbins, C. A., The Cuban Threat (New York, 1983), p. 211.Google Scholar Also see, Franqui, , Family Portrait, pp. 194–5.Google Scholar Castro himself suggested this interpretation in 1974 by saying: ‘We felt very passionate…We were annoyed by matters of form, by certain formalities in the conduct of the negotiations.’ See, Mankiewicz, and Jones, , With Fidel, p. 152.Google Scholar At the 1989 Moscow conference, Cuban participants acknowledged that the necessity ‘of time’ made the lack of consultation understandable. But they argued that even then Khrushchev should have qualified his acceptance of Kennedy's proposal with a requirement that Cuba's security demands be satisfied; ‘Cuban Transcript’, pp. 25, 56–7.

⁹⁹ ‘Cuban Transcript’, p. 26; Szulc, , Fidel, pp. 585–8Google Scholar; Thomas, , Cuban Revolution, p. 636Google Scholar; Julien, , ‘Sept Heures Avec M. Fidel Castro’, p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Letter from Prime Minister Fidel Castro to UN Secretary General U Thant, 15 Nov. 1962; unofficial UN translation; US Department of State Incoming Telegram, no. 1802, 15 Nov. 1962, 7:00 p.m., p. 2; classified Secret; now declassified.

¹⁰¹ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), pp. 126–7.Google Scholar Also see Smith, , Closest of Enemies, pp. 83–4.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Mikoyan, , ‘La Crisis del Caribe’, p. 55Google Scholar; Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 267–8.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 122Google Scholar; Schlesinger, , Robert Kennedy, pp. 574–5Google Scholar; Assassination Report, pp. 147–8.

¹⁰⁴ Castro letter to U Thant, 15 Nov. 1962, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 3, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 122.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ These ideas were expressed by Jorge Risquet and Emilio Aragonés at the 1989 Moscow conference. Also see, Hernández interview. Notably, the Soviet Union did propose direct US-Cuban negotiations ‘regarding the removal of the Guantanamo naval base’, in a joint Cuban–Soviet protocol offered on 15 November to settle the November crisis. See US Department of State Incoming Telegram, no. 1798, 15 Nov. 1962, 6 p.m., p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ For example, Draper, Theodore, ‘Castro and Communism’, The Reporter, 17 01 1963Google Scholar; Matthews, , Fidel Castro, pp. 230–2.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ For insightful discussions of this point, see Blight and Welch, On the Brink, ch. 6; Lebow, Richard Ned, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 98 (Fall 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁰ It appears that Cuba was unaware until 1963 of the implicit agreement between the Soviet Union and United States over removal of the Jupiters in Turkey. See Szulc, , Fidel, pp. 586–7.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Verde Olivo, 11 11 1962, p. 14Google Scholar; Bernstein, , ‘Trading the Jupiters in Turkey’, pp. 116–17.Google Scholar

¹¹² LeoGrande, , ‘Uneasy Allies’, p. 31.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Kennedy, , Thirteen Days, pp. 124, 127–8.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ On the awareness of Cuba's fears, see Paterson, , ‘Fixation with Cuba’, p. 141.Google Scholar On the discussion about Turkish missiles, see: Bernstein, , ‘Trading the Jupiters in Turkey’, pp. 104–11Google Scholar; ‘October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm’. Notably, the ExComm was sensitive to Turkish and NATO concerns about a withdrawal of missiles without consultation, but US officials did not extrapolate this sensitivity to the parallel circumstance of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

¹¹⁵ This view of Cuba was most evident in President Kennedy's 22 October address to the nation, in which he said: ‘Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba…Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbours in the Americas…’ See ‘Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962’, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy 1962, p. 809. An alternative explanation, of course, is that the Kennedy Administration did not want to abandon its hope of destroying the Cuban revolution.

¹¹⁶ For a good discussion of these see Nathan, James A., ‘The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now’, World Politics, 01 1975, pp. 272–6.Google Scholar Also see Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, pp. 93–111.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Bonsai, P., Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 187Google Scholar; Blasier, C., The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1983), pp. 104–7Google Scholar; Garthoff, , Reflections (1989), p. 138Google Scholar; Matthews, , Fidel Castro, p. 199Google Scholar; Szulc, , Fidel, pp. 585–6.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Duncan, W. R., The Soviet Union and Cuba (New York, 1985), p. 44.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ ‘Balance del Primer Encuentro con La Realidad Soviética’, pp. 92, 93.

¹²⁰ Duncan, , The Soviet Union and Cuba, p. 43.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Garthoff, Quoted in, Reflection (1989), p. 23.Google Scholar Also see, Nathan, , ‘The Missile Crisis’, pp. 279–80.Google Scholar

¹²² Erisman, , Cuba's International Relations, p. 18.Google Scholar

¹²³ Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 839.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Assassination Report, pp. 170–7. Also see Schlesinger, , Robert Kennedy, pp. 590–602Google Scholar; Paterson, , ‘Fixation with Cuba’, pp. 152–3.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Revolución, 16 01 1963, p. 9.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 841.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ For example, see Cline, Ray S., ‘Commentary: The Cuban Missile Crisis’, Foreign Affairs (Fall 1989).Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Blight, and Welch, , On the Brink, p. 281.Google Scholar Also see Bobrow, Davis B., ‘Stories Remembered and Forgotten’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 2 (06 1989), pp. 197–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹²⁹ Bobrow, , ‘Stories Remembered and Forgotten’, p. 203.Google Scholar