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On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack

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  • First Online: 20 December 2001
  • pp 199–211
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Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2001)
On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack
  • Pascal Junod6 

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2259))

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  • International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
  • 1780 Accesses

  • 49 Citations

  • 3 Altmetric

Abstract

Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES at this time. Given 243 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Matsui expected a complexity of less than 243 DES evaluations in 85 % of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded by 241 DES evaluations in 85 % of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than 239 DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Security and Cryptography Laboratory, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Pascal Junod

Authors
  1. Pascal Junod
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. EPFL, LASEC, 1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Serge Vaudenay

  2. University of Waterloo, CACR, Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Ontario, Canada

    Amr M. Youssef

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Junod, P. (2001). On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack. In: Vaudenay, S., Youssef, A.M. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2259. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45537-X_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45537-X_16

  • Published: 20 December 2001

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43066-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45537-0

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Keywords

  • linear cryptanalysis
  • DES

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